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Abstract
This thesis contains three chapters, each concerning the social welfare effects of fiscal policy.
The first chapter examines the changes to government spending and tax rates that achieve
a potentially substantial reduction in government debt at least cost to social welfare. The
consequences of altering the speed of debt reduction are also examined. The second chapter
considers how differences in monetary policy regime and stance may alter the optimal mix of
spending and tax rate changes for government debt reduction. These two chapters make use of
the representative agent theoretical framework. By contrast, the third chapter uses a framework
of heterogeneous agents, in which there is a non-trivial distribution of wealth and income. The
framework includes both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. The third chapter characterises
a constrained efficient outcome in this framework. This outcome is treated as a welfare
benchmark. The competitive equilibrium outcome is compared to this benchmark and shown
to be constrained inefficient in certain circumstances. The sign and magnitude of constrained
inefficiency in competitive equilibrium depends critically on the way in which aggregate shocks
affect the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks. The extent of wealth inequality is also an important
determining factor. Competitive equilibria under different fiscal policies are then considered as
potential welfare improvements.
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Introduction
This thesis contains three chapters, each concerning the social welfare effects of fiscal policy.
The first chapter investigates what mix of government spending and tax rate changes finances a
desired reduction in outstanding government debt at least cost to social welfare. The appropriate
speed for debt reduction is also considered. These questions are investigated theoretically in a
deterministic, neoclassical model with public and private capital. Government spending takes
the form of investment in a productive public capital stock. The government solves a Ramsey
(optimal fiscal policy) problem and chooses government spending and tax rates on private capital
and wage income to engineer an exogenous downward path for the level of real government debt.
The problem is solved for different exogenous downward paths for debt, each reflecting a different
speed of debt reduction. Solutions are obtained using numerical methods, with parameters set
in accordance with empirical studies. In a model with public capital but without private capital,
a reduction in the level of government debt is optimally financed by lowering public spending.
Labour tax rates are lowered as debt is retired. Increasing the speed of government debt reduction
implies relatively lower spending and higher tax rates while debt is being paid down, leading to
lower consumption. However, these fiscal policy measures can be reversed earlier because debt
is paid down faster. Consumption also recovers faster. In a model with both private and public
capital, the Ramsey planner prefers to finance debt reduction by sustained taxation of private
capital income. The post tax rate of return on private capital falls. The real market interest rate on
government bonds is also relatively low, because of a no arbitrage condition. This reduces the real
burden of government interest payments on debt. Public spending is left relatively unaltered and
labour income taxes are initially low. Faster debt reduction requires higher tax rates on private
capital income, accompanied by lower real interest rates on government debt.
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The second chapter considers how differences in monetary policy regime (and the stance of
policy) can change the optimal combination of government spending changes and tax rate changes
that achieve a given path for government debt reduction over a given timeframe. This question is
addressed by solving a Ramsey problem in a theoretical model with monetary policy. The Ramsey
planner chooses a path for productive government spending and distortionary labour income tax
rates in order to achieve an exogenous downward path for the level of real government debt. I
consider two monetary policy regimes. First, I allow the Ramsey planner to determine monetary
policy optimally. Second, I constrain the Ramsey planner to have to choose a nominal interest
rate consistent with an interest rate feedback rule, similar to those used to describe the behaviour
of inflation targeting central banks. In both settings, I present the deterministic transition path
of the economy as the government engineers a reduction in real government debt of between
approximately five and ten percentage points of GDP. I find that the government chooses to
finance some of the required debt reduction by lowering government spending (public investment).
Distortionary tax rates are reduced as spending falls and debt is lowered. The real interest rate is
generally higher when monetary policy is set in accordance with an interest rate feedback rule,
compared with when monetary policy is chosen optimally by the government. Higher real interest
rates increase the real value of debt repayments that the government must make. Reducing debt
when monetary policy follows the rule requires higher tax rates and leads to lower levels of real
consumption.
In the third chapter, the theoretical assumption that there is a representative consumer is
relaxed. This chapter studies the constrained efficiency of saving / private capital accumulation in
a model with incomplete markets for both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. Understanding the
efficiency (i.e. welfare properties) of competitive equilibria in a heterogeneous agent framework
is important for designing fiscal policy that improves welfare. Constrained inefficiency arises
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because of the pecuniary externality of saving on factor prices, something that is not taken into
account in individual consumer decisions. This chapter shows that the sign and magnitude of
constrained inefficiency depends critically on the interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk. That is, on how aggregate shocks change the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock,
conditional on the aggregate shock realisation. For certain levels of wealth inequality, there can be
constrained inefficiency due to under saving if bad (good) aggregate shocks make the realisation of
bad (good) idiosyncratic employment shocks more likely, as may happen in recessions and booms.
The aggregate shock realisation changes the skewness of the idiosyncratic shock’s conditional
distribution in this case. By contrast, there can be constrained inefficiency due to over saving if a
bad (good) aggregate shock makes bad idiosyncratic employment shocks potentially more (less)
severe, in the sense that the idiosyncratic shock has a larger (smaller) conditional variance. In both
these examples, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock can be approximately the
same as in the case where aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are fully independent. This shows
the importance of studying efficiency in the presence of both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk,
rather than only considering the latter. The sign and magnitude of constrained inefficiency also
depends on the degree of wealth inequality. A tax / subsidy on the return to saving can induce
different saving behaviour that improves efficiency, if accompanied by lump sum subsidies / taxes
that balance the government budget but do not redistribute income. Re-distribution by fiscal
transfers to consumers that are asset poor can be itself welfare improving. This can justify positive
taxation on the rate of return to capital, even if saving / capital accumulation is inefficiently low
(i.e. constrained inefficient) in a competitive equilibrium without fiscal policy.
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Chapter 1 The Speed and Composition of Optimal Fiscal Policy for Government Debt
Reduction
1.1 Introduction
A government seeking to engineer a reduction in its outstanding level of debt faces a number
of key questions. First, governments must decide what mix of government spending and tax rate
changes should be implemented in order to help finance government debt reduction. Presumably,
governments wish to choose the policy mix that achieves the debt reduction objective with the
minimum cost to the economy and society. Second, governments must choose a desired time
profile for government debt reduction: that is, by how much should government debt fall in each
period of time?
This chapter presents a theoretical investigation of these questions.
The approach of the chapter is first to take a particular downward path for the level of
government debt as given, and determine what mix of government spending and tax rate changes
should a benevolent government implement to achieve it? The theoretical framework used in the
chapter is that of a deterministic, neoclassical model. There are publicly owned and privately
owned capital stocks. Government spending takes the form of investment in the productive
public capital stock. The government can raise revenue by levying distortionary taxes on income
from private capital and from labour income, but does not have access to lump sum taxation.
The government solves a Ramsey optimal policy problem, choosing a sequence of government
spending and tax rates to maximise consumer welfare, subject to the requirement that the chosen
sequence gives rise to a competitive equilibrium and provided the desired downward path for the
level of government debt is achieved. It is assumed that the government can fully commit to an
announced sequence of government spending and tax rates, that is referred to as a fiscal policy. It
should be noted that there is no long run or steady state economic growth in the model.
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The speed of debt reduction is considered by studying different downward paths for the level of
government debt. Each downward path is specified exogenously and the Ramsey planner chooses
a fiscal policy to achieve it. The paths are of the same length and involve reducing real government
debt by the same amount. However, they differ as to the timing of debt reduction. Paths reflecting
a relatively fast pace of debt reduction require more of the desired debt reduction to occur sooner.
A numerical simulation is then presented, using parameter values chosen to reflect the results
of empirical studies. Specifically, what is shown is the deterministic transition path of the
economy from a steady state in which the level of government debt is relatively high to one in
which government debt is relatively low. Government debt falls as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) over the transition path. Along this transition path, government spending and tax
rates are set at Ramsey optimal levels, subject to being consistent with a particular, exogenous
downward path for the level of government debt from its initial condition to its target level in
the new steady state. The deterministic transition path is solved for by simultaneously solving
a system of equations describing the behaviour of the economy under optimally chosen fiscal
policy, over a fixed time horizon. The values of government debt and other variables are initialised
at their values in the steady state with a relatively high level of government debt. The values of
these variables in the steady state with a relatively low level of government debt are imposed as
terminal conditions in the final period of the transition path. The level of government debt follows
a particular, exogenous downward path over the transition, reaching its target level at or before the
end of the chosen time horizon. This numerical simulation is performed for different exogenous
downward paths of government debt, reflecting different speeds of debt reduction. The results
for optimal fiscal policy over the transition path can be compared for different speeds of debt
reduction.
First, I consider a relatively slow pace of debt reduction, such that government debt falls
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from 60 per cent of GDP to 45 per cent of GDP in approximately ten years. In a model with
only public capital (and without physical capital), the Ramsey planner finances debt reduction
by setting public spending (i.e. public investment) sufficiently low such that the public capital
stock is eroded over time. The tax rate on labour income is relatively high in the early periods
of the transition path. This lowers the post tax wage and consumption declines. The labour tax
rate is then lowered as the level of government debt approaches its new, lower target level. I
compare these results with the choices of the Ramsey planner under a different exogenous path for
government debt - one which involves a faster pace of debt reduction, in the sense that more of the
desired debt reduction occurs sooner. In the early periods of the transition, government spending
(i.e. public investment) is now lower and the labour tax rate is higher. Consumer income and the
level of real consumption are both lower because of this. However, the position changes further
along the transition path. Government debt nears its new, lower target level sooner. This allows
labour tax rates to be reduced sooner and government spending to be increased. The after-tax
wage and consumption recover faster. It seems that a faster pace of debt reduction requires more
painful austerity in the short run (in terms of lower consumption), but that the costs of austerity
are of shorter duration.
Next, I consider the full model with both private and public capital. This allows the government
the ability to tax income from investment in private capital. The Ramsey planner chooses a
positive tax rate on private capital income over much of the transition path. This reduces the
post-tax rental rate of return on private capital investment. The real market interest rate on
government bonds is also relatively low, reflecting a no arbitrage condition. This reduces the real
value of interest payments on government debt. The planner principally uses revenue from private
capital income taxation to finance debt reduction, something made easier by lower real interest
rates on government bonds. The reduction in the post-tax rental rate of return on capital leads to
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lower private investment, eroding the private capital stock. Compared with the model with only
public capital, government spending (i.e. public investment) is left relatively unaltered and the
public capital stock relatively unaffected. Tax rates on labour income are also lower for much of
the transition path.
A faster exogenous pace of debt reduction prompts the Ramsey planner to set both capital and
labour income tax rates higher in the early periods of the transition. The higher capital income tax
rate forces the rental rate on capital and the real interest rate on government bonds even lower.
However, debt is paid down to be near its new target level more quickly, so the tax increases can
be unwound sooner than if debt was reduced more slowly. This implies a faster recovery in the
post-tax rental rate on capital, boosting private investment. The result is that the private capital
stock does not fall for as long or by as much as when debt is reduced more slowly. Consumption
is also higher than it otherwise would be, further along the transition path.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section (1.2) describes the deterministic,
neoclassical model that is the theoretical setting for the chapter. The Ramsey problem is
formulated and the conditions characterising the economy’s behaviour under Ramsey optimal
fiscal policy are obtained. Section (1.3) presents the numerical simulation exercise, providing the
deterministic transition path for the economy under Ramsey optimal fiscal policy, from an initial
steady state with a relatively high level of government debt to one with a relatively low level of
government debt. Section (1.4) concludes.
1.2 The Model
The optimal fiscal policy problem in this chapter is solved in the theoretical setting of a
neoclassical model in discrete time indexed by t = f0; 1; 2; :::g. The model is deterministic, so
that there is no uncertainty and agents have perfect foresight. I abstract from uncertainty because it
is not the aim of the chapter to study the response of the economy to shocks in the neighbourhood
of a particular steady state. Rather, the aim of the chapter is to study how optimal fiscal policy
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engineers the economy’s transition from a steady state with a relatively high level of government
debt to one with a relatively low level of government debt. Adding uncertainty to the model would
not add anything essential to performing this exercise. There are three types of agent in the model:
consumers, perfectly competitive firms and a benevolent government.
1.2.1 The Production Technology
The deterministic, neoclassical model has a single sector - that is, a single production
technology. This technology is used to produce a homogeneous good that can be used for
consumption, or investment in the private and public capital stocks. The number of units of the
homogeneous good Yt that can be produced each period is given by
Yt = F (Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) (1.1)
where F is a function F : R3+  ! R+ in three inputs: the public capital stock Gt 1 owned
by the government that is predetermined each period, the privately owned capital stock Kt 1 that
is also predetermined and labour supply ht. The function F is continuously differentiable in its
arguments (i.e. each of the first order partial derivatives exist and is continuous) and also strictly
increasing in its arguments, so that
FG(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) > 0 (1.2)
FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) > 0
Fh(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) > 0
It is further the case that
Yt = F (0; Kt 1; ht) = 0 (1.3)
Yt = F (Gt 1; 0; ht) = 0
Yt = F (Gt 1; Kt 1; 0) = 0
The function F is strictly quasi-concave. The production technology each period also satisfies
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the following Inada conditions:
lim
K!1
FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) = 0 (1.4)
lim
G!1
FG(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) = 0
lim
K!0
FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) = 1
lim
G!0
FG(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) = 1
It is assumed that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in private inputs.
Private capital and labour are private inputs because they are owned by private agents and not
the government, as defined in section (1.2.2). I make this assumption for analytical convenience
because it implies that perfectly competitive firms earn zero profits in competitive equilibrium.
There are increasing returns to scale across all three inputs.1 However, note that only the public
and private capital stocks constitute reproducible inputs, since the endowment of available hours
in the economy is fixed and constant: see section (1.2.2). There will be decreasing returns to scale
in reproducible inputs, a necessary condition for a zero growth steady state.
1.2.2 Consumers
The endowment of available hours in the economy each period is normalised to one. Markets
are complete, so it is possible to treat the economy as if there is a single representative consumer
with an endowment of time or hours each period equal to one, with 0  ht  1. The consumer
accumulates and owns a stock of private capital Kst 1; which is rented to firms for use in
production. The representative consumer owns all shares in firms. Each period, the representative
agent consumes an amount of the consumption good ct; supplies an amount of labour hours
hst and saves in the form of both investment in its private capital stock iKt and demand for one
1 The assumption of increasing returns to scale across all three inputs implies that the public capital stock is a stock of
pure public goods, to which all firms have costless and unrestricted access. It is possible to relax the assumption that
the public capital stock is non-rival and allow for "congestion" of the public capital stock. One way to achieve this
would be to allow the ratio of the public to private capital stocks to enter the production function, rather than the level
of the public capital stock. I leave this for future research.
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period risk free government bonds bdt . In this model, the level of outstanding government debt
at the beginning of period t equals the level of government borrowing the previous period. This
is because of the assumption that government bonds reach maturity after one period. The terms
government debt and government borrowing may be used interchangeably for this reason.
The representative consumer’s problem is to choose in advance an infinite sequence
ct; h
s
t ; K
s
t ; b
d
t
	1
t=0
of consumption, hours worked, private investment (implicitly by choosing
next period private capital stock) and demand for government bonds to maximise the discounted
present value of future utility
1X
t=0
t [u(ct) + v(1  ht)] (1.5)
where  is the subjective discount factor 0 <  < 1. The period utility functions u : R+  ! R
and v : R+  ! R are assumed bounded above, continuously differentiable in each argument and
strictly increasing in each argument. The functions are assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. The
following Inada conditions hold:
lim
c!1
u0(c) = 0 (1.6)
lim
c!0
u0(c) = 1
lim
h!1
v0(1  h) = 1
The representative consumer’s maximisation problem is subject to the consumer’s budget
constraint each period
ct + p
b
tb
d
t +K
s
t   (1  K)Kst 1  (1  ht )wthst + (1  Kt 1)rtKst 1 + bdt 1 (1.7)
and also subject to the inequality constraint every period
0  hst  1 (1.8)
as well as the non-negativity constraints every period
ct  0 (1.9)
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bdt  0 (1.10)
Kst  0 (1.11)
plus the equation determining the accumulation of the private capital stock
Kst = i
K
t + (1  K)Kst 1 (1.12)
with initial conditions bd 1 and Ks 1.
The consumer takes as given all prices and tax rates each period: wt is the real wage, rt is the
rental rate paid to private capital leased by households to firms in period t, pbt is the time t price
of a risk-free government bond paying one unit the next period. Note that the tax rate Kt 1 on
private capital income received by consumers in period t is predetermined. I make this assumption
because fixing the initial tax rate K 1 is a convenient way of preventing the government from
using the taxation of private capital income at time zero as a form of lump sum, non-distortionary
taxation, confiscating all income from the pre-existing stock of private capital. Furthermore, the
assumption of a pre-determined capital income tax rate prevents the government from confiscating
all private capital income in the first period of the deterministic transition path from a steady state
with a relatively high level of government debt to a steady state with a low level of government
debt, as presented in section (1.3).
It turns out that the inequality constraint (1.8) and the non-negativity constraints (1.9), (1.10)
and (1.11) will never bind because of the assumptions made about the production technology
in subsection (1.2.1) and utility in subsection (1.2.2). The Inada conditions (1.6) show that
consumption must always be positive and that hours worked can never equal one. The assumption
in (1.2) that production is zero if any individual input is zero implies that labour supply and
the private capital stock must always be positive. Otherwise, there would be no output and
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non-positive consumption, which has been ruled out. However, it is important to note that private
investment iKt may be negative, allowing for disinvestment in the private capital stock. The
inequality constraint on demand for government bonds (1.10) will never bind in competitive
equilibrium because I will assume that government borrowing is exogenous, positive and on a
downward path, in all competitive equilibria. Similarly, although in principle consumers are
subject to an upper limit on government bond holdings to prevent the government running Ponzi
schemes, this will never bind in competitive equilibrium. The consumer budget constraint (1.7)
will hold with equality each period in equilibrium because it can never be optimal to leave
resources unspent, given that the marginal utility of consumption u0(c) > 0 for all c > 0.
Solving the representative consumer’s problem yields conditions that characterise optimising
behaviour by consumers each period:
v0(1  hst) = u0(ct)(1  ht )wt (1.13)
u0(ct) = 
u0(ct+1)
pbt
(1.14)
u0(ct) = u0(ct+1)

(1   kt )rt+1 + (1  K)
 (1.15)
as well as the limit on government bond holdings ruling out Ponzi schemes and the budget
constraint (1.7) each period. Please see Appendix (A.1) for further information on the derivations.
Equation (1.13) is an intratemporal optimality condition requiring that the marginal disutility of
an additional hour worked equal the marginal utility of the additional after-tax real income that
would be earned by this. Equation (1.14) is an Euler equation for government bonds, requiring
that the marginal disutility of foregoing current period consumption for saving equals the present
utility value of return on marginal additional saving next period. Finally, equation (1.15) is an
Euler equation for private capital investment, requiring that the marginal disutility of foregoing
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current period consumption for private investment equals the present utility value of the next
period marginal return on this investment, after tax. The combination of equations (1.14) and
(1.15) implies a no-arbitrage condition: namely that the present utility value of next period
marginal return on private capital investment and on government bond holdings (i.e. the two
forms of savings) must be equal.
1.2.3 Firms
It is possible to view the economy as containing a single, representative firm. This is because
there is only one type of good produced in the single sector economy and labour and private capital
can be viewed as being supplied by a single representative consumer, with public capital provided
by the government. The representative firm is assumed to behave in a perfectly competitive
fashion, taking the price of its output Yt as given each period. Further, the representative firm can
be treated as solving a static, profit maximisation problem each period. This is because the firm
does not make intertemporal decisions. Private capital services and labour services are rented from
the representative consumer each period, with public capital provision being the responsibility of
the government.
Normalising the price of output to one, the firm chooses labour demanded hdt , and private
capital services demanded Kdt 1 each period to maximise period profit
Yt   wthdt   rtKdt 1 (1.16)
subject to
Yt  F (Gt 1; Kdt 1; hdt ) (1.17)
Because the firm is perfectly competitive, it is assumed that the firm takes the wage wt and
the rental rate rt as given and does not take into account the effect of its choices of hdt and Kdt 1
on these factor prices when maximising profit. It can never be optimal for the firm not to use
rented inputs, so that (1.17) holds with equality and can be substituted into (1.16). The profit
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maximisation problem can be expressed as
max
Kt 1;ht
F (Gt 1; Kdt 1; h
d
t )  wthdt   rtKdt 1 (1.18)
The first order conditions of this simple unconstrained maximisation problem are sufficient to
characterise a unique maximum for two reasons. First, this is because the expression for period
profit in (1.18) is strictly quasi-concave, because it is a linear combination of the production
technology (1.1), which is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. Second, the opportunity set for
firms can be assumed to be convex. Available labour supply is necessarily bounded between zero
and one, as shown in (1.8), while the public and private capital stocks are necessarily bounded
below by zero. For convexity of the firm’s opportunity set each period, it must only then be
assumed that available public and private capital are bounded above by some arbitrary constants
The conditions describing firm optimality behaviour are thus
wt = Fh(Gt 1; Kdt 1; h
d
t ) (1.19)
rt = FK(Gt 1; Kdt 1; h
d
t ) (1.20)
These conditions (1.19) and (1.20) imply that labour and private capital are paid their marginal
products in equilibrium. Profit each period in equilibrium can be expressed as
F (Gt 1; Kdt 1; h
d
t )  Fh(Gt 1; Kdt 1; hdt )hdt   FK(Gt 1; Kdt 1; hdt )Kdt 1 (1.21)
In equilibrium, the profit of the representative, perfectly competitive firm is zero each period.
This follows from the assumption in subsection (1.2.1) that the production technology exhibits
constant returns to scale to the private inputs (labour hdt and private capital services Kdt 1) and is
thus homogeneous of degree one in the private inputs. By Euler’s Theorem, the expression for
period profit in (1.21) must equal zero.
1.2.4 The Government
The government spends by investing iGt each period in the public capital stock which becomes
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productive next period. In other words, the public capital stock is predetermined, so that the public
capital stock available at the beginning of a period t+ 1 evolves according to
Gt = i
G
t + (1  G)Gt 1 (1.22)
where G is the depreciation rate of public capital. The government levies a distortionary tax
ht on labour income each period and a tax Kt 1 on private capital income earned by consumers in
period t. This capital income tax is predetermined, so that the tax rate levied in period t + 1 is
chosen in time t. As explained in section (1.1), this feature prevents the government confiscating
all capital income from consumers in the initial period of the deterministic transition of the
economy under Ramsey optimal fiscal policy from a steady state with a high level of government
debt to one with a low level of government debt. This is because the predetermined tax rate
on capital income in this first period of the transition is the tax rate that prevailed in the initial
steady state. The government is assumed not to have access to lump sum taxation. Otherwise, the
Ramsey optimal fiscal policy would rely on non-distortionary lump sum taxation. The government
borrows by issuing one period risk free bonds, bt at price pbt , which require the government to pay
one unit of the consumption good the next period t+ 1. Each period the government must satisfy
its period budget constraint
Gt   (1  G)Gt 1 + bt 1  htwtht + Kt 1rtkt 1 + pbtbt (1.23)
1.2.5 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The economy must satisfy the aggregate resource constraint each period, which is given by
ct +Kt   (1  K)Kt 1 +Gt   (1  G)Gt 1  F (Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) (1.24)
This constraint will hold with equality in equilibrium because it can never be optimal to leave
resources unspent, given that the marginal utility of consumption u0(c) > 0 for all c > 0. It
has been shown in section (1.2.2) that the consumer’s period budget constraint must also always
hold with equality each period in equilibrium. Together, these two constraints imply that the
15
government period budget constraint (1.23) must hold with equality each period.
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1.2.6 Competitive Equilibrium
The statement of the competitive equilibrium will make use of the following definitions:
Definition 1 Given initial conditions b 1; K 1; G 1 and K 1, a Feasible Allocation is a sequence
fct; ht; Ktg1t=0 together with a Public Capital Stock Path fGtg1t=0 such that the aggregate resource
constraint (1.24) is satisfied with equality each period. A Tax Policy is a sequence of tax rates
ht ; 
K
t
	1
t=0
, while a Government Borrowing Path is a sequence fbtg1t=0. A Price Path is a
sequence

wt; rt; p
b
t
	1
t=0
It is now possible to define a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 2 A Competitive Equilibrium is a Feasible Allocation, a Tax Policy, a Government
Borrowing Path and a Price Path such that each period the consumer optimality conditions (1.13),(1.14)
and (1.15), the consumer budget constraint (1.7), the firm optimality conditions (1.19) and (1.20),
the government budget constraint (1.23) and the aggregate resource constraint (1.24) all hold.
Further, all markets clear each period and appropriate transversality conditions must hold.
Note that market clearing implies that the government bond market and the markets for the
supply of labour and private capital services each period all clear, so that
bst = b
d
t = bt (1.25)
hst = h
d
t = ht (1.26)
Kst = K
d
t = Kt (1.27)
The transversality conditions necessary for a competitive equilibrium are
lim
j!1
ju0(ct+j)

(1   kt+j 1)rt+j + (1  K)

Kt+j = 0 (1.28)
lim
j!1
j
u0(ct+j)
u0(ct)
bt+j = lim
j!1
 
j 1Y
s=0

pbt+s
!
bt+j = 0 (1.29)
Note that the bond price pbt is the reciprocal of the gross interest rate on government bonds. It
follows that (1.29) requires government debt to grow slower than the rate of interest in the limit,
so that a No Ponzi condition is satisfied. This statement of competitive equilibrium follows the
structure used by Farhi (2010).
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All competitive equilibria considered in this chapter will consider an exogenous Government
Borrowing Path of the form
bt   b = 
 
bt 1   b
 (1.30)
given an initial condition b 1, where b is an exogenously specified target level of government
borrowing. The parameter  determines the speed of debt reduction, where 0 <  < 1, in the
sense that a reduction in this parameter’s value requires more of the debt reduction from b 1 to
b to be achieved sooner. It is clear that the transversality condition on government bonds (1.29)
is satisfied in all these competitive equilibria, provided the interest rate on government bonds
is positive in the limit. Government debt is constant at level b in the limit, thus growing more
slowly than the rate of interest and satisfying a No Ponzi condition. This exogenous downward
path for government borrowing will be a constraint on the Ramsey planner in the following
Ramsey problem. The Ramsey problem can be solved for different Government Borrowing Paths
reflecting different speeds of debt reduction.
1.2.7 The Ramsey Problem
I define the optimal policy problem formally.
Definition 3 Given initial conditions b 1; K 1; G 1 and K 1, the Ramsey Problem is to choose
a Feasible Allocation, a Tax Policy, and a Price Path to maximise consumer welfare (as defined by
equation (1.5)) subject to all the requirements in the definition of a competitive equilibrium being
satisfied, with the Government Borrowing Path equal to the exogenous, downward path specified
in equation (1.30).
Effectively, the Ramsey planner (i.e. the benevolent government) maximises over the set of
competitive equilibria, so that the chosen optimal fiscal policy - Public Capital Stock Path and Tax
Policy - give rise to a competitive equilibrium. In order now to state the problem mathematically,
some endogenous variables are eliminated from the competitive equilibrium conditions which
constrain the Ramsey planner. First, the consumer optimality conditions (1.14) and (1.13) are
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used to isolate the period t price of government bonds pbt and the labour income tax rate ht
pbt = 
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
(1.31)
ht = 1 
v0(1  ht)
u0(ct)wt
(1.32)
Equations (1.31) and (1.32) are used to eliminate the bond price pbt and the labour income
tax rate from the consumer period budget constraint (1.7), while the firm optimality conditions
(1.19) and (1.20) are used to eliminate the wage wt and the rental rate on private capital rt. The
consumer period budget constraint becomes
ct + 
u0(ct+1)
u0(ct)
bt +Kt   (1  K)Kt 1 (1.33)
=
v0(1  ht)
u0(ct)
ht + (1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)Kt 1 + bt 1
Equation (1.7) is now rearranged to isolate the forward looking term u0(ct+1)
ctu
0(ct)
bt
+ u0(ct+1) +
u0(ct)
bt
(Kt   (1  K)Kt 1) (1.34)
=
v0(1  ht)
bt
ht +
u0(ct)(1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)Kt 1
bt
+
u0(ct)bt 1
bt
I call this equation an Implementability Condition deriving from the consumer period budget
constraint.
Further, the firm optimality condition (1.20) is used to eliminate the rental rate on private
capital from the Euler equation for private capital (1.15)
u0(ct) = u0(ct+1)

(1   kt )FK(Gt; Kt; ht+1) + (1  K)
 (1.35)
This is also an Implementability Condition deriving from the Euler equation for private capital.
Mathematically, the Ramsey problem is then for the Ramsey planner (i.e. benevolent
government ) to choose an infinite sequence ct; ht; Kt; Gt; Kt 	1t=0 to maximise consumer
welfare (1.5)
1X
t=0
t [u(ct) + v(1  ht)]
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subject to the two Implementability Conditions (1.34) and (1.35)
ctu
0(ct)
bt
+ u0(ct+1) +
u0(ct)
bt
(Kt   (1  K)Kt 1)
=
v0(1  ht)
bt
ht +
u0(ct)(1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)Kt 1
bt
+
u0(ct)bt 1
bt
u0(ct) = u0(ct+1)

(1   kt )FK(Gt; Kt; ht+1) + (1  K)

and subject to the aggregate resource constraint (1.24)
ct +Kt   (1  K)Kt 1 +Gt   (1  G)Gt 1 = F (Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)
plus the exogenous downward process for government borrowing (1.30)
bt   b = 
 
bt 1   b

given initial conditions b 1; K 1; G 1 and K 1. The government budget constraint need
not be stated as a constraint because it must hold with equality if both the consumer budget
constraint (1.7) (which can be recovered from the Implementability Condition (1.34)) and the
aggregate resource constraint (1.24) hold with equality every period. I call an infinite sequence
ct; ht; Kt; Gt; 
K
t
	1
t=0
that solves the Ramsey problem as stated above a Ramsey Optimal Plan
or Ramsey Economy.
It is important to note that the opportunity set or feasible set of competitive equilibria defined
by (1.34), (1.35), (1.24) and (1.30) over which the Ramsey planner maximises may not be
convex. In such a case, the first order conditions of the Ramsey problem may not be sufficient
to characterise a unique Ramsey economy. However, in the numerical simulations I present in
section (1.3), the Ramsey plan presented is unique.
1.2.8 A Recursive Formulation to Solve the Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem as defined in section (1.2.7) is not recursive. Supposing that the Ramsey
planner makes decisions sequentially, a recursive problem in a deterministic setting is one where
the decision facing a Ramsey planner is the same each period. The decision problem is the
20
same each period given the beginning of period value of state variables. These state variables
encapsulate the effects of the initial conditions on the problem as well as the effects of all
decisions made in periods prior to current time t. When the problem in a deterministic setting is
recursive, the sequence of variables chosen sequentially each period by the Ramsey planner will
be the same as the sequence chosen if all decisions (i.e. the entire infinite sequence) are made in
the initial period. I have not yet defined state variables for the Ramsey problem in section (1.2.7).
Recursive formulations are useful when seeking to apply numerical solution techniques to the
model, although a recursive formulation is not strictly necessary to solve for the deterministic
transition path that I present in section (1.3).
In the Ramsey problem defined in section (1.2.7), the Ramsey planner is constrained at each
time t by conditions which contain forward looking terms (i.e. dated at time t + 1). Specifically,
the Implementability Condition derived from the consumer period budget constraint (1.34)
contains the term u0(ct+1), while the Implementability Condition derived from the Euler equation
for private capital (1.35) contains the terms
u0(ct+1)

(1   kt )FK(Gt; Kt; ht+1) + (1  K)

The presence of these forward looking terms among the time t constraints on the Ramsey planner
implies that decisions made by the Ramsey planner in future periods limit the choices available
to the Ramsey planner at time t. In other words, decisions taken today constrain the Ramsey
planner’s choices in previous periods. However, there is no mechanism in the Ramsey problem as
it is defined in Section (1.2.7) that allows the Ramsey planner to take into account the effect of a
decision taken at time t on the set of feasible choices available to the Ramsey planner in previous
periods. Making decisions sequentially given the state variables will not be the same as if the
Ramsey planner made all choices in the initial period, taking into account the effect that choices
at time t have on the set of feasible choices in previous periods. Because of this, decisions made
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sequentially under the current formulation of the Ramsey problem may not be optimal. For more
information, please see Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Kydland and Prescott (1980).
In order to obtain a recursive formulation of the Ramsey problem, I proceed by defining the
following modified problem at time t. Given values for predetermined variables bt 1; Kt 1; Gt 1
and Kt 1
max
fct+j ;ht+j ;Kt+j ;Gt+j ;Kt+jg1j=0
1X
j=0
(t [u(ct+j) + v(1  ht+j)])
 1 [u0(ct)]  2

u0(ct)

(1   kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) + (1  K)
 (1.36)
subject to the constraints on the Ramsey problem for all periods from t onwards. These include
the two Implementability Conditions (1.34) and (1.35)
ct+ju
0(ct+j)
bt+j
+ u(ct+1+j) +
u0(ct+j)
bt+j
(Kt+j   (1  K)Kt+j 1)
=
v0(1  ht+j)
bt+j
ht+j
+
u0(ct+j)(1  Kt+j 1)FK(Gt+j 1; Kt+j 1; ht+j)Kt+j 1
bt+j
+
u0(ct+j)bt+j 1
bt+j
u0(ct+j) = u0(ct+j+1)

(1   kt+j)FK(Gt+j; Kt+j; ht+j+1) + (1  K)

and subject to the aggregate resource constraint (1.24)
ct+j +Kt+j   (1  K)Kt+j 1 +Gt+j   (1  G)Gt+j 1 = F (Gt+j 1; Kt+j 1; ht+j)
and the exogenous downward process for government borrowing (1.30)
bt+j   b = 
 
bt+j 1   b

The difference between this problem and the one defined in section (1.2.7) is that I have added
the forward looking components of the Implementability Conditions (1.34) and (1.35) from time
t  1 to the objective function of the Ramsey planner, weighted by 1 and 2. This formulation of
the problem can be solved every period t: In order to obtain a recursive formulation, it is necessary
that the planner commits to update the weights 1 and 2 when solving the modified problem in
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period t with the values of the Lagrange multipliers attached to the time t   1 Implementability
Conditions (1.34) and (1.35) from the modified problem solved the previous period, at time t  1.
By committing to update the weights 1 and 2 in this way each period, the planner commits to
take into account the effect of decisions at time t on the feasible choices available to the Ramsey
planner in previous periods. This sequence of modified optimisation problems defines a recursive
formulation for the Ramsey problem. The state variables each period t are the predetermined
values b 1; K 1; G 1 and K 1 and the values of the Lagrange multipliers attached to the time
t  1 Implementability Conditions in the modified problem solved at time t  1. Given the values
of these state variables, the modified problem is the same each period. The key feature allowing
for this recursive formulation is the augmenting of the number of state variables with the Lagrange
multipliers described, as pointed out by Kydland and Prescott (1980), Marcet and Marimon (2011)
and Kumhof and Yakadina (2007). The solution to this sequence of modified problems can be
obtained by solving a single problem using the method of Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian
for this problem is:
max
fct;ht;Kt;Gt;Kt g1t=0
L =
1X
t=0
t (1.37)8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
u(ct) + v(1  ht)  Et 1u0(ct) 
Kt 1u
0(ct)

(1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) + (1  K)

+
Kt u
0(ct)  Et
h
u0(ct)ct
bt
+ u
0(ct)
bt
(Kt   (1  K)Kt 1)
i
+Et
h
v0(1 ht)ht
bt
+
(1 Kt 1)FK(Gt 1;Kt 1;ht)Kt 1u0(ct)
bt
+ u
0(ct)bt 1
bt
i
+At

F (Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)  ct  Kt
+(1  K)Kt 1  Gt + (1  G)Gt 1

9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
where Et and Kt are the Lagrange multipliers at time t attached to the Implementability
Conditions (1.34) and (1.35) derived from the consumer budget constraint and Euler equation for
private capital respectively. The Lagrange multiplier At is attached to the aggregate resource
constraint at time t.
The necessary conditions for a unique solution to the Ramsey problem, or in other words,
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necessary conditions for a Ramsey Economy are given by the equations determining when the first
order partial derivatives of the Lagrangian (1.37) vanish each period, together with the constraints
on the Ramsey planner each period. These constraints include the exogenous downward path for
government borrowing (1.30). The conditions characterising the Ramsey economy also include
the transversality conditions for private capital (1.28) and government bond holdings (1.29). An
additional transversality condition required to characterise the Ramsey economy is one for public
capital, since it cannot be optimal to leave public capital positive as time tends to infinity:
lim
j!1
ju0(ct+j)Gt+j = 0 (1.38)
From the sequence

ct; ht; Kt; Gt; 
K
t ; 
E
t ; 
K
t ; 
A
t
	1
t=0
of endogenous variables and sequence of
government borrowing fbtg1t=0 satisfying these conditions it is then possible to recover a sequence
pbt ; wt; rt; 
h
t
	1
t=0
for the price of government bonds, the rental rate on private capital, the wage
and the labour income tax rate, using the competitive equilibrium conditions (1.31), (1.19),
(1.20) and (1.32). The conditions characterising a Ramsey Economy and their full derivation are
presented in Appendix (A.3).
1.3 The Deterministic Transition Path Of The Ramsey Economy
In this section, I use numerical methods to compute the deterministic transition path of the
Ramsey Economy from a steady state with a relatively high level of government debt to one with
a relatively low level of government debt. Over the transition path, the level of debt falls as a
percentage of GDP. This exercise captures the behaviour of the economy under Ramsey optimal
fiscal policy, as the government engineers a potentially large reduction in the level of government
debt, following an exogenous path for the level of real government debt. This exercise can be
repeated for different exogenous paths for the level of government debt, each reflecting a different
speed of debt reduction. By contrast, studying how the economy behaves in response to small
shocks in the neighbourhood of a particular steady state seems unlikely to capture how large
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reductions in government debt are achieved.
This section of the chapter is divided as follows. First, I choose specific functional forms for
period utility and for the production technology in section (1.3.1). Second, values are assigned
to the parameters of the model in section (1.3.2). In section (1.3.3), I explain how the Ramsey
Economy’s deterministic transition path between steady states is computed using numerical
methods. Fourth, I present the transition path between steady states of relatively high government
debt and relatively low government debt in a model with public capital but without private capital:
see section (1.3.4). Finally, I present the transition path in a model with both private and public
capital. In both settings, I consider different speeds of government debt reduction. I also discuss
the robustness of my results to different choices for parameter values.
It should be noted at this point that Lansing (1998) considers optimal fiscal policy in a model
with public and private capital stocks. However, my work differs from Lansing (1998) in a
number of key respects. First, the focus of Lansing’s (1998) paper is not on government debt
reduction and government borrowing is endogenous in that paper. Further, Lansing (1998) solves
for policy functions giving the endogenous variables as functions of state variables, exogenous
variables and shocks, by taking approximations of the model’s equilibrium equations around a
steady state. Lansing (1998) uses these policy functions to characterise the model’s behaviour in
the neighbourhood of the steady state in response to shocks. By contrast, I solve for the model’s
transition path between steady states, without recourse to local approximation methods. Guo and
Lansing (1997) is a similar paper to Lansing (1998).
1.3.1 Specific Functional Forms
For the purposes of computing the deterministic transition path of the Ramsey Economy
between steady states, I assume that period utility takes the form
u(c) + v(1  h) = ln(c) + { ln(1  ht) (1.39)
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This implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is one. The
parameter { affects the consumer labour supply choice and its value will influence the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage (for a given marginal utility of
consumption). I discuss the choice of the value for { in section (1.3.2).
The production technology each period is assumed to take the multiplicative form
F (G 1; K 1; h) = G 1K

 1h
1  (1.40)
where 0 <  < 1 and  > 0. The parameter  governs the elasticity of output with respect to
public capital. Consistent with the general functional form outlined in section (1.2.1), this specific
functional form exhibits constant returns to scale in the private inputs: private capital K 1 and
labour h. Again, I discuss the specific values chosen for these parameters in section (1.3.2).
1.3.2 Choice of Parameter Values
The benchmark choices for the model’s parameters are displayed in the following table:
Table 1.3.2
Benchmark Parameter Values
 0.05
 0.36
 0.99
G 0.02
K 0.02
{ 3
 0.95
The most controversial choice is that for the parameter  determining the elasticity of
output with respect to public capital. There is a literature computing empirical estimates
for this parameter. Unfortunately, the range of parameter estimates in this literature is quite
wide. However, recent surveys of this literature such as Bom and Ligthart (2013) attempt to
systematically reconcile the various estimates by understanding the differences in methodological
approach taken in different papers. Bom and Ligthart (2013) find that values are most commonly
in the narrower range of 0.05-0.1. Estimates nearer or over 0.1 are found when the measurement
of public capital is restricted to infrastructure such as roads and ports. Lower estimates closer to
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0.05 are found when the measurement of public capital is expanded to cover infrastructure such as
schools and hospitals. Papers presenting real business cycle type models with public capital such
as the recent paper of Leeper and Yang (2010) use the conservative value 0.05 for the parameter
determining the elasticity of output to public capital, when solving models numerically. The well
known paper of Baxter and King (1993) also uses the value 0.05. Following Leeper and Yang
(2010) and Baxter and King (1993), I choose the conservative value 0.05 for  as the benchmark.
However, I will consider the robustness of my results to a higher value.
The parameter { is set to three. This implies that the Frisch elasticity of labour supply with
respect to the real wage (given constant marginal utility of consumption) is around 3.5 in the
steady states that I consider.2 Values of 3-4 for the Frisch elasticity of labour supply have been
used before in the theoretical macroeconomics literature: see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
and Kumhof and Yakadina (2007). It should be noted that there are micro-level estimates of the
Frisch elasticity that are much lower: see Chetty and Weber (2011) and Peterman (2012). I test the
robustness of my results by solving for the deterministic transition path of the Ramsey Economy
using the lower value of two for the Frisch elasticity.
The value 0.95 is chosen as a benchmark for the parameter determining the rate at which the
level of government borrowing must fall over the transition path. The autoregressive nature of the
equation determining the downward path for government borrowing implies that the reduction
in government borrowing is frontloaded: that is, the amount by which government borrowing is
reduced each period falls over time. The level of government borrowing asymptotes to its new
target value over the transition path. Nonetheless, the value 0.95 chosen for  produces a relatively
gradual reduction in the level of government borrowing (debt), compared with values closer to
2 The Frisch elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage (given constant marginal utility of consumption)
is given by @h@w
w
h
ju0(c)= 1 hh for the chosen specific functional form for utility. Setting { = 3 implies that hours
worked in the steady states I consider h will be approximately 0:25, giving a Frisch elasticity of around 3:5. This
approach of choosing Frisch elasticity of labour supply to match particular values of hours worked (implememted by
choosing {) follows Prescott (2003).
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zero. In my numerical simulation, government debt falls from 60 per cent to 45 per cent of GDP in
approximately ten years. I also solve for the deterministic transition path of the Ramsey Economy
setting  to be 0.75. This reflects a faster, frontloaded debt reduction path, with government debt
falling from 60 to 45 per cent of GDP in less than five years. It should be noted that the exogenous
downward paths for debt are the same length, under either value for  and the amount of debt
reduction that occurs is the same. Lower values of  imply that more of the desired debt reduction
occurs sooner.
I set the quarterly depreciation rate of public capital to be 2 per cent (corresponding to G of
0.02). This is at the high end of the range of estimates of quarterly public capital depreciation
rates in a recent International Monetary Fund study: see Serkan Arslanalp and Sze (2010). I set
the quarterly depreciation rate of private capital to the same value. This is within the range of
values for quarterly private capital depreciation rates used in the macroeconomics literature and is
close to the value of 2.5 per cent (corresponding to K of 0.025) that was used in the recent paper
of Leeper and Yang (2010), to solve numerically a model that also contained public capital.
The chosen values for the remaining parameters are standard in the macroeconomic theory
literature. The share of output paid to private capital  is set to 0.36, close to that in Leeper and
Yang (2010), which also features a production technology with public capital and constant returns
to private inputs. The subjective discount factor of consumers  is set to 0.99.
1.3.3 Solution Method
I present the deterministic transition path of the Ramsey Economy from a steady state with a
relatively high level of government debt to one with a relatively low level of government debt.
Over the transition path, government debt falls as a percentage of GDP. I undertake the following
steps to do this:
(1) I derive again the equations characterising the Ramsey Economy described in section (1.2.8),
this time using the specific functional forms chosen in section (1.3.1).
(2) The values of the model’s parameters are set to those described in section (1.3.2).
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(3) I solve for the steady state values of the endogenous variables
K;G; K
	
in a steady state where the exogenous target level of government borrowing is bhigh, which I
set to a value such that level of government debt to GDP is around 60 per cent in this steady
state.
(4) Initial conditions are required for b0, K0, G0, K0 , E0 and K0 . I set b0 = bhigh. The initial
conditions for the private capital stock K0, public capital stock G0 and predetermined capital
income tax rate K0 are set to their values in the steady state consistent with bhigh, as solved
for in the previous step. The remaining terms E0 and K0 are set to zero. These terms are the
multipliers attaching to the constraints (1.34) and (1.35) on the Ramsey problem that contain
forward looking terms. Marcet and Marimon (2011) explain that these multipliers E0 and
K0 must be zero initially because there are no previous policy commitments with which the
planner must be consistent.
(5) I simulate the transition path over T = 200 periods. In period one of the transition, the target
level of government borrowing jumps exogenously from bhigh to blow (bhigh > blow). The target
level remains at blow thereafter. The level of government borrowing must fall in the first period
of the transition path according to the equation (1.30) describing the exogenous downward
path for government borrowing. Thereafter, government borrowing bt asymptotes towards its
new target level blow over the transition path.
(6) There are eight equations for each of the T periods of the transition path, forming a large
system of simultaneous non-linear equations. In the final period T , I set the values of
the endogenous variables to their values in a steady state where the level of government
borrowing is blow. In this steady state, the level of government debt (as a percentage of GDP)
is around 40 per cent. This is a terminal condition and the chosen length of the transition
period T = 200 is sufficiently long such that the economy will be close to this new steady
state by the time period T is reached. I then solve this system of equations for the sequence
ct; ht; Kt; Gt; 
K
t ; 
E
t ; 
K
t ; 
A
t
	T 1
t=1
: The solution can be obtained by using a solver of
systems of simultaneous non-linear equations, such as that described in Juillard (1996) or
Reiter (2005).3
(7) Different lengths T for the transition path can be experimented with, to ensure that the choice
of T does not overly influence the results. In other words, the level of government borrowing
should have time to fall from bhigh to blow according to the exogenous path given by equation
(1.30) by the time T is reached, so that endogenous variables have had time to adjust. By the
time T is reached, endogenous variables should be close to their values in the new steady
state.
(8) This process can be repeated using different exogenous, downward paths for government debt
reflecting different speeds of government debt reduction. Again, these different paths are
all of the same length. A faster pace of debt reduction means that more of the desired debt
reduction occurs sooner. The speed of government debt reduction is altered by changing the
parameter  in (1.30).
3 The non-linear equation solver used to obtain the results presented in this chapter is that called by the "SIMUL"
command in DYNARE Version 4.3. I have also solved the model using an alternative non-linear equation solver
designed for systems with a very large number of equations. This alternative solver was developed by Michael Reiter
and I am most grateful to him for providing me with the necessary computer code.
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1.3.4 Government Debt Reduction In A Model Without Private Capital
I now consider the model with only public capital and abstract from private capital. First, I
present the transition path of the Ramsey economy using the benchmark choices for parameter
values, whereby government debt falls from 60 to 45 per cent of GDP in around ten years (NB:
In the model, one period is one quarter). I then compare the results with Ramsey optimal policy
under a faster, exogenous pace of debt reduction, so that more of the desired debt reduction is
achieved earlier. Third, I consider the robustness of my results to alternative choices for parameter
values.
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1.3.4.1 Public Capital Only: The Benchmark Case
In the early part of the transition path, the government finances a reduction in borrowing by
generating more revenue while keeping government spending relatively low. Spending in the form
of public investment is set sufficiently low such that the public capital stock is eroded, because
investment does not offset depreciation fully.
Figure 1.3.4.1 - Part One
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There is an increase in the rate of labour income taxation which causes government revenue to
rise: Figure (1.3.4.1) (Part Two). The real interest rate on government bonds is initially low. In
fact, it is negative for one period. This effectively constitutes taxation of consumers with holdings
of government bonds, the only asset that can be used to smooth consumption over time in the
absence of private capital. This low real interest rate reflects a high price for government bonds
(since the interest rate is the reciprocal of the bond price). The amount of government bonds
issued and available for consumers to use as savings instruments declines, hence the high bond
price.
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Figure 1.3.4.1 - Part Two
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The post tax wage is lower because of the higher tax rate on labour income and the lower
public capital stock:
(1   t)wt = (1   t)Gt 1 (1.41)
Because of this, labour supply and output fall in the early part of the transition: Figure (1.41).
Consumption also falls, reflecting lower income for consumers from labour and bond holdings.
The fall in consumption is consistent with the initially low real interest rate, as shown by the Euler
equation (1.14) (using the specific functional forms):
u0(ct)
u0(ct+1)
=
ct+1
ct
=

pbt
= Rt
where Rt is the real interest rate, the reciprocal of the bond price pbt .
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Figure 1.41
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The position changes further along the transition path. As government debt nears its new, lower
target value blow, the amount by which government borrowing must fall each period is lower,
according to the exogenous, frontloaded debt reduction path in (1.30). This allows the government
to lower the labour income tax rate and increase government spending (i.e. public investment).
The erosion of the public capital stock is somewhat reversed. The post tax wage rises, as do hours
worked and output. This allows consumption to recover.
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1.3.4.2 Public Capital Only: The Speed of Debt Reduction
I now compare the results in Subsection (1.3.4.1) with the deterministic transition path of the
Ramsey economy when the Ramsey planner engineers a faster reduction in government borrowing
from bhigh to blow. The deterministic transition path is the same length as above, but more of the
desired debt reduction must now occur sooner. Specifically, the parameter  governing the speed
of debt reduction in the exogenous process (1.30) is set to 0.75. Government debt now falls from
60 to 45 per cent of GDP in less than five years, rather than ten years in the model presented in
Subsection (1.3.4.1) above.
Forced to reduce debt faster, the Ramsey planner sets public investment lower initially. There
is actually disinvestment in public capital and the public capital stock declines by more than when
debt reduction occurred more gradually. There is a larger rise in the labour income tax rate and
also more taxation of bond holdings, in the form of an even lower, negative real interest rate:
Figure (1.3.4.2) (Part Two).
Figure 1.3.4.2 - Part One
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Legend: —  = 0:95 (slow);     = 0:75 (fast)
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Figure 1.3.4.2 - Part Two
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Legend: —  = 0:95 (slow);     = 0:75 (fast)
The initial decline in the post tax wage is sharper and deeper, as is the fall in consumer income
from bond holdings, which must be lower than they otherwise would be as the government
reduces debt faster. The result is a sharper and deeper fall in consumption: Figure (1.3.4.2) (Part
Three).
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Figure 1.3.4.2 - Part Three
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Legend: —  = 0:95 (slow);     = 0:75 (fast)
However, the faster pace of debt reduction means that debt nears its new, lower target level
blow sooner. This allows the labour income tax rate to be reduced faster than it would be if debt
reduction occurred more gradually: Figure (1.3.4.2) (Part One). Similarly, public investment
can rise more sharply and the public capital stock can be restored more quickly. This allows for
a faster recovery in the post tax wage and thus a faster recovery of hours worked and output.
Consumption also recovers faster.
Overall, it seems that a faster pace of debt reduction involves a greater short term cost (in terms
of consumption). However, these austerity costs are of shorter duration and consumption recovers
faster than if there was a slower pace of debt reduction.
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1.3.4.3 Public Capital Only: Robustness to Alternative Parameter Values
I consider the robustness of the results presented in Subsection (1.3.4.1) along two dimensions.
(1) I consider a more productive public capital stock. I alter the benchmark choice of parameter
values by setting , the elasticity of output to public capital, to 0.1, instead of 0.05. This is
at the higher end of estimates for this elasticity in the empirical papers surveyed by Bom
and Ligthart (2013). This should test whether a more productive public capital stock makes
government spending cuts too costly for output and consumption, so that the Ramsey planner
becomes reliant on tax rate increases to achieve debt reduction. The deterministic transition
path of the Ramsey economy under this alternative choice of parameter values is presented in
Appendix (A.4).
(2) I test robustness to a lower Frisch elasticity of labour supply. I do this by setting the parameter
 in the utility function to two, rather than three. This generates a steady state Frisch elasticity
of two, rather than over three. This tests whether more inelastic labour supply allows the
planner to rely on higher rates of income taxation to reduce debt, because the tax increases
will be less distortionary to labour supply and output in these circumstances. The results are
presented also in Appendix (A.4).
I find that the qualitative features of the results presented in Subsection (1.3.4.1) are largely
unchanged under these alternative choices for parameter values. Government debt reduction is
still financed by a combination of lower government spending (public investment) and higher
labour income tax rates.
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1.3.5 Government Debt Reduction: The Full Model with Private and Public Capital
I now present the transition path in the model with both private capital and public capital. In
this model, the government can tax income from investment in private capital, as well as labour
income. Again, government debt falls from 60 to 45 per cent of GDP over the transition path.
1.3.5.1 Private and Public Capital: The Benchmark Case
In a model with both private and public capital, it is taxation of private capital income and its
affect on the real interest rate on government bonds that are key to achieving the desired debt
reduction.
In the first period of the transition path, the capital income tax rate is fixed or predetermined
 k0 at its value in the steady state corresponding to government debt being approximately 60 per
cent of GDP. This prevents "surprise" taxation of pre-existing private capital in the first period.
Because of this, the government finances the reduction in government borrowing required in the
first period by setting government spending (i.e. public investment) at a relatively low level - there
is disinvestment in public capital: Figure (1.3.5.1) (Part One).
Figure 1.3.5.1 - Part One
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After the first period, the Ramsey planner is free to set the capital income tax rate. The planner
chooses to set a positive rate of capital income taxation over much of the transition path. This
causes government revenue to jump up in the second period. This is not "surprise" taxation of
pre-existing capital, since the positive capital income tax rate persists over the transition path. It
causes a fall in private capital investment and a protracted decline in the private capital stock:
Figure (1.3.5.1) (Part Two).
Figure 1.3.5.1 - Part Two
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The elevated tax rate on private capital income reduces the post tax rental rate of return on
private capital. The real interest rate on government bonds will be low also, reflecting a no
arbitrage condition obtained by combining the Euler equations (1.14) and (1.15) for government
bonds and private capital income:
u0(ct)
u0(ct+1)
=
1
pbt
= Rt = (1   kt )rt+1 + (1  k) (1.42)
using specific functional forms, where Rt is the real interest rate on government bonds and rt
is the rental rate of return on private capital.
The real interest rate remains below its level in any steady (i.e. R = 1

) over much of the
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transition path: Figure (1.42) (Part Three). This reduces the real value of interest payments on
government debt that the government must make.
Figure 1.42 - Part Three
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Figure 1.42 - Part Four
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Figure 1.42 - Part Five
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Access to revenue from private capital income taxation and the reduction in the real interest
rate on government bonds are the key factors explaining how the government finances government
debt reduction. Compared to the model with only public capital, there is little erosion of the public
capital stock: Figure (1.3.5.1) (Part Two). Government spending (i.e. public investment) quickly
settles at its ultimate steady state level of around 3-4 per cent of GDP. This is consistent with the
average level of public investment computed for OECD countries by the recent IMF study of
Serkan Arslanalp and Sze (2010). Labour income taxation plays a relatively small role in raising
revenue for debt reduction, compared with the model containing only public capital. The labour
income tax rate is close to zero in the early periods of the transition path: Figure (1.42) (Part
Three). It then rises slowly as the tax rate on private capital income falls to zero in the ultimate
steady state. The post tax wage falls eventually over the transition as the rate of labour income
taxation rises and the level of private capital is eroded, as shown by
(1  h)w = (1  h)(1  )G 1K 1h  (1.43)
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using specific functional forms. This is reflected in the fall in hours worked over the transition
path. Lower labour supply and private capital stock lead to lower output: Figure (1.42) (Part Four).
Consumers suffer lower labour income and also lower income from investment in government
bonds and private capital. Real consumption falls over the transition, consistent with the low value
of the real interest rate, as shown by the Euler equation (1.14):
u0(ct)
u0(ct+1)
=
ct+1
ct
=

pbt
= Rt
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1.3.5.2 Private and Public Capital: The Speed of Debt Reduction
I compare the results in Subsection (1.3.5.1) with the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for a faster
pace of debt reduction: i.e. reducing government debt from 60 to 45 per cent of GDP in less than
five years. Again, the length of the transition path remains the same as in Subsection (1.3.5.1).
However, a larger share of the desired debt reduction now occurs in the early part of the transition
path. The Ramsey planner achieves this by raising the capital income tax rate even higher.
Figure 1.3.5.2 - Part One
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Legend: —  = 0:95 (slow);     = 0:75 (fast)
The post tax rental rate of return on private capital and the real interest rate on government
bonds are driven down lower, according to the no arbitrage condition (1.42). This further reduces
real interest payments for the government: Figure (1.3.5.2) (Part Two). The tax rate on labour
income is also higher in the early periods of the transition, compared with when debt is reduced
more slowly. This makes the post tax wage lower: Figure (1.3.5.2) (Part Three). Consumer
income from labour, government bond holdings and private capital investment are all lower in the
early periods of the transition than they would be under slower debt reduction. Because of this,
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there is a sharper and deeper fall in consumption. Lower consumption is consistent with a lower
real interest rate, according to the relationship described by the bond Euler equation (1.14).
Figure 1.3.5.2 - Part Two
Post Tax Rental Rate Real Interest Rate
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
0.016
0.018
0.02
0.022
0.024
0.026
0.028
0.03
0.032
Periods
Re
nt
al
 R
at
e 
- P
os
t T
a
x
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0.995
1
1.005
1.01
Periods
Re
al
 I
nt
er
e
st
 R
at
e
Private Investment Private Capital Stock
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
Periods
Pr
iv
at
e 
In
v
es
tm
en
t
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
10.68
10.7
10 .72
10.74
10.76
10.78
10.8
10 .82
10.84
Periods
Pr
iv
at
e 
Ca
pi
ta
l S
to
ck
Figure 1.3.5.2 - Part Three
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However, the position changes considerably further along the transition path. Faster debt
reduction ensures that debt is closer to its new, lower target level blow sooner. This allows lower
rates of capital and labour income taxation further along the transition path, than would otherwise
be the case. This avoids the larger and more protracted fall in the private capital stock that occurs
when debt reduction is slower, as in Subsection (1.3.5.1). It also boosts the post tax wage such
that labour supply is higher than it would otherwise be, further along the transition path. It follows
that output is also higher than it would otherwise be: Figure (1.3.5.2) (Part Four). Consumption is
then higher further along the transition path than under a slower pace of debt reduction.
Figure 1.3.5.2 - Part Four
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It seems that a faster pace of debt reduction involves a larger consumption cost in the short
term, as was the case in the model with only public capital. However, paying debt down faster
allows fiscal policy to return to more normal settings faster. In turn, this allows the economy to
recover from the effects of austerity faster than it otherwise would.
1.3.5.3 Private and Public Capital: Robustness to Alternative Parameter Values
The qualitative properties of Ramsey optimal policy over the transition path in the model with
both private and public capital do not change when:
(1) The stock of public capital is more productive (i.e. when the elasticity of output to public
capital  is set to 0.1 rather than 0.05); and
(2) The Frisch elasticity of labour supply is lowered from three to two, by setting the parameter 
to 2 rather than 3.
Numerical solutions for the behaviour of the Ramsey economy over the transition path under
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these alternative parameter settings are presented in Appendix (A.5).
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a theoretical investigation of how a benevolent government chooses
changes to government spending and tax rates to achieve an exogenously given, frontloaded path
of government debt reduction. The optimal policy choices have been studied for different speeds
of debt reduction. Specifically, different exogenous, downward paths for government debt have
been considered, each of the same length. A faster pace of debt reduction requires more of the
desired reduction in debt to occur sooner. The benevolent government solves a Ramsey problem
in a deterministic, neoclassical model with public and private capital. Government spending
takes the form of investment in the productive public capital stock. The chapter presents the
deterministic transition path between a steady state with a relatively high level of government debt
to one with a low level of government debt. Over the transition path, government debt falls as a
percentage of GDP.
The optimal fiscal policy changes for achieving a reduction in government debt depend on
the ability of the government to tax private capital income. In a model without private capital,
a reduction in government debt is achieved by raising the labour income tax rate and setting
government spending (i.e. public investment) to a sufficiently low level such that the public capital
stock is eroded. Consumption falls as the post tax wage declines.
Imposing a faster pace of debt reduction requires a larger increase in the labour income tax
rate and lower government spending in the early periods of the transition. There is a sharper and
deeper fall in consumption. However, this more painful austerity in early periods allows more of
the desired debt reduction to be achieved sooner. This allows the government to revert to more
normal fiscal policy settings earlier in the transition, lowering the labour income tax rate and
raising government spending (i.e. public investment). Post tax labour income recovers faster and
so too does consumption.
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Optimal fiscal policy for reducing government debt changes in a model with both private and
public capital. Over much of the transition path, the government taxes income from private capital
investment, but leaves government spending (i.e. public investment) relatively unaltered. Labour
income tax rates are low in the early periods of the transition.
The reduction in the post tax rental rate of return on private capital reduces private investment.
This erodes the private capital stock. The reduction in the post tax rental rate drives down the real
interest rate on government bonds, reflecting a no arbitrage relationship. It is the reduction in the
real value of government interest payments and the revenue from private capital income taxation
that principally finance government debt reduction in this setting with both private and public
capital. Consumption is driven down by reductions in consumer income from capital, labour and
government bond holdings.
If a faster pace of debt reduction is imposed, capital income tax rates are set even higher in the
early periods of the transition. This drives down even further the post tax rental rate on private
capital and the real interest rate on government bonds. However, paying down more of the debt
faster again allows the government to reduce both capital and labour income tax rates sooner.
This boosts private investment and actually prevents the larger and more prolonged decline in the
private capital stock that occurs under a slower pace of debt reduction. The post tax wage, labour
supply, output and consumption all recover faster and are higher than they would otherwise be
further along the transition path. It seems that incurring greater consumption costs of austerity in
the short term allows for a faster recovery of consumption in later periods.
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Chapter 2 Optimal Fiscal Policy For Reducing Government Debt Under Different
Monetary Policy Regimes: How Hawkish Monetary Policy Leads To Higher Taxes and
Lower Consumption
2.1 Introduction
Fiscal stimulus and assistance to the banking industry during the crisis of 2008-2009 are among
the reasons why a number of governments in developed economies have accumulated large stocks
of outstanding debt, as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). In fact, some of these
governments entered the crisis of 2008-2009 with already high levels of debt. A number of these
governments have announced an intention to reduce government budget deficits by particular
dates (and potentially run surpluses), with the ultimate aim of lowering the ratio of outstanding
government debt to GDP. Some of these governments have committed to changes to government
spending and tax rates in order bring about these reductions in debt and deficits.
The Research Question And The Methodology
In essence, governments in this situation face two related questions. First, what combination of
changes to government spending and tax rates will bring about the debt reduction within a desired
timeframe at the least cost (or greatest benefit) to employment, output and consumer welfare?
Second, what monetary policy allows for the level of government debt to be reduced, at least
cost to employment, output and welfare? Also, if monetary policy is not set optimally in this
sense, how does the chosen fiscal policy change and is this change harmful to the real economy
and consumers? Finally, governments must consider what is the optimal speed of debt reduction,
choosing by how much debt should be reduced each year into the future?
This chapter investigates the first three of these questions, but abstracts from the final question
as to speed and timing of debt reduction. Specifically, this chapter presents a theoretical
investigation of the optimal combination of changes to government spending and tax rates to
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achieve a given reduction in government debt according to a given timeline for this debt reduction.
First, optimal fiscal policy is determined in the case when monetary policy can be chosen
optimally by the government, jointly with fiscal policy. This is then compared to optimal fiscal
policy in the case where monetary policy follows a feedback (or Taylor type) rule for the nominal
interest rate, similar to those used to describe the behaviour of inflation targeting central banks.
The Type of Model
The theoretical setting for this chapter is a deterministic, cashless model with many of the
features of a neoclassical model, with the addition of nominal rigidity in the setting of goods
prices. The nominal rigidity arises by the assumption that there are real costs of price adjustment,
which take the form outlined in Rotemberg (1982). The presence of a nominal rigidity allows
for fiscal policy changes to impact upon aggregate demand. This setting also allows government
borrowing to be modelled as occurring through the issuance of one period, risk free nominal
bonds. Because of this assumption, the outstanding stock of government debt is equal to the
level of government borrowing each period. The real return on government bonds (i.e. the real
repayment burden) is determined by both the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate in the
economy. Monetary policy can be modelled in this setting as the choice of the nominal interest
rate on government borrowing. The government has no recourse to lump sum taxation but can
levy a distortionary tax on labour income. Government spending takes the form of investment in a
productive public capital stock, which is an input into the production of output along with labour.
It should be noted that there is no long run or steady state economic growth in the model.
The Optimal Policy Problem Of The Government
The benevolent government solves a Ramsey problem, effectively choosing a sequence of
government spending and tax rates to reduce the level of real government borrowing (i.e. the
value of outstanding debt in terms of the economy’s price level), which must follow an exogenous
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downward path. The Ramsey problem is solved in two cases. The first allows the government
to jointly choose monetary policy, which I refer to as optimal monetary policy or endogenous
monetary policy. In the second case, the Ramsey planner is constrained by the requirement that the
nominal interest rate follow a standard, inflation targeting interest rate feedback rule (i.e. a Taylor
type rule). This investigates whether monetary policy under the interest rate feedback rule is more
or less contractionary than endogenous monetary policy (i.e. whether interest rates are higher or
lower), as the government reduces real debt. The impact of these different monetary policies on
optimal fiscal policy choices is then examined. Further, the chapter then presents a study of the
different impacts on the real economy of these monetary policies and their corresponding optimal
fiscal policies, as real government debt is reduced.
It is assumed throughout the chapter that the government is able to commit fully to an
announced sequence of government spending, tax rates and nominal interest rates, constituting a
fiscal policy and monetary policy. The Ramsey planner’s problem is non-trivial. It is not optimal
for the Ramsey planner to simply use inflation as a form of lump sum taxation, to reduce the real
value of the government’s nominal borrowing. This is because inflation has real costs in a model
with nominal rigidities: see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) for further discussion.
A deterministic setting is chosen for the model because the objective is to study a transition
path along which there is potentially substantial government debt reduction, rather than to study
the economy’s response to shocks in the neighbourhood of a steady state. I solve numerically
for this transition path by formulating a system of equations characterising the behaviour of
the economy under Ramsey optimal fiscal policy over a particular horizon. I impose initial
conditions which imply that government debt is relatively high. Terminal conditions correspond
to the economy being in a steady state with a lower level of government debt. Real government
debt (equivalent to real government borrowing with one period bonds) follows an exogenous
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downward path and reaches the level of real debt corresponding to the steady state at or before the
end of the horizon. Government debt as a percentage of GDP falls over the transition path. The
model is solved using parameter values chosen based on the results of empirical studies.
The Results: Government Spending and Tax Rates
It is found that the government lowers real government debt by reducing government spending
(public investment). The stock of public capital ultimately falls to its final steady state value. The
labour tax rate is gradually reduced from its initial level as public investment declines. The tax
rate settles at a lower level in the ultimate steady state. This suggests that the reduction in public
investment finances both debt reduction and a lower distortionary tax rate. This is the case both
when monetary policy is chosen optimally and when chosen in accordance with an interest rate
feedback rule.
In both cases, it should be noted that the Ramsey planner generates some surprise inflation in
the initial period. This reduces the real value of debt repayment in the first period, by lowering the
real interest rate. In other words, the government generates seigniorage revenue in the first period.
This is a standard feature of the first period of a Ramsey plan, because the planner is not bound to
any previous policy commitments in this period. The amount of surprise inflation is modest in this
model, reflecting that inflation is assumed to have real economic costs.
Optimal Monetary Policy
The government chooses to lower the nominal interest rate in the first period of the transition
path, when setting monetary policy optimally, unconstrained by a monetary policy rule. This
helps lower the real interest rate and thus the real debt repayment burden of the government in the
first period of the transition. It is a form of surprise taxation on bond holders (i.e. consumers).
My results suggest that the Ramsey planner would be constrained by the zero lower bound on
nominal interest rates, if the planner attempted a government debt reduction of more than around
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ten percentage points of GDP, using a frontloaded debt reduction path. Following the first period,
the government then raises the nominal interest rate, to avoid a sharp fall in consumption.
Monetary Policy Under An Interest Rate Rule: Inflation Targeting
Monetary policy is less accommodating when it is chosen in accordance with the interest rate
feedback rule than when chosen optimally by the government. By following the interest rate
rule (with standard choices for its parameters), the government places a higher weight on price
stability than on easing the real interest burden on government debt. There is no reduction of the
nominal interest rate in the first period of the transition. The real interest rate is higher compared
to the case when monetary policy is set optimally. The real value of government debt repayments
is also higher. Because of this, labour tax rates must be initially set higher when monetary policy
follows the rule, as opposed to when it is chosen optimally. Consumption is also lower over much
of the transition path, reflecting a lower post-tax wage.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section (2.2) presents the cashless
model with nominal rigidity in a deterministic setting. Competitive equilibrium is defined and
the Ramsey problem is formulated and solved. In section (2.3), I present the numerical solution
for the model’s deterministic transition under Ramsey optimal fiscal policy, from a state with
a relatively high level of government debt to a steady state with a relatively low level of debt.
Government debt as a percentage of GDP falls over the transition path. I do this twice: once when
monetary policy is also determined optimally by the Ramsey planner and once when nominal
interest rates must follow an interest rate feedback rule. Section (2.4) concludes.
2.2 The Model
Discrete time is indexed by t = f0; 1; 2; :::g in the deterministic, cashless theoretical model
similar in some respects to that in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004).4 In this section, I define first
4 It should be noted that optimal monetary policy may display some stabilisation bias in this model, because a role for
money is not assumed.
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the production technology and then describe the actions of the two types of agent in the model:
consumers (who also act as producers) and a benevolent government. I then define competitive
equilibrium and formulate the Ramsey problem of the government.
2.2.1 The Production Technology
I assume that there is a continuum of varieties of intermediate goods in this model, indexed
by i 2 (0; 1). It is further assumed that a single production technology is used to produce each of
these varieties. This technology is used to produce Yit units of variety i in period t according to
Yit = F (Gt 1; hit) (2.1)
where F is a function F : R2+  ! R+ of two inputs: the public capital stock Gt 1 owned
by the government that is predetermined each period and the amount of labour hit applied by a
producer to the production of variety i in period t. The function F is continuously differentiable
in its arguments (i.e. each of the first order partial derivatives exist and is continuous) and also
strictly increasing in its arguments, so that
FG(Gt 1; hit) > 0; Fh(Gt 1; hit) > 0 (2.2)
It is further the case that
Yit = F (0; hit) = 0; Yit = F (Gt 1; 0) = 0 (2.3)
The function F is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. The production technology each period
also satisfies the following Inada conditions:
lim
G!1
FG(Gt 1; hit) = 0; lim
G!0
FG(Gt 1; hit) =1 (2.4)
It is assumed that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in the private,
non-reproducible input hit, that is provided by a fixed quantity of consumers (see section (2.2.2))
and not the government. There are increasing returns to scale across both the public input (public
capital) and the private input.5 However, note that there will be decreasing returns to scale in the
5 Public capital is a pure public good, to which any number of firms can have costless and unrestricted access.
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sole reproducible input, public capital. This is a necessary condition for a zero growth steady state
to exist in the model.
2.2.2 Consumers
It is assumed that each consumer is the monopolistically competitive producer of a single
variety of intermediate good. This implies that there is a continuum of consumers indexed by
i (0; 1). Each variety is produced according to the single production technology described in
section (2.2.1). The consumer has free access to the predetermined public capital stock Gt 1 and
also demands and hires labour services hit from a perfectly competitive labour market, where
the real wage is wt and is taken as given by the consumer. The consumer chooses price pit to
charge for the intermediate variety. The consumer also consumes an amount ct of an aggregate
consumption good, comprising the continuum of intermediate goods. This aggregate takes the
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) form:
ct =
Z 1
0
c
 1

it
 
 1
(2.5)
where  is a parameter. The consumer chooses to supply hst labour hours to the perfectly
competitive labour market. Each consumer is assumed to have an endowment of time or hours
each period that is normalised to one, so that 0  hst  1. The decisions about how much labour
to demand for production and how much to supply to earn labour income are taken separately by
the consumer and the consumer does not believe that its labour supply decision impacts upon the
wage wt or on the labour demand decision and vice versa. The consumer saves by demanding
holdings of nominal government bonds Bdt .
2.2.2.1 Consumers’ Two Stage Maximisation Problem
The maximisation problem facing a consumer is to choose an infinite sequence of the
consumption aggregate ct, labour supply hst , savings by nominal government bond holdings
demandedBdt , labour demanded hit for production and price of the produced intermediate good pit
to maximise the discounted present value of utility over an infinite horizon. This implies that the
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consumer chooses an infinite sequence of each variety cit to consume. It is possible to solve this
maximisation problem in two stages because the consumption aggregate ct exhibits homogenous
separability: see John-Green (1971) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for further information.
Stage One of the Consumers’ Problem The consumer determines how much of each variety
cit will be consumed to achieve one unit of consumption ct of the aggregate good. The consumer
does this by solving the following intra-temporal expenditure minimisation problem in a given
period t
min
ci
Z 1
0
picidi (2.6)
subject to the constraint that
ct =
Z 1
0
c
 1

it di
 
 1
 1 (2.7)
which will hold with equality, since otherwise expenditure could be minimised further if all
prices are positive. The first order conditions of this problem imply that the demand by the
consumer for each variety of intermediate good is given by
ci = (
pi
Pt
) ct (2.8)
where Pt is the price of one unit of the consumption aggregate ct
Pt =
Z 1
0
p1 i di
 1
1 
(2.9)
The own price elasticity of demand for variety i is given by   while the income elasticity of
demand is one. The parameter  can also be shown to equal the elasticity of substitution between
varieties.6 Full derivations of the expenditure minimisation problem are available in Appendix
(B.1).
Stage Two of the Consumers’ Problem Given the composition of the consumption aggregate
ct, the second stage of the consumers’ maximisation problem is an inter-temporal problem. The
6 The elasticity of substitution between varieties is given by
@ log(
ci
cj
)
@ log(
pi
pj
)
=  .
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consumer chooses an infinite sequence

ct; h
s
t ; b
d
t ; hit; pit
	1
t=0
of consumption, labour (hours
worked supplied), nominal government bond holdings demanded, labour services demanded for
production and the price of the intermediate good produced to maximise the discounted present
value of future utility
1X
t=0
t [u(ct) + v(1  ht)] (2.10)
where  is the subjective discount factor 0 <  < 1. The period utility functions u : R+  ! R
and v : R+  ! R are assumed bounded above, continuously differentiable in each argument and
strictly increasing in each argument. The functions are assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. The
following Inada conditions hold:
lim
c!1
u0(c) = 0; lim
c!0
u0(c) =1; lim
h!1
v0(1  h) =1 (2.11)
The representative consumer’s maximisation problem is subject to the consumer’s nominal
budget constraint each period
Ptct +B
d
t  Pt(1  ht )wthst + Pt
"
pit
Pt
qit   wthit   
2

pit
pit 1
  1
2#
+Rt 1Bdt 1 (2.12)
where Rt 1 is the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds issued in period t   1
and ht is the distortionary tax rate on labour income. I introduce the variable qit to denote the
amount of the intermediate variety sold each period, which must equal the amount demanded by
the economy at price pit
qit = (
pit
Pt
) at (2.13)
Aggregate demand at comprises purchases of an aggregate of varieties by all consumers and
also by the government, something that will be explained further in section (2.2.3). The real profit
of a consumer as an intermediate good producer at time t corresponds to the term
pit
Pt
qit   wthit   
2

pit
pit 1
  1
2
(2.14)
where real costs to the producer of changing the price of the intermediate good in period t take
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a form following Rotemberg (1982):

2

pit
pit 1
  1
2
(2.15)
with  a parameter. Additional constraints on the consumers’ problem include a requirement that
production of the intermediate good meet demand at the posted price pit each period:
F (Gt 1; hit)  (pit
Pt
) at (2.16)
This will hold with equality always since it can never be profit maximising to produce more output
than is sold. The consumer is also subject to the inequality constraint
0  hst  1 (2.17)
as well as the non-negativity constraints every period
ct  0 (2.18)
Bdt  0 (2.19)
This constraint (2.19) prevents the consumer running Ponzi schemes. The consumer is also
assumed to be subject to some upper limit on bond holdings. The initial condition is R 1B 1.
It turns out that the inequality constraint (2.17) and the non-negativity constraints (2.18)
and (2.19) will never bind in competitive equilibrium. The Inada conditions (2.11) show that
consumption must always be positive and that hours worked can never equal one. In competitive
equilibrium, hours worked can also never be zero. This is because it will be shown that all
consumers supply the same amount of labour in competitive equilibrium, so that national output
and income would be zero if labour supply was zero, as shown by (2.3). The inequality constraint
on demand for government bonds (2.19) and the upper limit on bond holdings will never bind
in competitive equilibrium because I will assume that real government borrowing is exogenous,
positive and on a downward path, in all competitive equilibria. A consumer is assumed to not
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consider the effect of its pricing, production and labour supply decisions on the aggregate price
level Pt and the real wage wt. It should be noted that the parameter  must be greater than one 
to ensure that the period utility functions in (2.10) are concave.
I solve the consumers’ problem using the method of Lagrange multipliers.
The Lagrangian for the consumers’ problem is
L =
1X
t=0

2666664
u(ct) + v(1  ht)
 t
Pt
8<: Ptct +B
d
t   Pt(1  ht )wthst
 Pt

pit
Pt
qit   wthit   2

pit
pit 1
  1
2
 Rt 1Bdt 1
9=;
 mctt
n
(pit
Pt
) at   F (Gt 1; hit)
o
3777775 (2.20)
where t
Pt
is the multiplier on the consumer period budget constraint, implying that t is
the marginal utility of real wealth in period t. The multiplier on the constraint requiring that
production meet demand is mctt. It will be shown below that mct is the real marginal cost of
producing one unit of an intermediate variety at time t. The first order necessary conditions for an
interior maximum are given by the following:
@L
@ct
= u0(ct)  t = 0 (2.21)
@L
@hst
=  v0(1  hst) + t(1  ht )wt = 0 (2.22)
@L
@Bdt
=  t
Pt
+ 
t+1
Pt+1
Rt = 0 (2.23)
@L
@hit
=  twt +mcttFh(Gt 1; hit) = 0 (2.24)
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@L
@pit
= t(1  )p it (
1
Pt
)1 at (2.25)
 t( pit
pit 1
  1)( 1
pit 1
)
+t+1(
pit+1
pit
  1)(pit+1
p2it
)
+mcttp
  1
it (
1
Pt
) at
= 0
together with the consumer budget constraint (2.12) holding with equality each period, because
it cannot be optimal to leave excess income unconsumed. There is also the initial condition
R 1B 1. Further assumptions would need to be made to establish that these first order
conditions are sufficient to characterise a unique, interior maximum for the infinite sequence
ct; h
s
t ; B
d
t ; hit; pit
	1
t=0
. However, the first order conditions do characterise a unique interior
maximum in the numerical simulations I present in section (2.3).
These first order conditions embody optimising behaviour by consumers and can be interpreted
as follows. Equation (2.21) implies that the marginal utility of consumption each period must
equal the marginal utility of that period’s wealth. The next condition (2.22) is an intra-temporal
condition stating that consumers should supply labour up to the point where the marginal disutility
of an additional unit of labour supplied equals the marginal utility value of the additional after
tax income attained by doing this. Equation (2.23) is a standard Euler equation for government
bond holdings, implying that consumers will demand bonds in period t up to the point where the
marginal utility cost of purchasing the bond equals the real discounted marginal utility value of
the bond’s return in period t + 1. The condition (2.24) can be rearranged to show that the real
marginal cost mct of producing an additional unit of a consumer’s differentiated intermediate
good each period equals the real labour cost per unit of the good produced, given by
wt
Fh(Gt 1; hit)
(2.26)
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The first order condition with respect to the price for a consumer’s intermediate good pit
implies that the price adjustment costs (related to the parameter ) prevent the consumer setting
the real price pit
Pt
so as to equal a mark-up over real marginal cost mct. That is, if  = 0 and there
were no price adjustment costs
pit
Pt
=

   1mct (2.27)
2.2.3 The Government
The government spends by investing IGt each period in the productive public capital stock
Gt 1. The public capital stock is predetermined, so that the public capital stock available at the
beginning of period t+ 1 equals
Gt = I
G
t + (1  G)Gt 1 (2.28)
where G is the depreciation rate of the public capital stock. One unit of investment in the
public capital stock IGt is an aggregate of intermediate varieties, constructed in the same way as
the consumption aggregate ct so that
IGt =
Z 1
0
(IGit )
 1
 di
 
 1
(2.29)
The government is assumed to choose how much of each intermediate variety should be used
to construct one unit of the investment good IGt by solving an expenditure minimisation problem,
identical to that of the consumer: please see Appendix (B.1) for the derivations.
Recall that in section (2.2.2.1), I noted that at as aggregate demand would comprise
consumption and government investment in productive public capital. It is now possible to define
aggregate demand as
at  ct + IGt (2.30)
The government raises revenue by levying a distortionary tax ht on consumer’s labour income.
The government borrows by issuing one period, risk free nominal bonds. Bonds issued in
period t pay the gross nominal interest rate Rt in period t + 1. Each period the government must
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satisfy its nominal period budget constraint:
Pt

Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

+Rt 1BSt 1  Pthtwtht +BSt (2.31)
where Gt   (1   G)Gt 1 is real period t investment in public capital, as shown by (2.28).
Gross nominal interest payments required on debt issued in period t   1 are given by Rt 1BSt 1.
On the revenue side, tax takings from tax on labour income are Pthtwtht while the nominal
amount raised by issuing bonds in period t is BSt . Defining the real value of government bond
issuance in period t as
bSt 
BSt
Pt
(2.32)
the real period budget constraint of the government can be written as
Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

+Rt 1
bSt 1Pt 1
Pt
 htwtht + bSt (2.33)
2.2.4 Aggregate Resource Constraint
The economy must satisfy its aggregate resource constraint each period, which in real terms is
given by
ct +Gt   (1  G)Gt 1 + 
2
(t   1)2  F (Gt 1; ht) (2.34)
implying that consumption ct, investment in public capital by the governmentGt (1 G)Gt 1
and the real costs of price adjustment across the economy 
2
(t   1)2 must be less than or equal to
real output each period, where
t  Pt
Pt 1
(2.35)
is the gross inflation rate of the aggregate price level. This constraint (2.34) will hold with
equality in equilibrium because it can never be optimal to leave resources unspent, given that the
marginal utility of consumption u0(c) > 0 for all c > 0. It has been explained in section (2.2.2.1)
that the consumer’s period budget constraint must also always hold with equality each period
in equilibrium. Together, these two constraints imply that the government’s real period budget
constraint (2.33) must hold with equality each period.
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2.2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
It is possible to simplify the first order conditions of the consumers’ problem stated in section
(2.2.2.1). First, all consumers producing an intermediate good will charge the same price for that
good. This is because all firms use the same production technology (2.1) and face the same real
wage wt; with labour the only private input. The price charged by each producer will equal the
aggregate price level in the economy in equilibrium
pit = Pt (2.36)
All firms will hire the same amount of labour also for these reasons. There is a continuum of
producers all hiring labour and a continuum of consumers supplying labour, so it must be that
hit = h
s
t = ht (2.37)
The labour supply hst of each consumer can be treated as the amount of labour hired by each
producer every period. Because of these assumptions about price setting and hours worked, it is
possible to treat the model as if there is a single representative consumer. These results can be
imposed on the representative consumer’s problem first order conditions, along with the constraint
(2.16) that output equal the amount demanded. These conditions become
@L
@ct
: u0(ct) = t (2.38)
@L
@hst
: v0(1  ht) = t(1  ht )wt (2.39)
@L
@Bdt
: t = 
t+1
t+1
Rt (2.40)
@L
@hit
: wt = mctFh(Gt 1; ht) (2.41)
@L
@pit
: tt(t   1) = t+1t+1(t+1   1) (2.42)
+tF (Gt 1; ht)

mct  

   1


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The formal statement of the competitive equilibrium will also make use of the following
definitions:
Definition 4 Given initial conditionsR 1b 1; G 1, a Feasible Allocation is a sequence fct; ht; t;mctg1t=0
together with a Public Capital Stock Path fGtg1t=0 such that the aggregate resource constraint
(2.34) is satisfied with equality each period. A Tax Policy is a sequence of tax rates ht 	1t=0, while
a Real Government Borrowing Path is a sequence fbtg1t=0. A Wage Path is a sequence fwtg1t=0
while a Nominal Interest Rate Path is a sequence of gross nominal interest rates fRtg1t=0 :
It is now possible to define a competitive equilibrium formally.
Definition 5 A Competitive Equilibrium is a Feasible Allocation (including a Public Capital
Stock Path), a Tax Policy, a Government Borrowing Path, a Nominal Interest Rate Path and a
Wage Path such that each period the first order conditions of the representative consumer’s problem
(2.38), (2.39) (2.40), (2.41) and (2.42), a real version of the consumer’s budget constraint (2.12),
the real government budget constraint (2.33) and the aggregate resource constraint (2.34) always
hold. Further, all markets clear each period and an appropriate transversality condition must
hold.
Note that market clearing implies that the nominal government bond market and the market for
labour each period all clear, so that
Bst = B
d
t = Bt (2.43)
hst = hit = ht (2.44)
This last condition implies that the representative consumer’s labour supply hst equals the
amount of labour demanded by a representative consumer producing an intermediate good.
The transversality condition on nominal government borrowing necessary for a competitive
equilibrium is
lim
j!1
j
u0(ct+j)
u0(ct)
Bt+j = lim
j!1
jY
s=0
"
1
Rt+s 1
t+s
#
Bt+j = 0 (2.45)
Note that the condition (2.45) requires the nominal value of government debt Bt to grow more
slowly than the real rate of interest in the limit, satisfying a No Ponzi condition. This statement
of competitive equilibrium follows the structure used by Farhi (2010).
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All competitive equilibria considered in this chapter will consider an exogenous Real
Government Borrowing Path of the form
bt   b = 
 
bt 1   b
 (2.46)
given an initial condition b 1, where b is an exogenously specified target level of real
government borrowing. The transversality condition on nominal government bond holdings (2.45)
is satisfied in all these competitive equilibria, provided that the real rate of interest exceeds the rate
of inflation in the limit. In the limit, the level of nominal government debt B grows at the rate of
inflation, since the level of real government debt is constant. If the real rate of interest exceeds the
inflation rate, then the level of nominal government bond holdings grows slower than the real rate
of interest. This is the case in all numerical examples presented in section (2.3). The exogenous
downward path for real government borrowing will be a constraint on the Ramsey planner in the
following Ramsey problem.
Note that condition (2.42) from the representative consumer’s first order condition with respect
to price setting can be viewed as an aggregate supply relation or Phillips Curve, relating current
inflation to future inflation and to current real marginal cost of production.
2.2.6 The Ramsey Problem
The statement of the Ramsey problem will make use of the following definition:
Definition 6 A Monetary Policy is a infinite sequence of gross nominal interest rates fRtg1t=0.
It is now possible to state the Ramsey problem.
Definition 7 Given initial conditions R 1b 1; G 1, the Ramsey Problem is to choose a Feasible
Allocation (including a Public Capital Stock Path), a Tax Policy and a Monetary Policy to maximise
consumer welfare (as defined by equation (2.10)) subject to all the requirements in the definition
of a competitive equilibrium being satisfied, with the Real Government Borrowing Path equal to
the exogenous, downward path specified in equation (2.46).
In other words, the Ramsey planner (i.e. the benevolent government) maximises over the
set of competitive equilibria, so that the chosen Public Capital Stock Path (part of the Feasible
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Allocation), Monetary Policy and Tax Policy give rise to a competitive equilibrium.
Before stating the problem mathematically, the competitive equilibrium conditions in Section
(2.2.5) can be simplified by eliminating the real wage wt and the tax rate on labour income ht .
The representative consumer’s first order condition (2.41) can be used to isolate wt:
wt = mctFh(Gt 1; ht)
while the intratemporal condition (2.39) can be manipulated to isolate ht :
ht = 1 
v0(1  ht)
twt
(2.47)
These expressions can be used to eliminate wt and ht from the real government period budget
constraint (2.33), which becomes what I call an Implementability Condition derived from this
constraint:
Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

+Rt 1
bt 1
t
 mctFh(Gt 1; ht)ht + v
0(1  ht)ht
t
= bt (2.48)
Mathematically, the Ramsey Problem is then for the Ramsey planner (i.e. benevolent
government ) to choose an infinite sequence fct; ht; Gt; t; t;mct; Rtg1t=0 to maximise consumer
welfare (2.10)
1X
t=0
t [u(ct) + v(1  ht)]
subject each period to the Implementability Condition (2.48) derived from the real government
budget constraint
Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

+Rt 1
bt 1
t
 mctFh(Gt 1; ht)ht + v
0(1  ht)ht
t
= bt
and competitive equilibrium conditions (2.38), (2.40) and (2.42)
u0(ct) = t
t = 
t+1
t+1
Rt
tt(t   1) = t+1t+1(t+1   1) + tF (Gt 1; ht)

mct  

   1


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plus the real aggregate resource constraint (2.34)
ct +Gt   (1  G)Gt 1 + 
2
(t   1)2  F (Gt 1; ht)
and the exogenous downward process for government borrowing (2.46)
bt   b = 
 
bt 1   b

given initial conditions R 1b 1; G 1. The real consumer period budget constraint need not
be stated as a constraint because it must hold with equality if both the real government budget
constraint (2.33) (which can be recovered from the Implementability Condition (2.48)) and
the real aggregate resource constraint (2.34) hold with equality every period. I call an infinite
sequence fct; ht; Gt; t; t;mct; Rtg1t=0 that solves the Ramsey problem as stated above a Ramsey
Optimal Plan or Ramsey Economy.
It is important to note that the opportunity set or feasible set of competitive equilibria defined
by (2.48), (2.38), (2.40), (2.42), (2.34) and (2.46) over which the Ramsey planner maximises
may not be convex. In such a case, the first order conditions of the Ramsey problem may not
be sufficient to characterise a unique Ramsey economy. However, in the numerical exercises I
present in section (2.3), the Ramsey plans presented are unique.
In the Ramsey problem as defined above, Monetary Policy is set optimally. Alternatively, I
will consider solving a Ramsey problem with an additional constraint on the Ramsey planner.
Namely, this additional constraint requires that Monetary Policy be chosen such that the gross
nominal interest rate is consistent with the following interest rate feedback rule or Taylor-type
rule:
ln(
Rt
Rt 1
) =  ln

t
t 1

+ AD ln

at
at 1

(2.49)
where at is aggregate demand. Comparing the solutions of the Ramsey problem when
Monetary Policy is set optimally to when it is constrained to follow the rule (2.49) will help to
illustrate whether Monetary Policy set in accordance with the feedback rule is optimal from the
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point of view of a Ramsey planner seeking to reduce real government debt. It should also reveal
any different real economic effects of these two potentially different monetary policies.
2.2.7 A Recursive Formulation to Solve the Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem as defined in section (2.2.6) is not recursive.
In a deterministic setting, the problem of a Ramsey planner that makes decisions sequentially
each period is a recursive problem if the decision facing the Ramsey planner is the same each
period, given the beginning of period values of state variables. State variables encapsulate the
effects of the initial conditions on the problem as well as the effects of all decisions made in
periods prior to current time t. When the problem in a deterministic setting is recursive, the
sequence of variables chosen sequentially each period by the Ramsey planner will be the same as
the sequence chosen if all decisions (i.e. the entire infinite sequence) are made in the initial period.
A recursive formulation is useful when applying numerical solution techniques to a deterministic
model like that in this chapter, although it is not strictly necessary.
I follow the approach of Kydland and Prescott (1980), Marcet and Marimon (2011) and
Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) and obtain a recursive formulation for the Ramsey problem in
section (2.2.6) by augmenting the number of state variables with the Lagrange multipliers attached
to the forward looking constraints on the Ramsey planner each period - that is, constraints
containing terms indexed by time t+ 1. Specifically, these are the Euler equation for government
bond holdings (2.40) and the Phillips Curve relation (2.42). The other state variables are
the beginning of period values of the public capital stock Gt 1 and the real government debt
repayment obligations for that period Rt 1bt 1. A detailed explanation of how I formulate this
recursive Ramsey problem is given in Appendix (B.2). The Lagrangian that is used to solve the
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recursive Ramsey problem is:
max
fct;ht;Gt;t;t;mct;Rtg1t=0
L =
1X
t=0
t (2.50)8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
u(ct) + v(1  ht)  Et 1 tt+
Pt 1tt(t   1) + Et tRt
+Ct [u
0(ct)  t]
+Pt
"
tF (Gt 1; ht)
h
mct  

 1

i
 tt(t   1)
#
+Gt

bt  

Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

 Rt 1 bt 1t +mctFh(Gt 1; ht)ht  
v0(1 ht)ht
t

+At

F (Gt 1; ht)  ct
 Gt + (1  G)Gt 1   2(t   1)2

9>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
where Et and Pt are the Lagrange multipliers at time t attached to the competitive equilibrium
conditions (2.40) and (2.42) with forward looking terms. According to Marcet and Marimon
(2011), Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) and Reiter (2005), these multipliers must be zero initially
(i.e. E 1 = 0 = P 1). This is because the planner in period zero need not behave consistently
with the time t   1 versions of (2.40) and (2.42), containing forward looking terms. I impose
this when solving the Ramsey problem numerically in Section (2.3). The Lagrange multiplier Gt
is attached to the Implementability Condition (2.48) derived from the government’s real period
budget constraint while At is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the aggregate resource constraint
(2.34) at time t. An additional Lagrange multiplier Ct is attached to the competitive equilibrium
condition (2.38).
The necessary conditions for a unique solution to the Ramsey problem, or in other words,
necessary conditions for a Ramsey Economy are given by the equations determining when the
first order partial derivatives of the Lagrangian vanish each period, together with the constraints
(2.48), (2.38), (2.40), (2.42) and (2.34) on the Ramsey planner each period. Also necessary is
the constraint determining the exogenous downward path for real government borrowing (2.46)
and the initial conditions R 1b 1 and G 1. The conditions characterising the Ramsey economy
also include the transversality condition for government bond holdings (2.45). An additional
68
transversality condition required to characterise the Ramsey economy is one for public capital,
since it cannot be optimal to leave public capital positive as time tends to infinity:
lim
j!1
ju0(ct+j)Gt+j = 0 (2.51)
From the sequence

ct; ht; Gt; t; t;mct; Rt; 
E
t ; 
P
t ; 
G
t ; 
A
t ; 
C
t
	1
t=0
of endogenous variables
and sequence of real government borrowing fbtg1t=0 satisfying these conditions it is then possible
to recover a sequence

wt; 
h
t
	1
t=0
for the real wage and the labour income tax rate, using the
expressions (2.41) and (2.47). The conditions characterising a Ramsey Economy are presented in
Appendix (B.3). In that Appendix, I present the conditions characterising the Ramsey economy
when the Ramsey planner is constrained to implement Monetary Policy consistent with an interest
rate feedback rule in (2.49).
2.2.8 The Intuition of Optimal Fiscal Policy to Reduce Government Debt
The path of government spending (i.e. investment in public capital) and labour income tax
rates chosen by the Ramsey planner (i.e. the government) must at all times satisfy the competitive
equilibrium conditions (2.38), (2.39), (2.40), (2.41) and (2.42). This is also true for the path of
nominal interest rates, whether they are chosen optimally by the government or set in accordance
with the interest rate feedback rule (2.49). These competitive equilibrium conditions can be used
to gain intuition about the effects of changes in government spending, tax rates and the nominal
interest rate on the economy.
Government Spending
An increase in public spending has a direct one-for-one cost to the government budget, as can
be seen from the government’s real period budget constraint (2.33). All else equal, this has also
the effect of raising labour productivity Fh(Gt 1; ht) and this lowers the real marginal cost of
production, which using competitive equilibrium condition (2.41) can be expressed as
wt
Fh(Gt 1; ht)
(2.52)
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This should put downward pressure on inflation which the Phillips Curve relation (2.42) shows
is a function of real marginal cost and future inflation. However, higher labour productivity should
raise the after tax real wage, assuming tax rates are constant. Labour supply should increase as
a result. This should have a positive, second order effect on the government budget by raising
government revenue from labour income taxation
 twtht (2.53)
This assumes that consumer income levels and the functional form for utility are such that the
increase in labour supply because of the substitution effect of higher wages is not outweighed by
any income and wealth effects.
Labour Tax Rates
An increase in the rate of labour income tax has a direct, positive effect on the budget, all else
equal, as revealed by the government’s real period budget constraint (2.33). However, the after tax
real wage is lowered mechanically
(1   t)wt (2.54)
and this reduces labour supply, again assuming that substitution effects outweigh income
and wealth effects. This has a negative, second order effect on the government period budget
constraint by feeding back into lower revenue from income taxation, as implied by (2.53). This
second order effect may change if there is further effect on the real wage caused by the increased
scarcity of labour after the reduction in labour supply.
Nominal Interest Rates
An increase in the gross nominal interest rate Rt 1 paid on beginning of period bond holdings
raises the gross real interest rate
Rt 1
t
(2.55)
all else equal. A standard Euler equation for bond holdings can be written by combining
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competitive equilibrium conditions (2.38) and (2.40), giving
u0(ct)
u0(ct+1)
= 
Rt
t+1
(2.56)
The path of nominal interest rates must be always consistent with this Euler equation,
irrespective of whether nominal interest rates are chosen optimally by the government or set
in accordance with the interest rate feedback rule (2.49). The Euler equation indicates that
consumption growth will be always proportional to the gross real interest rate, given that the
utility function is assumed concave in section (2.2.2.1).
This intuition will be referred to when interpreting numerical results in section (2.3).
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2.3 Government Debt Reduction: The Deterministic Transition Path Of The Ramsey
Economy
In this section, I use numerical methods to compute the deterministic transition path of the
Ramsey Economy from a state with a relatively high level of government debt to a steady state
with a relatively low level of government debt. Government debt eventually falls as a percentage
of GDP over the transition path. First, this computation will be done for the Ramsey Economy
where monetary policy is chosen optimally. This exercise captures the behaviour of the economy
under Ramsey optimal monetary and fiscal policy, where fiscal policy consists of a Public Capital
Stock Path (implying a path for public investment spending) and a Tax Policy. Second, I perform
this exercise for the Ramsey Economy where the Ramsey planner is constrained to implement
monetary policy that satisfies the interest rate feedback rule in (2.49). By doing this, I investigate
how optimally chosen monetary policy differs from monetary policy that satisfies the type of
interest rate feedback rule that central banks in many developed economies are often thought to
follow. This exercise also sheds light on how optimal fiscal policy to reduce real government debt
differs between the two types of Ramsey Economy and shows the real economic effects of these
differences.
This section of the chapter is divided as follows. First, I choose specific functional forms for
period utility and for the production technology in section (2.3.1). Second, values are assigned
to the parameters of the model in section (2.3.2). Third, I present the transition path from a state
of relatively high government debt to a steady state with relatively low government debt under
Ramsey optimal fiscal policy, with monetary policy also set optimally: see section (2.3.3). Fourth,
I present the transition path in a model with optimal fiscal policy but where the Ramsey planner is
constrained to implement a monetary policy that satisfies the interest rate feedback rule (2.49): see
section (2.3.4). Finally, I analyse the robustness of my results to alternative choices for parameter
values. A detailed explanation of the numerical method used to solve for the deterministic
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transition path is given in Appendix (B.4).
2.3.1 Specific Functional Forms
For the purposes of computing the deterministic transition path of the Ramsey Economy, I
assume that period utility takes the form
u(c) + v(1  h) = ln(c) + { ln(1  ht) (2.57)
This implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption is one. The
parameter { affects the consumer labour supply choice and its value will influence the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage. I discuss the choice of the value for { in
section (2.3.2).
The production technology each period is assumed to take the multiplicative form
F (G 1; h) = G 1h (2.58)
where  > 0. The parameter  governs the elasticity of output with respect to public capital.
Consistent with the general functional form outlined in section (2.2.1), this specific functional
form exhibits constant returns to scale in the private input: labour supply h. There are increasing
returns to scale across both inputs.
2.3.2 Choice of Parameter Values: The Benchmark
The chosen values for the model’s parameters are displayed in the following table:
Table 2.3.2
Parameter Values
 0.05  16.5 G 0.02  1.5
 0.99  6 { 3 AD 0
 0.8
Amongst the most controversial choices is that for the parameter  determining the elasticity
of output with respect to public capital. There is a literature computing empirical estimates
for this parameter. Unfortunately, the range of parameter estimates in this literature is quite
wide. However, recent surveys of this literature such as Bom and Ligthart (2013) attempt to
systematically reconcile the various estimates by understanding the differences in the approach
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taken in different papers. Bom and Ligthart (2013) find that values are most commonly in the
narrower range of 0.05-0.1. Estimates nearer or over 0.1 are found when the measurement of
public capital is restricted to infrastructure such as roads and ports. Lower estimates closer to
0.05 are found when the measurement of public capital is expanded to cover infrastructure such as
schools and hospitals. Papers presenting real business cycle type models with public capital such
as the recent paper of Leeper and Yang (2010) use the conservative value 0.05 for the parameter
determining the elasticity of output to public capital, when solving models numerically. The well
known paper of Baxter and King (1993) also uses the value 0.05. Following Leeper and Yang
(2010) and Baxter and King (1993), I choose the conservative value 0.05 for :
The parameter  determines the consumers’ elasticity of substitution between varieties of the
intermediate good and also the own price elasticity of demand for each intermediate good. I
follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and choose a value for  such that the mark up of the
price of intermediate goods over marginal costs in a steady state of the Ramsey economy will be
around 25 per cent, consistent with the estimates of these mark ups in Basu and Fernald (1997).
The parameter  determines the extent to which price adjustment has real costs. Values chosen
for this parameter can be over 50. This can be justified using Keen and Wang (2007), which
discusses how the value of  is related to the values of the elasticity of substitution between
varieties  in New Keynesian models. Further, papers presenting New Keynesian models such as
Ireland (2001) have used similarly high values for . I follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004)
and choose  of 16.5, since the model in that paper has similar features to mine. This value for 
can be seen as reflecting a conservative estimate of the degree of price stickiness in a developed
economy. The value is based on estimates of 
( 1)h by Sbordone (2002), who analyses a New
Keynesian Phillips Curve analogous to the one that could be derived from competitive equilibrium
condition (2.42) in my model.
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The parameter { is set to three. This implies that the Frisch elasticity of labour supply with
respect to the real wage is around 4 in the steady states that I consider.7 Values of 3-4 for the
Frisch elasticity of labour supply have been used before in the theoretical macroeconomics
literature: see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Kumhof and Yakadina (2007). It should
be noted that there are micro-level estimates of the Frisch elasticity that are much lower: see
Chetty and Weber (2011). Recent research by Peterman (2012) attempts to reconcile these
competing estimates. Peterman (2012) finds that a Frisch elasticity of around 3 is obtained when
an estimation methodology used in some microeconometric studies is modified to account for
changes in both the total number of the employed (the extensive margin) as well as labour supply
changes by those already employed (the intensive margin).
The value 0.8 is chosen for the parameter determining the rate at which the level of government
borrowing must fall over the transition path. The autoregressive nature of the equation (2.46)
determining the downward path for government borrowing implies that the reduction in
government borrowing is frontloaded: that is, the amount by which government borrowing is
reduced each period falls over time. The level of government borrowing asymptotes to its new
target value over the transition path.
I set the quarterly depreciation rate of public capital to be 2 per cent (corresponding to G of
0.02). This is at the high end of the range of estimates of quarterly public capital depreciation
rates in a recent International Monetary Fund study: see Serkan Arslanalp and Sze (2010).
The parameters  and AD determine the response of the gross nominal interest rate to
changes in inflation and aggregate demand respectively, under the interest rate feedback rule
(2.49). I set  to be 1.5 and AD to be close to zero. This reflects the findings of Schmitt-Grohe
7 The Frisch elasticity of labour supply with respect to the real wage (given constant marginal utility of wealth) is given
by @h@w
w
h
j= 1 hh for the chosen specific functional form for utility. Setting { = 3 implies that hours worked in
the steady states I consider h will be approximately 0:2, giving a Frisch elasticity of around 4. This approach of
choosing Frisch elasticity of labour supply to match particular values of hours worked (implememted by choosing {)
follows Prescott (2003).
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and Uribe (2007) that interest rate feedback rules should react to inflation but not react strongly to
changes in output, if the rules are to be optimal in terms of consumer welfare.
Finally, I set the quarterly subjective discount factor of consumers  to 0.99, as is standard in
the literature.
2.3.3 Optimal Fiscal And Monetary Policy
Figure (2.3.3) (Parts One and Two) presents the transition path for the Ramsey Economy
when the government chooses monetary policy optimally . The economy moves from a state
with relatively high government debt bhigh until it reaches a steady state where the level of real
government borrowing is blow. Initial conditions must be set for real government debt b 1 (i.e.
bhigh), initial public capital G 1 and the gross nominal interest rate R 1. I set bhigh and G 1
such that government debt is around fifty-five percent of GDP in the first period of the transition
path. The gross nominal interest rate R 1 is set to the value it will take in any steady state. Real
government borrowing falls by more in period one of the transition than in any subsequent period.
This is because of the assumed frontloaded path for real debt reduction: see equation (2.46).
The Ramsey planner reduces public spending (i.e. public investment) over the transition path,
allowing the revenue saved to be used for debt reduction. In fact, public investment falls to zero
(and is briefly negative) for some time. At these low level of public investment, the effects of
public capital depreciation are not offset and the public capital stock is eroded (and of course, this
happens if there is disinvestment). The labour tax rate is initially well above its ultimate steady
state level, but is actually reduced over the horizon as public investment falls. The reduction in
public investment spending funds not only debt reduction but also a reduction in the distortionary
tax rate: see Figure (2.3.3) - Parts One and Two.
Erosion of the public capital stock reduces labour productivity as shown by equation (2.41)
and thus reduces the real wage considerably. Despite the fall in the rate of tax over the transition,
the post tax real wage falls also. All else equal, this should reduce labour supply, provided the
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substitution effect of the change in the post tax wage outweighs the income and wealth effects.
The combined effect of a lower tax rate, lower real wages and reduced labour supply is to lower
real government revenue from income taxation, all else equal. The reduction in real government
debt occurs in an environment of falling government revenue.
It should be noted that there is some surprise inflation in the first period of the transition path.
This lowers the real interest rate (or the real debt repayment burden) for the government in the
first period, all else equal. An equivalent interpretation is that the planner generates seigniorage
revenue in the first period of the transition path, all else equal. This seigniorage revenue may
keep public investment higher than it would otherwise be in the first few periods of the transition
path. In fact, public investment is still sufficiently large in the early periods for the stock of
public capital actually to increase somewhat, before being eroded in the manner described above.
Surprise inflation is a standard feature of Ramsey plans because the planner is not bound by any
previous policy commitments in the first period of the transition. The amount of surprise inflation
is modest in this model (only four or five percentage points), given that there are real economic
costs of inflation, because of price adjustment costs (2.15). Inflation quickly falls to near zero and
does not seem to play a dominant part in achieving the desired reduction in real government debt
over the transition path.
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Figure 2.3.3 - Part One
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Unconstrained by an interest rate rule, the planner sets monetary policy by reducing the gross
nominal interest rate in the first period of the transition path. This reduces the cost of debt
repayment for the government. Note that the Ramsey planner would be constrained by the zero
lower bound, if a larger debt reduction was attempted (as a percentage of GDP), following a
similar frontloaded debt reduction path.
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Figure 2.3.3 - Part Two
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In subsequent periods of the transition path, the Ramsey planner raises the gross nominal
interest rate, to ensure that the real interest rate is positive. This prevents the dramatic collapse
of consumption growth that Euler equation (2.56) predicts would otherwise occur if the planner
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allowed the real interest rate to be negative beyond the first period of the transition. This reversal
in the sign of the real interest rate explains the kink in the transition path for consumption.
Overall, the reduction in labour supply and the erosion of public capital cause total production
/ output to fall, as government debt is reduced over the transition to the steady state. Government
debt rises initially as a percentage of GDP, before eventually falling to reach a lower level in the
new steady state.
2.3.4 Optimal Fiscal Policy With Monetary Policy Rule
I now present the transition path for the Ramsey Economy when the government is constrained
to set monetary policy in accordance with an interest rate feedback rule: see Figure (2.3.4). I
use the same initial conditions as for the case of optimal monetary policy in Subsection (2.3.3).
Government debt falls by around ten percentage points of GDP over the transition path, before
reaching the new steady state level.
There is again a modest amount of surprise inflation in the first period of the transition path.
However, the Ramsey planner must follow the interest rate rule, so that there is no reduction in
the gross nominal interest rate in the first period. In fact, interest rates rise to counter the inflation.
The real interest rate is higher in the early periods of the transition, compared with the case where
the planner is unconstrained by the interest rate rule. In fact, there is deflation for some time
while the nominal interest rate is elevated, driving up the real interest rate. The government’s real
interest repayment burden is consequentially higher. The tax rate is set higher in the early periods
of the transition to help finance debt reduction under the higher real interest rate.
However, the higher tax rate makes the post-tax wage lower, compared with the case where the
Ramsey planner is unconstrained by the interest rate rule. The combination of the lower post-tax
wage and higher real interest rate mean that consumption is initially lower than when the planner
is free to set the interest rate.
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Figure 2.3.4
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Legend: — optimal policy;    interest rate rule
Interestingly, public investment is initially higher under the interest rate rule than in the case
where monetary policy is set optimally. This helps to avoid an even lower post-tax wage.
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2.3.5 Robustness of Numerical Results
I consider the robustness of my numerical results to the chosen parameter values. I do this
in the model where the Ramsey planner is constrained to follow an interest rate rule. I consider
robustness along two dimensions:
(1) Productivity of Public Capital: I consider the case where the elasticity of output to public
capital  is given by 0.1, rather than 0.05. This is among the higher values for this elasticity
in the literature surveyed by Bom and Ligthart (2013). It is also one of the values used by
Leeper and Yang (2010). Making the public capital stock more productive may make the
Ramsey planner rely more heavily on taxation to reduce government debt, rather than on the
reduction of public investment.
(2) Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply: I experiment with lowering the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply to three and also to two. I do this by setting the parameter  to 2.5 and 3
respectively, with the price adjustment cost parameter raised to 21.875 and 26.25 in each case.
This generates the desired Frisch elasticities in the steady state of a competitive equilibrium.
A more inelastic labour supply may also make the Ramsey planner rely more on taxation to
achieve debt reduction. This is because increases in the distortionary labour income tax rate 
should be less distortionary to labour supply.
Changing these parameters changes the ultimate steady state around which the Ramsey
economy settles after real government debt has been reduced to the desired level. Initial conditions
must be also altered to ensure that the Ramsey economy begins at a relatively high level of
government debt (as a percentage of GDP), which then declines over the transition path.
However, figures (B.5) to (B.6) in Appendices (B.5) and (B.6) show that the qualitative
features of my results do not change under either of the two parameter specifications discussed
here. There is still a fall in public investment over the transition path (eroding the public capital
stock), accompanied by a fall in the distortionary labour income tax rate.
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2.4 Conclusions And Implications
This chapter has presented a theoretical investigation of what is the optimal combination of
government spending and tax rate changes that should be implemented in order to achieve a
desired reduction in the level of real government borrowing, at least cost to consumer welfare.
This question has been investigated both with monetary policy chosen optimally and alternatively
with monetary policy following an inflation targeting, interest rate feedback rule. The downward
path of real government borrowing is treated as exogenous in this chapter, so no comment is made
on the optimal speed of government debt reduction.
Specifically, I solved a Ramsey problem in a model with nominal rigidity, choosing an optimal
path of public capital investment and tax rates to achieve the exogenous downward path for real
government borrowing. Under the two alternative monetary policy regimes, I solved for the
deterministic transition path of the Ramsey economy from a state with a relatively high level
of real government debt (as a percentage of GDP) to a steady state with lower debt. Numerical
results are obtained under choices for parameter values informed by empirical studies. However,
the robustness of the qualitative results to different choices for certain parameter values has also
been demonstrated.
In general, real government debt reduction is achieved by a fall in public investment. Labour
taxation plays a role. However, the fall in public investment allows for the reduction of both real
government debt and the labour income tax rate over the deterministic transition path.
The chapter also highlights the trade-off between price stability and the cost to governments
of real debt reduction. Setting monetary policy in accordance with an interest rate feedback rule
(typical of an inflation targeting regime) can result in real interest rates on government debt being
higher than a Ramsey planner (i.e. a benevolent fiscal authority) would otherwise want them to
be. In fact, a Ramsey planner that is unconstrained by an interest rate feedback rule would seek a
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lower real interest rate (and lower real debt repayment burden for the government). This is despite
the fact that there are real economic costs of inflation and that the Ramsey planner is trying to
minimise costs to employment and consumer welfare.
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Chapter 3 The Interaction Between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk in an Incomplete
Markets Model: Implications for Constrained Efficiency and Fiscal Policy
3.1 Introduction
Understanding the inefficiency of competitive equilibria in heterogeneous agent models
is important for designing appropriate fiscal policies that improve welfare. An allocation is
constrained efficient if it maximises a weighted average of expected consumer utilities (i.e.
utilitarian social welfare), within the class of allocations that satisfy all budget constraints and
where factor prices are determined in competitive markets. This is one potential benchmark
against which fiscal policies that give rise to a competitive equilibrium can be assessed.
Generating a Pareto efficient outcome involves completing markets. Realistic tax and transfer
policies usually fail to complete markets, so the constrained efficient outcome can be the more
useful benchmark.
3.1.0.1 Constrained Inefficiency
First, in this chapter I characterise the constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria in
a neoclassical model, with incomplete markets for both aggregate risk and idiosyncratic risk to
labour income, as well as consumer borrowing constraints. In doing this, I extend the analysis of
Davila and Rios-Rull (2012) and Gottardi and Nakajima (2013).
I obtain intuition about the causes of constrained inefficiency by considering the marginal
effect on utilitarian social welfare in competitive equilibrium of increasing aggregate saving /
capital. If this marginal effect is positive, then it may be said that there is constrained inefficiency
of competitive equilibrium due to under saving and vice versa. At the margin, I demonstrate that
any efficiency improvement of higher aggregate saving / capital occurs through the pecuniary
externality of saving on factor prices. Specifically, a marginal increase in capital lowers the
interest rate and raises the wage. There are two competing forces at work. First, a higher wage
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and lower interest rate raises the proportion of every consumer’s expected total income that is
derived from labour income. Conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock, this raises the
share of income subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. In isolation, this harms the utility of
risk averse consumers. I call this the negative idiosyncratic risk effect. The second force relates
to changes in expected total income. Conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock, it is
the case in the model that a lower interest rate and higher wage raise the expected total income of
asset poor consumers: that is, those with lower than average saving. This raises their utility. For
asset rich consumers, the reverse happens and their utility is lower. The expected income of the
average consumer is unaffected: that is, the consumer with average saving. Intuitively, a higher
wage and lower interest rate benefit those receiving the bulk of their income from labour, while it
harms those receiving the bulk of their income from capital. Overall, I show that this has a positive
effect on utilitarian social welfare, because the utilitarian social welfare function favours income
redistribution of this type. I call this the positive expected income effect and distribution effect.
These effects are not taken into account by individual consumers when making a saving choice.
These external effects matter in an incomplete markets environment. The relative magnitude
of the idiosyncratic risk effect and the expected income effect determines whether a marginal
increase in capital raises utilitarian social welfare in competitive equilibrium (i.e. whether there is
constrained inefficiency due to under saving).
I will show that the trade off between the idiosyncratic risk effect and the expected income
effects depends on the level of wealth inequality and the way in which aggregate risk affects the
distribution of idiosyncratic risk.
3.1.0.2 Interaction Between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk
I study two cases in which aggregate shocks alter the conditional distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock in different ways (i.e. conditional in the realisation of the aggregate shock).
In both cases, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock remains approximately the
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same as when aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are fully independent. However, I demonstrate
that the sign and magnitude of constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria differs between
the two cases. This illustrates the importance of studying efficiency in the presence of aggregate
risk, allowing for different interactions with idiosyncratic risk.
In the first case, bad aggregate shocks make bad idiosyncratic shocks more likely than good
idiosyncratic shocks. Under a good realisation of the aggregate shock, good idiosyncratic shocks
are more likely. In this case, aggregate shocks change the skewness of the conditional distribution
of the idiosyncratic shock. Empirically, it seems plausible that bad idiosyncratic employment
outcomes like job loss become more likely in recessions. In this case, higher saving is welfare
improving, for most levels of wealth inequality. The negative idiosyncratic risk effect of a
higher wage and lower interest rate (if aggregate saving rises) is lower in absolute value. The
correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk reduces the extent of truly idiosyncratic risk,
so the scaling up of labour income’s share in total income is not as costly. There is constrained
inefficiency due to under saving, because the positive expected income and distribution effect of
higher saving dominates.
In the second case, the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock has a relatively large
variance under a bad aggregate shock and a relatively small variance under a good idiosyncratic
shock. Again, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock remains approximately the
same as when the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks are fully independent. Empirically, it seems
plausible that bad idiosyncratic shocks can be larger in recessions, while lucky agents receiving
good shocks do particularly well, widening the income distribution. The result is that there is over
saving in competitive equilibrium for many levels of wealth inequality. The negative idiosyncratic
risk effect of a higher wage and lower interest rate (if aggregate saving rises) is higher overall in
this case and can dominate the positive expected income and distribution effect of higher saving.
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3.1.0.3 Tax / Transfer Programs that Improve Efficiency
I consider specific types of tax / transfer schemes that may generate an efficiency improvement,
compared with constrained inefficient competitive equilibria without fiscal policy. The fact that it
is a pecuniary externality of saving that causes constrained inefficiency suggests that an efficiency
improvement is possible if consumers are induced to save in a different way. I follow Gottardi
and Nakajima (2013) in abstracting completely from government purchases. The only useful role
that any tax / transfer scheme can play is the improvement of utilitarian social welfare. First, I
derive the marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare of introducing these schemes. When there
is constrained inefficiency due to under saving, a subsidy to the return on saving (financed by
personalised lump sum taxes that do not redistribute income) can be welfare improving.
However, even if there is under saving in a constrained inefficient, competitive equilibrium
without fiscal policy, the introduction of a positive tax rate on the return to saving improves
efficiency if it is accompanied by sufficiently large re-distributive transfers from the asset rich to
the asset poor. The efficiency benefit of the redistribution can outweigh the distortion to saving
caused by the tax. A utilitarian social welfare function rewards re-distribution because it reduces
wealth and income inequality, effectively providing some insurance against the bad shocks that
lead to low income and low wealth.
The efficiency benefit of this redistribution will be larger in the presence of aggregate risk,
compared with the effect in a model with only idiosyncratic risk. This is because bad aggregate
shocks can lower the income ratio of the asset poor to the asset rich, provided that the bad
shock lowers the wage by at least as much as the interest rate in percentage terms. In these
circumstances, the re-distributive transfers improve welfare by more. Also, these re-distributive
effects become more important when the distribution of initial wealth is more unequal.
I solve for the Ramsey optimal levels of tax / transfers within the classes or types of policies
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considered, using numerical methods. These are Ramsey problems in the sense that the optimal
policies within each class cannot complete markets and attain the Pareto efficient outcome:
the Ramsey planner chooses the second best. I compare the level of aggregate saving / capital
accumulation under Ramsey optimal policy to the constrained efficient level in an economy
without fiscal policy. The Ramsey optimal level of capital accumulation will be relatively close
to the constrained efficient level if a subsidy (tax) on the return to capital is used to induce saving
behaviour that improves utilitarian social welfare, financed by lump sum taxes (transfers) that do
not redistribute income. By contrast, if transfers redistribute income, then this may have a welfare
benefit that outweighs the distortionary effect of taxing saving. This can justify a positive rate of
tax on the return to saving, driving the Ramsey optimal level of capital accumulation below the
constrained efficient level.
3.1.0.4 Optimal Cyclicality of Transfers
I consider the role that re-distributive transfers can have as partial insurance against aggregate
shocks. I find that it is never optimal for the size of these transfer payments to be counter-cyclical.
A-cyclical or counter-cyclical transfers paid to asset poor consumers can reduce the incentive for
these consumers to save, because they provide a form of partial insurance against bad aggregate
shocks. Numerical results provide some evidence that Ramsey optimal transfers should in fact be
slightly pro-cyclical.
I use a simple two period framework for the above analysis. This framework allows for
useful theoretical analysis and avoids the formidable task of using numerical methods to solve
infinite horizon, Ramsey optimal fiscal policy problems in the presence of both aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk. To my knowledge, solving such a problem with an infinite horizon has not yet
been attempted but would be a valuable topic of future research.
3.1.0.5 Related Literature on Optimal Fiscal Policy in Heterogeneous Agent Models
The literature on optimal fiscal policy has followed three broad approaches. In the
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macroeconomics literature, it is common to assume an exogenous path for government spending
and to solve a Ramsey optimal policy problem, to find the levels of taxation that fund spending
at minimum cost to utilitarian social welfare. The maximisation occurs only within a given
class of policies (e.g. linear, proportional taxes on capital and labour income) and subject to
satisfying the conditions characterising competitive equilibrium, including Euler equations.
Ramsey problems search for the "second best," given that exogenous government spending must
be financed using distortionary taxation instruments. Pareto efficiency is not attained. Classic
papers solving Ramsey optimal fiscal policy problems in the representative agent setting include
those of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1986). More recently, Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Garriga
(2003) extended this analysis to the overlapping generations framework. In a deterministic model
where agents differ by initial wealth, Saez (2013) analyses optimal non-linear capital taxation. In
frameworks with incomplete markets for idiosyncratic labour income risk, Reiter (2004), Acikgoz
(2014), Bakis and Poschke (2012) and Gottardi and Tomoyuki (2011) study various aspects of
optimal fiscal policy by solving Ramsey problems. Gottardi and Nakajima (2013) and Panousi
(2010) (building on the model of Angeletos (2007)) solve Ramsey problems in the presence of
idiosyncratic risk to capital income. A classic paper that warrants particular mention is that of
Aiyagari (1995), which concludes that the tax rate on income from capital should be positive in
the presence of incomplete markets for idiosyncratic risk. Important for this result is the presence
of government debt in the model, which allows the government to spread the burden of taxation
over time.
Another approach in the macroeconomics literature is to use numerical methods to compute
the utilitarian social welfare arising under various tax policies in competitive equilibrium, without
solving a Ramsey problem. Examples of this approach include Benabou (2002), Domeij and
Heathcote (2004), Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa and Krueger (2009). These papers
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concern the optimal progressivity of income tax rates. This is the subject of ongoing research and
recent papers include Krueger and Ludwig (2013), Krueger and Kindermann (2014), Fehr and
Kindermann (2012) and Heathcote and Violante (2014).
The third approach is found in the public finance literature. Optimal income taxation has
been studied in dynamic models where consumers are heterogeneous in their productivity, with
individual productivity being private information. The objective of the planner is to redistribute
income from high productivity to low productivity consumers with the minimum of distortion.
Unlike in Ramsey problems, tax policies are not restricted to having a particular functional form
(like a linear or progressive proportional tax rate) but can be specific to individuals and depend on
an entire history of consumer income. There are a great many papers in this literature, including
Werning (2007), Werning (2011), Farhi and Werning (2012), Farhi and Werning (2013), Findeisen
and Sachs (2014), Golosov and Tsyvinski (2003) and Golosov and Tsyvinski (2013).
None of the papers mentioned so far allow a role for aggregate risk, together with idiosyncratic
risk. There have been a number of papers in recent years that use numerical methods to solve
for competitive equilibrium in models with both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. Among
the first of these kind of papers were Krusell and Smith (1998) and Den Haan (1997). Fiscal
policy has been considered in frameworks with both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk in papers
by Heathcote (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2005), but a Ramsey problem does not appear to be
solved.
I study an incomplete markets model with aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, computing the
constrained efficient level of capital accumulation in the economy without fiscal policy. I solve
for the Ramsey optimal levels of proportional tax on capital income under two classes of fiscal
policy: one without redistributive transfers and one with redistributive transfers. I compare capital
accumulation under Ramsey optimal policy with the constrained efficient level in the economy
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without fiscal policy.
3.1.0.6 Structure of the Chapter
Section (3.2) of the chapter presents the modelling framework. In Section (3.3), I consider
the constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria in the model. First, I do this by considering
the marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare of an increase in aggregate saving. This effect is
decomposed to demonstrate that the extent of inefficiency depends on the distribution of wealth
across heterogeneous agents and also upon the interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk. I also derive the conditions characterising the constrained efficient level of aggregate saving
and solve for this level using numerical methods. Section (3.4) presents two main types of tax
/ transfers schemes and investigates whether they improve efficiency compared with the laissez
faire equilibrium. The first scheme involves a tax on the return to saving and personalised lump
sum transfers that rebate exactly the amount taxed (i.e. with no income redistribution). This
scheme was considered by Gottardi and Nakajima (2013) and allows the pure substitution effect
of the tax on savings decisions to be studied. The second type of tax / transfer schemes that I
consider involves a tax on the return to saving accompanied by transfers that redistribute income.
Transfers are subject to an asset based means test and are only paid to consumers that are relatively
asset poor. For both of these types of tax / transfer schemes, I study their effect on efficiency by
deriving their marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare in competitive equilibrium. I also derive
the conditions that characterise the Ramsey optimal levels of tax / transfers within each type.
For the tax / transfer scheme with re-distributive transfers, I solve the Ramsey problem allowing
the transfers to be state contingent - i.e. to vary with the realisation of the aggregate shock. I
compare the Ramsey optimal level of capital accumulation with the constrained efficient level in
an economy without fiscal policy. I solve the Ramsey problems using numerical methods.
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3.2 The Model
The modelling framework used in this chapter is a two period, one sector, neoclassical
model. In this model, heterogeneous agents face borrowing constraints and both aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks against which they can only partially insure. In other words, there are
incomplete insurance markets for both idiosyncratic and aggregate risk. There are only two types
of agents in the model: consumers and firms.
3.2.1 Consumers
There are I types of consumers. There is a continuum of consumers of each type, with measure
(1=I). Ex ante, the types of consumer differ only by endowment of initial wealth 
 = f
igIi=1.
Consumers of the same type are ex ante identical.
3.2.1.1 Period One
Consumers of type i take their endowment of initial wealth 
i as given and choose period one
consumption ci1 and saving ai, such that
ci1 + a
i  
i (3.1)
It is assumed that consumers cannot borrow, so that consumers must choose saving ai 2 [0;
i].
Savings in the one sector model take the form of capital accumulation. The amount saved a
becomes productive private capital in the second period. Consumers make no other choice in the
first period and do not supply any labour in this period. There is no uncertainty of any kind in the
first period.
3.2.1.2 Period Two
Consumers obtain income in the second period in two ways. First, they supply the capital
accumulated in the previous period to a perfectly competitive capital market, where it earns rental
rate of return r. At the end of the second period, the capital owned by consumers depreciates
fully. Second, consumers supply inelastically an endowment of productive labour e to a perfectly
competitive labour market, where it earns wage w. The endowment of productive labour is
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random and distributed independently but identically across all consumers. This is the sole source
of idiosyncratic uncertainty in the model. Its distribution is described in detail in Subsection
(3.2.4).
3.2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of perfectly competitive firms of measure one. Firms are inactive in
the first period. In the second period, firms rent productive labour L and capital K in perfectly
competitive factor markets, which the firms combine to produce output Y . Firms have access to a
neoclassical production technology f :
Y = zf(K;L) (3.2)
where z is total factor productivity. The function f is twice continuously differentiable in its
arguments (i.e. each of the first and second order partial derivatives exist and is continuous) and
also strictly increasing in its arguments, so that
fK(K;L) > 0 (3.3)
fL(K;L) > 0
Second order partial derivatives are assumed to be always
fKK(K;L) < 0 (3.4)
fLL(K;L) < 0
It is further the case that the cross-partial derivatives are assumed to be always positive
fKL(K;L) = fLK(K;L) > 0 (3.5)
where the equality follows from Young’s Theorem. In the extreme cases,
Y = f(0; L) = 0 (3.6)
Y = f(K; 0) = 0
The function f is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. It is also assumed that the production
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function exhibits constant returns to scale in private inputs capital K and labour L. I make this
assumption for analytical convenience because it implies that perfectly competitive firms earn
zero profits in competitive equilibrium.
3.2.3 Aggregate Uncertainty
There is no aggregate uncertainty in the first period. In the second period, total factor
productivity z is random and can take one of two values:
z =

zG with probability 
zB with probability 1  

(3.7)
where zG > zB > 0 and 0 <  < 1.
3.2.4 Idiosyncratic Uncertainty
There is no idiosyncratic uncertainty in the first period. In the second period, each agent’s
endowment of productive labour e is random. Productive labour e endowment has a discrete
distribution over two values, eH and eL, with eH > eL > 0. The distribution is independent but
identical across all consumers and is characterised by
e =

eL with probability (z)
eH with probability 1  (z)

(3.8)
The probability of eL, conditional on the realisation of the aggregate shock is given by
Pr(eL j z) = (z), where 0 < (z) < 1. The conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic
endowment of productive labour can change with the realisation of the aggregate shock.
3.2.5 Consumers’ Problem
The decision problem faced by the individual consumer of type i is to choose consumption ci1
and saving ai in the first period to maximise the discounted present value of expected utility, over
the two period life of the model:
max
ai2[0;
i]
u(ci1) + E0[u(c
i
2)] (3.9)
subject to a no borrowing constraint
ai  0 (3.10)
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and subject to the period budget constraint in period one
ci1 + a
i  
i (3.11)
plus the period two budget constraints for every possible combination of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shock realisations
ci2  rai + wen (3.12)
where n 2 fL;Hg. Note that consumers receive only the net return rai on their savings or
accumulated capital, because capital is assumed to depreciate fully at the end of the second period.
Consumption in the second period is denoted by c2. Consumers make no choices in period two,
because it is assumed that labour and capital are supplied inelastically in this period, as described
above in Subsection (3.2.1).
3.2.6 Concavity of the Objective Function
Consumer utility is assumed to be time separable, with period utility having the von Neumann
Morgernstern form, so that expected utility is a probability weighted average of utilities for all
realisations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The period utility function u is assumed
bounded above, continuously differentiable and strictly increasing. It is also assumed to be strictly
concave, so it is always the case that
u0(c) > 0 (3.13)
u00(c) < 0
It follows that expected utility is strictly concave, since it is a linear combination of period utility
for all realisations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shock. The following Inada conditions hold:
lim
c!1
u0(c) = 0 (3.14)
lim
c!0
u0(c) = 1
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3.2.6.1 Period One Inequality Constraints
Given an initial endowment of wealth, 
i, the no borrowing constraint (3.10) implies that the
opportunity set for saving a is given by the closed interval [0;
]: It is also clear that the period
one budget constraint (3.11) must hold with equality, since it is optimal to consume any resources
not saved, if period utility is strictly increasing. The consumer’s decision thus reduces to a choice
of saving ai 2 [0;
i] that implies a level of period once consumption
ci1 = 

i   ai
The Inada conditions on period utility u imply that it cannot be optimal for consumers to save
all the initial wealth endowment 
i and consume nothing in the first period. By contrast, it cannot
be optimal to consume all of the endowment 
i, if it is assumed that every type’s endowment
of initial wealth 
i is sufficiently large in comparison to the possible endowments of productive
labour in the second period feL; eHg. By sufficiently large, I mean large enough so that it must be
optimal for the consumer to smooth consumption by saving at least some of initial endowment

i, something the consumer will want to do because of the concavity of period utility. I impose
this restriction for convenience, to ensure that the solution to the maximisation problem is in the
interior of the consumer’s opportunity set [0;
i].
3.2.6.2 Period Two Inequality Constraints
The period two budget constraint (3.12) must hold with equality, since it is optimal to consume
all income in this final period, if period utility is strictly increasing.
Given an endowment of initial wealth 
i, it is now clear that the individual consumer’s problem
is to maximise a strictly concave objective function over a convex opportunity set. There exists a
global maximum to this optimisation problem, by the Weierstrass Theorem. Further, this global
maximum must be unique by the Local-Global Theorem. First order conditions will be sufficient
to characterise this maximum, which will be in the interior of the opportunity set [0;
i].
97
3.2.6.3 Obtaining the First Order Conditions
For consumers of type i, the expectation term in the objective function (3.9) can be expanded
using the joint distribution of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks:
u(ci1) +  Pr(z
G \ eL)u(ci2(zG; eL)) (3.15)
+ Pr(zG \ eH)u(ci2(zG; eH))
+ Pr(zB \ eL)u(ci2(zB; eL))
+ Pr(zB \ eH)u(ci2(zB; eH))
where Pr(zj \ en) is the joint probability of aggregate shock j 2 (G;B) and idiosyncratic
shock n 2 (L;H): The term c2(zj; en) denotes period two consumption when the aggregate shock
is zj and the idiosyncratic shock is en. The first period budget constraint (3.11) can be used to
substitute out the ci1 term. The period budget constraints (3.12) for all realisations of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks can be used to substitute out the c2(zj; ei) terms.
max
a2[0;
]
u(
  a) (3.16)
+ Pr(zG \ eL)u(r(zG)a+ w(zG)eL)
+ Pr(zG \ eH)u(r(zG)a+ w(zG)eH)
+ Pr(zB \ eL)u(r(zB)a+ w(zB)eL)
+ Pr(zB \ eH)u(r(zB)a+ w(zB)eH)
Using summation notation, this can be written as
max
ai2[0;
i]
u(
i   ai) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u(r(zj)ai + w(zj)en) (3.17)
This is effectively a classical maximisation problem in the single variable of saving ai. The
optimal level of saving for the individual consumer is denoted a and this satisfies the first order
condition that is sufficient to characterise the unique, interior maximum
d
da
ja=a= 0 =  u0(
i   ai) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj)u0(r(zj)ai + w(zj)en) (3.18)
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The amount of consumer saving is not a function of the aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks, because
the consumer saving decision is made to maximise expected utility, before these shocks are
realised. Because of this, the first order condition is the same for all consumers of the same type,
where types differ by endowment of initial wealth 
i.
Proposition 1 The level of saving ai for an individual consumer is strictly increasing in the level
of initial wealth 
i.
Proof. The first order condition defines implicitly the optimal level of saving for the individual
consumer a(
i) as a function of initial wealth 
i in a neighbourhood that should encompass
the I possible values of initial wealth [
1;
2; :::;
I ]. Individual consumers take the wage and
interest rate as given, with the decisions of any individual consumer having a negligible effect on
aggregate quantities. The Implicit Function Theorem can be applied. Denoting the right hand side
(RHS) of this first order condition (3.18) as a relation F (
i; ai) that is continuously differentiable
in its arguments, it can be seen that
d
da
ja=a= F (
i; ai) = 0 (3.19)
Letting a(
i) denote the decision rule describing optimal individual saving as a function of initial
wealth, the first derivative can be expressed as
a0(
i) =  @F (

i; ai)=@

@F (
i; ai)=@a
(3.20)
=  [  u
00(
i   a)0@ u00(
  a)+PjX
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; en)2u00(r(zj; en)ai + w(zj; en)en)
1A ]
> 0
The denominator of the fraction in (3.20) is unambiguously negative because of the concavity of
period utility. The numerator is clearly positive, also because of period utility’s concavity. Overall,
this makes clear that optimal consumer saving ai is an everywhere strictly increasing function of
initial wealth 
i: a0(
) > 0.
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Consumers with higher initial wealth have higher levels of saving. The intuition for this is that
individuals are smoothing consumption across the two periods of the model, given their initial
wealth.
3.2.7 Aggregation
3.2.7.1 Capital Accumulation Through Saving
The average per-consumer level of capital accumulated in the economy is denoted by k and is
given by
k = (
1
I
)
X
i
a(
i) (3.21)
which is a weighted average of consumer savings choices a(
i), over the I different types of
consumers. As noted in Subsection (3.2.5), the decision rule for saving is a function only of initial
wealth, because consumers make the decision to maximise expected utility before aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks are realised. Consumers and firms with rational expectations know the
distribution of initial wealth. Because of this, consumers and firms know average capital per
person k with certainty.
3.2.7.2 Labour Supply
Consumers supply inelastically their idiosyncratic endowment of productive labour in the
second period. The average per-consumer supply of productive labour in the second period is
denoted l(z) and is given by
l(z) = (z)eL + (1  (z))eH (3.22)
where (z) = Pr(eL j z), the probability of receiving idiosyncratic productive labour endowment
eL conditional on the realisation of the aggregate shock z.
Applying an appropriate law of large numbers, the fraction of the continuum of consumers
with eL (one of two possible productive labour endowments) is given by (z) = Pr(eL j z). This
implies that average per-consumer productive labour supply l(z) is known, conditional on the
realisation of the aggregate shock z. Rational consumers and firms that know the distribution of
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the aggregate shock thus know the distribution of average per-consumer labour supply l(z).
3.2.8 Firms’ Problem
Perfectly competitive firms solve a static profit maximisation problem in the second period.
Firms take as given the wage and rental rates that prevail in competitive factor markets, given
realisations of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, j 2 fG;Bg, n 2 fL;Hg. The
firm chooses amounts of capital K and productive labour L to rent in these factors markets, as
well as a level of production Y , in order to maximise profit.
max
K;L
PY (z)  wL  rK (3.23)
subject to production technology
Y  zf(K;L) (3.24)
where P is the price of the homogeneous output. This price is normalised to one hereafter.
The technology constraint will hold with equality because it can never be optimal to leave rented
labour and capital not utilised. The constraint can then be used to substitute out Y from the
objective function, so that the maximisation problem becomes
max
K;L
zf(K;L)  wL  rK (3.25)
Taking the aggregate shock realisation z, the wage w and the interest rate r all as given, the
objective function can be seen to be a linear combination of a strictly quasi concave neoclassical
production function and thus the objective function is quasi concave. Given consumer saving
choices, there is an upper limit on the amount of capital available. The distribution of the
idiosyncratic productive labour shock described in Subsection (3.2.4) implies an upper limit on the
amount of labour available. These limits constitute upper bounds on the firms’ opportunity sets,
with the lower bounds being given of course by zero. However, it can never be optimal for the
firm to choose to rent either zero capital or zero labour. This would result in no output, as shown
by conditions (3.6). I assume that the upper bounds on the opportunity set never bind the firm.
101
Since all firms are identical, it cannot be the case that only one firm rents all available resources.
In summary, the firm is maximising a strictly quasi concave objective function over a convex
set. The first order conditions will be sufficient to characterise a unique profit maximum (in the
interior of the firms’ opportunity set), something that follows in part from the Weierstrass and
Local-Global Theorems.
Given realisations zj and en of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in the second period,
where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H), the first order conditions for the firms’ problem are
@
@K
j K=K
L=L
= 0 = zjf
0
K(K;L)  r (3.26)
@
@L
j K=K
L=L
= 0 = zjf
0
L(K;L)  w
The optimal firm choices of rented capital and productive labour are denoted by K and L.
3.2.9 Competitive Equilibrium
It is possible now to define a competitive equilibrium in the two period model.
Definition 8 A Competitive Equilibrium is a Decision Rule for consumer saving a(
i) (a func-
tion of initial wealth 
i that varies by consumer type) such that (i) the no borrowing constraints
(3.10) are satisfied for all consumers; (ii) all consumer and firm budget constraints (3.11), (3.12)
and (3.24) are satisfied with equality for all possible combinations of aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); (iii) the first order condition (3.18) is satis-
fied for all individual consumers; (iv) the first order conditions (3.26) for all firms are satisfied for
all possible combinations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and
n 2 (L;H).
There is a continuum of firms of measure one and all are identical. All firms will choose to hire
the same amount of capital and labour. In competitive equilibrium, this amount must be equivalent
to the per-consumer amounts of labour l(z) and capital k supplied, given that there is a continuum
of consumers of measure one. These per-consumer average quantities were defined in Subsection
(3.2.7). This implies that firms’ first order conditions (3.26) must equal
r(zj; k) = zjf 0k(k; l(z
j)) (3.27)
w(zj; k) = zjf 0l (k; l(z
j))
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for all possible realisations of the aggregate shock zj where j 2 (G;B). Recall from Subsection
(3.2.7) that average per-consumer capital is known with certainty by rational consumers and firms.
Recall also that average per-consumer productive labour supply depends only on the realisation
of the aggregate shock zj , so the distribution of l(z) is known to rational consumers and firms.
Given average per consumer saving k, this implies that the rental rate r and the wage rate w
in competitive equilibrium differ depending on the realised value of the aggregate shock, so
can be written as r(z; k) and w(z; k) respectively. Rational consumers and firms thus know the
distribution of the rental rate and wage rate in competitive equilibrium, because the distribution of
the aggregate shock is known. Factor prices can be written as functions of k and z in competitive
equilibrium.
Given the realisation of the aggregate shock zj , it is clear from (3.27) that capital and labour are
paid their marginal products in competitive equilibrium. The expression for individual firm profit
in competitive equilibrium, given a particular realisation of the aggregate shock zj , j 2 (G;B), is
zjf(k; l(zj))  r(zj; k)k   w(zj; k)l(zj)
which is equivalent to
zjf(k; l(zj))  zjf 0k(k; l(zj))k   zjf 0l (k; l(zj))l(zj) (3.28)
Recall that the firm has access to a neoclassical production technology (3.2) that exhibits constant
returns to scale in private inputs. It follows from Euler’s Theorem that firm profits are zero in
competitive equilibrium, irrespective of the realisation of the aggregate shock.
It is possible to write the consumer’s first order condition (3.18) and Euler equation in
competitive equilibrium as
u0(
i   ai) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)ai + w(zj; k)en) (3.29)
for consumers of type i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig.
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3.3 Efficiency of Competitive Equilibrium
This section examines the normative properties or social welfare / efficiency of competitive
equilibrium in the presence of both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk.
Definition 9 Given a distribution of initial wealth (i.e. I types of initial wealth 
1;
2; :::;
I),
an allocation is a decision rule for savings a(
i) and an associated level of average per-consumer
accumulated capital k (as defined in Subsection (3.2.7)), which give rise to a competitive equilib-
rium, as defined in Subsection (3.2.9).
The expected utility to an individual consumer with initial wealth 
i from following a decision
rule a(
i) is given by indirect utility U :
U(
i; a(
i); k) = u(
i   a(
i)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u(r(k; zj)a(
i) + w(k; zj)en) (3.30)
The level of indirect utility produced by adopting a(
i) will differ across types of consumers
only because of differing initial levels of wealth 
.
In order to assess social rather than individual welfare in the two period model (i.e. to assess
the allocation that achieves social optimality), the indirect utility of all consumers must be taken
into account, by considering a weighted average of indirect utilities over the types of consumers,
differing by initial wealth:
SW = (
1
I
)
X
i
U(a(
)) (3.31)
Constrained efficiency is the notion of social optimality with which the competitive equilibrium
allocation is compared.
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Definition 10 A competitive equilibrium allocation (with saving rule a(
i)) is Constrained Ef-
ficient if it produces the highest weighted average of consumer indirect utility U :
(
1
I
)
X
i
U(a(
))
amongst the set  of all possible allocations that: (i) satisfy all consumer and firm budget con-
straints (3.11), (3.12) and (3.24) for all possible combinations of aggregate and idiosyncratic
shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); (ii) satisfy all no borrowing constraints
(3.10); and (iii) take as given factor prices r and w that are determined in competitive markets.
The set of allocations  referred to includes those where consumer Euler equations (i.e. those
derived from consumer first order condition (3.18)) are not satisfied. (Of course, the competitive
equilibrium allocation does satisfy the Euler equations) However, excluded from the set  are
allocations that can only be attained by the social planner completing insurance markets for
risk, by making transfers of wealth between agents after shocks are realised. Attaining a Pareto
efficient allocation may require this. Allowing these allocations in the set would render the
competitive equilibrium allocation in the incomplete markets model constrained inefficient by
definition. For this reason, the notion of efficiency is a constrained one because any potentially
efficient allocation must be achievable within a framework of incomplete markets for aggregate
and idiosyncratic risk, without intervention by a social planner to complete the markets.
The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained inefficient if a marginal change in
average per-consumer capital k raises the weighted average of consumer indirect utilities (3.31),
evaluated at competitive equilibrium values. In other words, a marginal change in aggregate
saving (i.e. aggregate capital) that increases the weighted average of indirect utilities demonstrates
constrained inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium allocation. To analyse this question,
I proceed in two stages. In Subsection (3.3.1), I analyse the effect of a change in average
per-consumer capital k on the indirect utility of an individual consumer in competitive equilibrium
with a particular initial wealth 
i. The effect of a change in k on the weighted average of
indirect utilities in competitive equilibrium - i.e. on utilitarian social welfare or efficiency - is
analysed in Subsection (3.3.2). I show how this welfare effect depends upon the way in which bad
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aggregate shocks change the distribution of the idiosyncratic employment shock. In Subsection
(3.3.3), I compute the constrained efficient level of average per consumer saving k by solving the
appropriate social planner’s problem.
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3.3.1 Marginal Effect Of Aggregate Saving On An Individual Consumer
For a consumer with initial wealth 
i, the derivative of expected indirect utility with respect to
average per consumer saving (i.e. capital) k, evaluated in competitive equilibrium is
@U(
i)
@k
jComp:Eq:= @U(

i; a(
i); k)
@a
@a
@k
+
@U(
i; a(
i); k)
@k
(3.32)
In competitive equilibrium, the term @U(

i;a(
i);k)
@a
is zero, as shown by the first order condition
of the individual consumers’ problem (3.18). This means that the Envelope Theorem can be
applied, so that (3.32) becomes
@U(
i)
@k
jComp:Eq:= @U(

i; a(
i); k)
@k
(3.33)
which implies
@U(
i)
@k
jComp:Eq:= 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)
(
@U(
i;a(
i);k)
@r
@r(zj ;k)
@k
+@U(

i;a(
i);k)
@w
@w(zj ;k)
@k
)
(3.34)
using the fact that factor prices r(zj; k) and w(zj; k) are functions of k in competitive
equilibrium, as discussed in Subsection (3.2.9) of Section (3.2). This expression demonstrates that
the marginal effect on indirect expected utility of higher aggregate saving k operates through the
pecuniary externality effect of a change in k on factor prices.
Davila and Rios-Rull (2012) and Gottardi and Nakajima (2013) make a similar point in an
environment without aggregate risk. Individual consumers do not take these external effects into
account when making savings decisions.
The external effects of saving on factor prices impact upon consumers as follows. Lowering
the interest rate r(zj; k) and raising the wage w(zj; k) changes the share of second period income
received from accumulated wealth (i.e. capital, a(
i)) and from labour income respectively. This
is true for every consumer. First, this changes expected total income, conditional on a realisation
of the aggregate shock. Whether or not this raises or lower’s a consumer’s expected income will
depend upon whether they save more than average (i.e. the asset rich, with a(
i) > k), or less
than average. I call this the Expected Income Effect. Second, changing the relative shares of total
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second period income received from accumulated wealth and labour income changes the share of
income subject to idiosyncratic risk, conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock. Labour
income is subject to idiosyncratic risk; capital income is not. This affects expected utility of risk
averse agents because risk is partially uninsurable. I call this the Idiosyncratic Risk Effect. Third,
both labour income and capital income are subject to aggregate risk, since factor prices depend on
the realisation of the aggregate shock. Changing the shares of total income received from capital
and labour may change exposure to aggregate risk. I call this the Aggregate Risk Insurance Effect.
The derivative (3.34) can be manipulated to demonstrate these effects.
First, the derivative in (3.34) can be re-written as
@U(
i)
@k
jComp:Eq:= 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj\en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i)+w(zj; k)en)

@r(zj; k)
@k
a(
i) +
@w(zj; k)
@k
en

Proposition 2 The marginal effect of higher average saving k on indirect expected utility (i.e. the
derivative in (3.34)) of a consumer with initial wealth 
i can be decomposed as:
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

k

@r(zj; k)
@k
  E(@r(z
j; k)
@k
)

+ (3.35)
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k
  E(l(zj)@w(z
j; k)
@k
)

+

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz @w(zj; k)
@k

+

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
 jz (ai   k)@r(zj; k)
@k

Proof. Please see Appendix (C.1).
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3.3.1.1 Interpretation of the Decomposition
3.3.1.2 First Two Terms - Aggregate Risk Insurance Effect
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

k

@r(zj; k)
@k
  E(@r(z
j; k)
@k
)

+ (3.36)
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k
  E(l(zj)@w(z
j; k)
@k
)

For all realisations of the aggregate shock zj , j 2 (G;B), recall that an increase in average
per consumer capital k raises the wage w(zj; k) and lowers the interest rate r(zj; k), as implied
by (3.4) and (3.27). Because of this, a change in average capital per consumer k changes the
shares of total income derived from capital and labour income, for an individual consumer. This
changes the extent of exposure to risk arising from aggregate shocks to the wage and interest
rate respectively. In order to obtain intuition for the expression in (3.36), note that the effect on
expected utility of replacing a unit of second period income subject to aggregate risk with its
expectation is:
dEU ((r(zj; k)k + w(zj; k)l(zj)) (1  p) + pE (r(zj; k)k + w(zj; k)l(zj)))
dp
jp=0 (3.37)
=  Eu0(
i; zj; en)

k

r(zj; k)  E(r(zj; k))+ w(zj; k)l(zj)  E(w(zj; k)l(zj))	
The terms in (3.36) can be seen as the net utility cost of the change in exposure to aggregate
risk - i.e. the change in exposure to aggregate risk brought about by changing the share of
total income derived from wage income and capital income (depending on the interest rate)
respectively.
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Proposition 3 The aggregate risk insurance effect is zero when the production function is h.d.1.
in private inputs capital k and labour l(zj).
Proof. Rearrange (3.36) to yield
Eu0(
i; zj; en)

k
@r(zj; k)
@k
+ l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k
  E

k
@r(zj; k)
@k
+ l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k

(3.38)
The production function y = zjf(k; l(zj)) is assumed homogenous of degree one (h.d.1) in
private inputs, as discussed in Section (3.2). By Euler’s Theorem, it must be the case that
y(zj; k) =
@zjf(k; l(zj))
@k
k +
@zjf(k; l(zj))
@l
l(zj) (3.39)
It follows that in competitive equilibrium
y(zj; k) = r(zj; k)k + w(zj; k)l(zj) (3.40)
for all j 2 (G;B), where y(zj) denotes the output of an individual firm and the interest rate and
the wage are defined as in equations (3.27). Taking the derivative of individual firm output with
respect to average per consumer saving k
@y(zj; k)
@k
=
@r(zj; k)
@k
k + r(zj; k) +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj) (3.41)
it follows that
0 =
@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj) (3.42)
for all j 2 (G;B), because (3.27) shows that
@y(zj; k)
@k
= r(zj; k)
This gives the result.
Intuitively, both capital income and labour income are exposed to aggregate risk. Changing the
shares of total income obtained from capital and labour income thus leaves exposure to aggregate
risk unchanged. The net utility effect is zero. However, aggregate risk can affect constrained
efficiency of competitive equilibria in other ways, including by changing the distribution of
idiosyncratic risk.
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3.3.1.3 Third Term - Idiosyncratic Risk Effect
This term is

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz @w(zj; k)
@k

(3.43)
Given any realisation of the aggregate shock zj , for all j 2 (G;B), an increase in average per
consumer capital raises the wage w(zj; k) and lowers the interest rate r(zj; k), as implied by (3.4)
and (3.27). This raises the share of expected total income obtained through inelastic labour supply
in the second period, conditional on the realisation of zj , the aggregate shock. In turn, this raises
the exposure of the consumer to risk from idiosyncratic shocks to the individual’s productive
labour endowment. Capital income is not subject to idiosyncratic risk. It can be shown that (3.43)
is the negative of the expected utility effect of substituting a unit of risky labour income with its
expectation, conditional on a particular value for the aggregate shock
dE

U

(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en) (1  p)
+pE (r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en) jz

jz
dp
jp=0 (3.44)
=
dE

U

(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en) (1  p)
+p (r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)E (en) jz)

jz
dp
jp=0
=  E  u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj)) jz w(zj; k)
The idiosyncratic risk effect can be thought of as the utility cost of substituting a unit of risk free
income for a unit subject to idiosyncratic risk, conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock.
Proposition 4 The idiosyncratic risk effect in (3.43) is negative.
Proof. The effect of higher average capital k per consumer on the wage is positive @w(z
j ;k)
@k
> 0
for all zj , as follows from (3.4) and (3.27). It is also the case that
E
 
u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj))
 j z = (3.45)
Cov
 
u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj))
 j z + E  u0(
i; zj; en)) jz E((en   l(zj)) jz
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The average deviation of a variable from its mean is zero, so E((en   l(zj)) jz= 0. For an
individual consumer, the covariance of u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj)) with respect to the idiosyncratic
shock is negative, something that follows from the concavity of period utility
E
 
u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj))
 jz= Cov  u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj)) jz< 0 (3.46)
This gives the result.
The intuition is as above. A greater share of expected total income now comes from labour
income, which is subject to idiosyncratic risk, unlike capital income which is risk free, conditional
on a realisation of the aggregate shock. This has a negative effect on utility.
3.3.1.4 Final Term - Expected Income Effect
This term is

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
 jz (ai   k)@r(zj; k)
@k

(3.47)
For any realisation of the aggregate shock, zj , for all j 2 (G;B), an increase in average per
consumer capital raises the wage w(zj; k) and lowers the interest rate r(zj; k), as implied by (3.4)
and (3.27). Conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock, this will raise the expected total
income of the asset poor - i.e. consumers with below average saving. It will have the opposite
effect on the asset rich. Intuitively, a higher wage and lower interest rate benefit those receiving
the bulk of their income from labour, while it harms those receiving the bulk of their income from
capital.
Proposition 5 The expected income effect is negative for relatively asset rich consumers and
positive for relatively asset poor consumers.
Proof. For any realisation of the aggregate shock, zj , for all j 2 (G;B), a marginal increase in
average capital k per consumer lowers the interest rate r(zj; k) and raises the wage w(zj; k), as
follows from (3.4) and (3.27). The term E [u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)] jz is always positive
because of the concavity of period utility. It follows that the sign of the entire distribution effect
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term (3.47) depends on the sign of a(
i)   k. This will be positive for relatively asset rich
consumers, with above average saving and negative for relatively asset poor consumers with
below average savings. This gives the result.
In the model of Section (3.2), the overall effect on individual expected utility in competitive
equilibrium (3.34) of a marginal change in k will depend on the net result of the expected income
effect and the idiosyncratic risk effect. So far, I have considered the marginal effect on the
expected utility of a single consumer in competitive equilibrium of an increase in average capital
k per consumer. I now turn to the marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare in competitive
equilibrium. If this effect is non-zero, then the level of saving in competitive equilibrium is
constrained inefficient. If the marginal effect is positive, then this suggests that there is under
saving in competitive equilibrium and vice versa.
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3.3.2 Marginal Effect Of Aggregate Saving On Social Welfare
The specific form of utilitarian social welfare is given by the average of expected utility across
the various types of consumer that differ ex ante only by initial wealth. The form is
SW = (
1
I
)
X
i
U(
i) = (
1
I
)
X
i
(
u(c1(

i)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u(c2(
i; zj; en))
)
(3.48)
The objective is to understand the change in efficiency (compared with its level in a laissez faire
competitive equilibrium) because of a change in the level of average saving k per consumer. This
can be measured by the marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare of an increase in k, evaluated
in laissez faire competitive equilibrium.
@SW
@k
jComp:Eq:= (1
I
)
X
i
@U(
i)
@k
(3.49)
This is simply the average over consumer types of the marginal effects of a change in k on
individual expected indirect utility, given by the decomposed expression (3.35), all evaluated in
laissez faire competitive equilibrium. That is
@SW
@k
jComp:Eq:= (50)
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)
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
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i) + w(zj; k)en)

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
@r(zj; k)
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  E(@r(z
j; k)
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
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
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 jz @w(zj; k)
@k

(
1
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X
i
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j
Pr(zj)
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u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
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
The first two terms are weighted averages across consumer types of the aggregate risk insurance
effect (3.36). In Proposition (3) of Subsection (3.3.1), it was demonstrated that this effect is
exactly zero for an individual consumer. This must also be the case for the average across
consumer types. This leaves the averages across consumer types of the idiosyncratic risk effect
(3.43) and the expected income effect (3.47).
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3.3.2.1 Expected Income Effect and Idiosyncratic Risk Effect
Proposition 6 The expected income effect on social welfare is always positive and it is given by
(
1
I
)
X
i

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
 jz (a(
i)  k)@r(zj; k)
@k

(3.51)
Proof. It was shown in Proposition (5) of Subsection (3.3.1) that the sign of the expected income
effect is positive for an individual consumer with below average saving (i.e. a(
i) < k, an asset
poor consumer) and negative for an asset rich consumer. In the average over consumer types
(3.51), the terms (a(
i) k) are weighted by the marginal utility of that consumer type’s expected
period two income,
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
 jz
conditional on the realisation of the aggregate shock zj , for all j 2 (G;B). This expected value
differs across consumer types by a(
i), which is increasing in initial wealth 
i, as shown by
Proposition (1) in Section (3.2). It follows that expected period two income is lower for relatively
asset poor consumers and higher for relatively asset rich consumers. Because of the concavity of
period utility, the marginal utility weights are larger for relatively asset poor consumers than for
relatively asset rich consumers. This gives greater weight in the weighted average to the terms
associated with poor consumers, which are positive in sign. Therefore, the expected income effect
on social welfare, (3.51), is positive in sign. This will be the case provided the distribution of
initial wealth is not highly skewed in either direction.
Intuitively, expected total income (conditional on the realisation of the aggregate shock) is
higher for asset poor consumers and lower for asset rich consumers, because of the marginal
change in factor prices (lower interest rate, higher wage) when k is perturbed. The expected total
income of the consumer with average saving k is unchanged because
0 =
@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj) (3.52)
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which implies
 @r(z
j; k)
@k
k =
@w(zj; k)
@k
E [en] jz (3.53)
noting that E [en] jz= l(zj) = (z)eL + (1  (z))eH , where (z) = Pr(eL j z). The relationship
in (3.52) follows from Euler’s Theorem (under a h.d.1. production technology), as discussed in
Appendix (C.1). For the consumer with average saving k, the reduction in expected total income
(conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock) because of a lower interest rate is exactly
offset by the increase in expected total income because of the higher wage. Overall, the change
in factor prices (when k is perturbed) reduces inequality of expected income (conditional on
any realisation of the aggregate shock), while leaving unchanged the mean of the distribution of
expected income. This generates a net gain to utilitarian social welfare.
Before considering the sign of the combined effect on social welfare (3.49) of increasing
average capital k per consumer, it is necessary to consider the idiosyncratic risk effect on social
welfare.
Proposition 7 The idiosyncratic risk effect on social welfare is negative and is given by
(
1
I
)
X
i

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz zj @w(zj; k)
@k

(3.54)
Proof. It was shown in Proposition (4) of Subsection (3.3.1) that the idiosyncratic risk effect for
an individual with initial wealth 
i is always negative. The effect on social welfare is a weighted
average of these initial effects across consumer types. Therefore, the effect on social welfare must
be also negative.
Conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock, increasing k increases the wage w(k; zj)
and reduces the interest rate r(k; zj), which increases the share of expected income derived from
labour for all consumers. Labour income is subject to idiosyncratic risk, while capital income is
not. This has a negative effect on utilitarian social welfare.
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3.3.2.2 Overall Effect on Social Welfare
Proposition 8 The marginal effect on social welfare (3.50) of higher average saving k per con-
sumer will be positive if the positive expected income effect (3.51) outweighs the negative idiosyn-
cratic risk effect (3.54).
Proof. Proposition (6) establishes that the expected income effect is positive, while Proposition
(7) shows that the idiosyncratic risk effect is negative. Proposition (3) of Subsection (3.3.1)
showed that the aggregate risk insurance effects are zero for all consumers if the production
function is h.d.1. This gives the result.
3.3.2.3 Effect of Initial Wealth Inequality
The marginal effect on social welfare (3.50) of higher average saving k per consumer should
become increasingly positive as the variance of the initial wealth distribution rises. Intuitively,
this is because the expected income effect on social welfare should be magnified as the variance
of the distribution of initial wealth increases. Increasing the wage and decreasing the interest rate
raises the expected income of the asset poor and lowers it for the asset rich, conditional on any
realisation of the aggregate shock. This is a form of income redistribution (while preserving the
mean expected income, as argued in the discussion of Proposition (6)). This income redistribution
will be more beneficial to utilitarian social welfare, the more unequal is the distribution of initial
wealth.
3.3.2.4 Interaction Between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk
The interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk also has important implications for
the marginal effect (3.50) of higher k on social welfare. Principally, this is because different
kinds of interaction can change significantly the idiosyncratic risk effect of higher k on social
welfare (3.54). I consider two examples where the realisation of the aggregate shock changes
the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock (i.e. conditional on the realisation of
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the aggregate shock). In both cases, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock
is approximately the same as where aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are fully independent.
This demonstrates the importance of studying efficiency in the presence of both aggregate and
idiosyncratic risk, not just the latter.
3.3.2.5 Case One - Skewness
First, I consider the situation where the realisation of the aggregate shock influences the
skewness of the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock. Specifically, bad idiosyncratic
shocks are more likely given a bad realisation of the aggregate shock and vice versa. Using
discrete conditional distributions, this can be represented as:
Pr(eL j zB) = Pr(eH j zG) > Pr(eL j zG) = Pr(eH j zB) (3.55)
I use continuous conditional distributions to give graphical intuition:
Intuitively, it seems plausible that a bad idiosyncratic employment shock becomes more likely
if there has been a bad realisation of the aggregate shock, which in this model is a productivity
shock that lowers economic output, as can happen in recession.
Proposition 9 The negative idiosyncratic risk effect (of higher wage and lower interest rate when
k rises) approaches zero in absolute value as the correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk described in (3.55) Corr(zj; en) approaches one.
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Proof. Pr(eH j zG) and Pr(eL j zB) rise as Corr(zj; en) described in (3.55) rises (while
Pr(eH j zB) and Pr(eL j zG) fall). Recall from equation (3.22) in Section Two that average labour
supply per consumer is given by the weighted average l(z) = Pr(eL j z)eL + Pr(eH j z)eH . This
implies that the absolute values
eL   l(zB) and eH   l(zG) fall as Corr(zj; en) described in
(3.55) rises. In the idiosyncratic risk effect on social welfare (3.54), the conditional expectation
terms are
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz (3.56)
which can be written asX
n
Pr(en j zj)

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz
AsCorr(zj; en) described in (3.55) rises, the dominant term is Pr(eH j zG)

u0(r(zG; k)a(
i)
+w(zG; k)eH)(eH   l(zG))

if zj = zG, or Pr(eL j zB)

u0(r(zB; k)a(
i)
+w(zB; k)eL)(eL   l(zB))

if zj = zB. These dominant terms
approach zero as Corr(zj; en) described in (3.55) rises since
eL   l(zB) and eH   l(zG)
approach zero, provided the marginal utility terms are not explosive.
Intuitively, introducing correlation between idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks reduces the
utility cost of increasing the share of expected income derived from labour and subject to
idiosyncratic risk (which occurs when there is a marginal increase in k). The extent of purely
idiosyncratic risk is lower. Hence the idiosyncratic risk effect should be lower.
It is now possible to discuss the marginal effect of a change in aggregate saving on utilitarian
social welfare in competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 10 The expected income effect (3.51) dominates the idiosyncratic risk effect as the
correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk Corr(zj; en) of the type described in (3.55)
approaches one.
Proof. The extent of Corr(zj; en) has no significant impact on the expected income effect on
social welfare, as is apparent from (3.51). Proposition (3) of Subsection (3.3.1) demonstrates
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that the aggregate risk insurance effects are exactly zero. Proposition (9) establishes that the
idiosyncratic risk effect approaches zero as the correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk Corr(zj; en) of the type described in (3.55) approaches one. This gives the result.
It was shown in Proposition (6) that the expected income effect is positive, while proposition
(7) shows that the idiosyncratic risk effect is negative. Therefore, the marginal effect of higher
k on social welfare in competitive equilibrium will be positive when the expected income effect
dominates (there is undersaving in competitive equilibrium), something Proposition (10) shows
will occur as the correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk Corr(zj; en) of the type
described in (3.55) rises.
3.3.2.6 Case Two - Variance
I consider the case where the variance of the idiosyncratic shock is relatively large when there
is a bad realisation of the aggregate shock, but relatively small when there is a good realisation
of the aggregate shock. Again, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is
approximately the same as when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are fully independent. I use
continuous conditional distributions to give graphical intuition:
Empirically, it seems plausible that bad idiosyncratic shocks become potentially large in
recessions, while lucky agents receiving good shocks do particularly well. I mimic this situation
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by modifying the discrete, conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock in the model such
that under a bad aggregate shock:
e =

eHB w. prob. 1
2
eLB w. prob. 1
2

(3.57)
while under a good aggregate shock
e =

eHG w. prob. 1
2
eLG w. prob. 1
2

where
eHB > eHG > eLG > eLB
An informal argument about the effect of this assumption on the marginal welfare effect (3.50)
of higher k is as follows. Recall that the negative idiosyncratic risk effect (3.54) of higher wage
and lower interest rate (when k rises) is given by
(
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)
X
i

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz zj @w(zj; k)
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
representing the utility cost of scaling up the share of expected income subject to idiosyncratic
risk, conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock. Under the assumptions made above
in (3.57), the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic shock is relatively large under a bad
realisation of the aggregate shock. The absolute values
en   l(zB) should be relatively large
in this case. The marginal utility weight u0() is largest under a bad realisation of both the
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, all else equal, by the concavity of marginal utility. This means
that the negative term eLB   l(zB) receives the greatest weight. The end result is a relatively large,
negative idiosyncratic risk effect (3.54). All else equal, this makes it more likely that the negative
idiosyncratic risk effect (3.54) of a marginal increase in k will dominate the positive expected
income effect (3.51). If this is the case, the welfare marginal effect (3.50) of higher k is negative
and there is constrained inefficiency due to over saving in competitive equilibrium.
Intuitively, increasing the variance of idiosyncratic risk in the bad state of the world (i.e. under
a bad aggregate shock) increases the utility cost of scaling up labour income’s share in expected
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total income, when k rises and increases the wage, but lowers the interest rate. This utility cost
may be lower in a good state of the world (i.e. under a good aggregate shock), because of the
much lower variance of the idiosyncratic shock in that situation. However, the utilitarian social
welfare function gives greater weight to the situation under a bad aggregate shock, as shown by
the marginal utility terms u0() in the decomposition (3.50). The end result is that for certain levels
of wealth inequality, there is constrained inefficiency due to over saving, the opposite of when
aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are fully independent or correlated in a different way, such as in
Case One.
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3.3.3 The Constrained Efficient Level of Saving
I characterise the constrained efficient level of saving by formulating a social planner’s
problem. The social planner chooses a decision rule for period one consumer saving a(
i) (that
dictates a level of saving for every consumer) to maximise utilitarian social welfare
SW = (
1
I
)
X
i
U(a(
i)) (3.58)
subject to satisfying no borrowing constraints for all consumers
a(
i)  0 (3.59)
and subject to satisfying all period budget constraints for consumers for all realisations of
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks
c1(

i) = 
i   a(
i) (3.60)
c2(

i; zj; en) = r(z
j; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en (3.61)
for all j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H), while allowing factor prices to be set in competitive markets
so that
r(zj; k) = zjf
0
k(k; l(z
j)) (3.62)
w(zj; k) = zjf
0
l (k; l(z
j)) (3.63)
and taking into account the effect of individual consumer saving a(
i) on aggregate quantities
k = (
1
I
)
X
i
a(
i) (3.64)
l(zj) = Pr(eL j zj)eL + Pr(eH j zj)eH (3.65)
The notation c1(
i) and c2(
i) recognises that the expected consumption levels for each consumer
will differ depending on initial wealth 
i, given any decision rule for saving a(
i). The notation
c2(

i; zj; en) recognises that actual realisations of period two consumption depend not only on
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initial wealth but on specific realisations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. The same can be
said for the factor price notation r (zj; k) and w(zj; k).
The planner is not constrained by consumer Euler equations (derived from the consumers’
problem first order condition (3.18)), which are necessary conditions for competitive equilibrium.
However, the planner may not complete markets for aggregate and idiosyncratic risk by making
transfers between consumers once shocks have been realised. The planner must respect all period
consumer budget constraints and no borrowing constraints. Factor prices must be allowed to be
determined in competitive markets given a decision rule for savings a(
i). These restrictions on
the planner follow from the notion of constrained efficiency discussed in Section Two.
I formulate the problem as a classical, unconstrained maximisation problem by (i) using the
budget constraints (3.60) and (3.61) to substitute for c1(
i) and c2(
i) ; (ii) using (3.62) and
(3.63) to substitute out factor prices r(zj; k) and w(zj; k); and (iii) using (3.64) to substitute out
the average per-consumer level of saving (i.e. capital accumulation) k.
The first order conditions for the planner’s problem are derived in Appendix (C.2). These first
order conditions imply the following condition
u0(
i   a(
i)) (3.66)
= 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
+
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)
(

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)
 
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
i)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
!
u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en
)
Recall that in a laissez-faire competitive equilibrium, the Euler equation for a consumer of type
i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig is given by (3.29):
u0(
i   ai) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)ai + w(zj; k)en)
Note that the right hand side (RHS) of the planner’s condition (3.66) differs from the competitive
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equilibrium condition (3.29) by the term
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(3.67)
If this term (3.67) is non-zero, the constrained efficient level of per consumer saving k must
differ from the level arising in laissez-faire competitive equilibrium. Actually, this term (3.67)
is identical to the marginal effect on social welfare in laissez-faire competitive equilibrium of a
change in k. This is because it is an average over consumer types i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig of the marginal
welfare effect on an individual consumer, which is given by (3.34). I showed in Subsection (3.3.2)
that the marginal effect of higher k on social welfare depends on (i) the variance of the initial
wealth distribution; and (ii) how the realisation of the aggregate shock changes the conditional
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock.
3.3.4 Numerical Solutions - Competitive Equilibrium and Constrained Efficiency
In order to compute numerical solutions, I assume that period utility has the constant coefficient
of relative risk aversion (CRRA) form
u(c) =
c1 
1   (3.68)
where 1

is the constant inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. I assume that the
production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form
zjf(k; l(zj)) = zjkl(zj)1  (3.69)
for all j 2 (G;B), which is homogenous of degree one in private inputs k and l(zj), consistent
with the assumption made in Section Two. The parameter  measures the share of output paid to
the owners of capital in period two of the model. The share of output paid to labour is (1  ).
I assign the following values to parameters
   I
0.99 3 0.36 2
The number of types of consumers I (which differ ex ante by initial wealth) is set to two. The
two types can be thought of as asset poor and asset rich respectively. The discount factor  is set
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to 0:99 while the coefficient of relative risk aversion  is set to three. These values are standard
in the literature. A similarly standard choice is the value 0:36 for , the share of output paid to
capital. In this Subsection (3.3.4), I set the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic employment
shock en to around sixty per cent of its mean. Unless otherwise specified, the standard deviation
of the aggregate shock zj is set to ten per cent of its mean.8
3.3.4.1 Saving - Constrained Efficient vs Competitive Equilibrium
Figure (3.3.4.1) compares the constrained efficient level of average per consumer saving k
with its level in laissez-faire competitive equilibrium, as the variance of the distribution of initial
wealth rises (along the horizontal axis). There is constrained inefficiency due to over saving if the
difference between constrained efficient k and its competitive equilibrium level is negative (and
vice versa).
Figure (3.3.4.1)
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The sign and magnitude of constrained inefficiency changes as the variance of the initial wealth
distribution var(
i) rises (this is on the horizontal axis of the graphs). At low levels of initial
wealth inequality, there is over saving, while there is under saving when wealth inequality is
relatively high.
8 All numerical solutions presented in this chapter were obtained using the non-linear equation solver developed by
Michael Reiter. I am most grateful to him for providing me with the necessary computer code.
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3.3.4.2 Explaining the Results using Local Analysis
These results are consistent with the local analysis presented in Subsection (3.3.2), where
I discussed the marginal effect of higher k on social welfare in competitive equilibrium. The
first panel of Figure (3.3.4.2) shows that this effect rises with the variance of initial wealth. It
is negative at low levels of wealth inequality (suggesting over saving), but becomes positive
when wealth inequality is relatively high (suggesting under saving). This is partly because the
Expected Income Effect of lower interest rate and higher wage (because of higher k) becomes
more important as var(
i) rises: see the second panel of Figure (3.3.4.2). The expected income
effect is positive because the lower interest rate and higher wage reduce inequality of expected
income conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock (while preserving the mean expected
income). This becomes more important as var(
i) rises.
Figure (3.3.4.2)
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3.3.4.3 Interaction between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk
The following graphs compare again the constrained efficient level of average per consumer
saving k with that in competitive equilibrium, as the variance of the initial wealth distribution
increases (along the horizontal axis). The difference between the graphs is the way in which bad
aggregate shocks affect the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic employment shock.
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3.3.4.4 Case One - Skewness
The left panel of Figure (3.3.4.4) shows the situation where a bad aggregate shock makes
the realisation of a bad idiosyncratic shock more likely. This is the case where the aggregate
shock affects the skewness of the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock, considered
in Subsection (3.3.2) of Section (3.3). In the right panel of Figure (3.3.4.4), the distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock is independent of the aggregate shock. If the bad aggregate shock makes a bad
idiosyncratic shock more likely, the left panel of Figure (3.3.4.4) shows that there is constrained
inefficiency due to under saving at all levels of wealth inequality shown in the graphs.
Figure (3.3.4.4)
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3.3.4.5 Explaining the Results using Local Analysis
This is consistent with the local analysis in Subsection (3.3.2). The negative Idiosyncratic
Risk Effect of a marginal increase in k is closer to zero when the realisation of a bad aggregate
shock makes a bad idiosyncratic shock more likely: see panel one of Figure (3.3.4.5). Intuitively,
the idiosyncratic risk effect captures the utility cost of scaling up the share of expected income
obtained from labour, which is subject to idiosyncratic risk. This scaling up occurs because
the wage rises (and the interest rate falls) when k increases. Capital income is not subject to
idiosyncratic risk, conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock. The utility cost of scaling
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up the share of income subject to idiosyncratic risk falls when there is correlation between the
direction of the aggregate shock and the idiosyncratic shock. The extent of purely idiosyncratic
risk is lower in this situation. This means that the marginal effect of higher k on welfare in
competitive equilibrium is larger: see panel two of Figure (3.3.4.5).
Figure (3.3.4.5)
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3.3.4.6 Case Two - Variance
In the left panel of Figure (3.3.4.6), a bad aggregate shock makes the variance of the
idiosyncratic shock relatively large, while a good aggregate shock has the opposite effect. This
is the case where the aggregate shock affects the variance of the conditional distribution of the
idiosyncratic shock, considered in Subsection (3.3.2) of Section (3.3). In the right panel of Figure
(3.3.4.6), the distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is again independent of the aggregate shock.
The left panel of Figure (3.3.4.6) now shows that there is constrained inefficiency due to over
saving over a somewhat larger range of wealth inequality levels (compared with the right panel),
when the aggregate shock affects the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic shock.
Figure (3.3.4.6)
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3.3.4.7 Explaining the Results using Local Analysis
This is consistent with the local analysis in Subsection (3.3.2). The negative Idiosyncratic
Risk Effect of a marginal increase in k is larger in absolute value when the realisation of the
aggregate shock changes the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic shock: see panel one of
Figure (3.3.4.7). Intuitively, the utility cost of scaling up the share of expected income subject to
idiosyncratic risk is more costly in this scenario. This scaling up occurs because the wage rises
(and the interest rate falls) when k increases. This means that the marginal effect of higher k on
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welfare in competitive equilibrium is now negative over a relatively large range of initial wealth
inequality levels: see panel two of Figure (3.3.4.7).
Figure (3.3.4.7)
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3.4 Achieving Constrained Efficiency Through Implementable Tax / Transfer Schemes
I now consider two types or classes of tax and fiscal transfer schemes, that are implementable in
the sense that they can give rise to a competitive equilibrium. There are no government purchases
that need to be financed. Therefore, the only potentially useful purpose that these schemes can
have is to improve utilitarian social welfare.
First, I investigate whether a tax / subsidy on the return to saving is efficiency improving,
accompanied by lump sum transfers / taxes that do not redistribute income. It is possible to
generate an efficiency improvement in this way because constrained inefficiency can be caused
by a pecuniary externality of saving. Inducing different saving behaviour should thus be a way
to improve efficiency. The welfare / efficiency effect of introducing a tax / subsidy on the return
to saving is affected by the variance of the distribution of initial wealth and the way in which
aggregate shocks change the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock.
The position changes when taxes are accompanied by transfers that redistribute income
and wealth. Redistribution itself may improve utilitarian social welfare (effectively insuring
consumers against low realisations of initial wealth), to such an extent that it offsets any negative
efficiency effect of an otherwise distortionary tax. I show how this welfare improvement of
redistribution depends on the variance of the aggregate shock.
Also, I solve for the optimal levels of tax rates and transfer payments within each type or class
of scheme, by formulating Ramsey-type optimal fiscal policy problems. The level of average
saving k per consumer generated by Ramsey optimal policy can be compared to the benchmark,
constrained efficient level in a model without fiscal policy.
The presence of aggregate risk allows me to study whether it is optimal for the level of
redistributive transfer payments to vary in a way that is pro-cyclical, a-cyclical or counter-cyclical.
Cyclical variation in the size of transfer payments may effect the extent to which they constitute
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insurance for consumers against bad aggregate shocks (which lower wages and interest rates). In
turn, this may affect the extent of precautionary saving by consumers.
Specifically, the two types of tax / transfer scheme studied are:
(1) A linear, proportional tax  k on the rate of return to saving r(zj; k) levied on consumers of all
types (i.e. all initial wealth 
i). The exact amount of revenue raised from each consumer is
rebated to the consumer using personalised lump sum transfers. These transfers eliminate
any income effect or redistribution effect of taxation. This allows the pure substitution effect
of the tax to be studied. Gottardi and Nakajima (2013) studies this type of taxation in an
environment without aggregate risk.
(2) A non-linear proportional tax  k(
i) on the rate of return to saving r(zj; k). It is non-linear
in the sense that the tax rate is positive only for those types of consumers with initial wealth
exceeding a threshold level 
, such that 
1 < ::
:: < 
I . Also, lump sum transfers are
paid but are subject to an asset based means test. Transfers are only paid to those types
of consumers with initial wealth below threshold 
. Clearly, this transfer scheme entails
significant redistribution. It is assumed that the government always runs a balanced budget, so
that if the level of transfer payments is fixed exogenously, the tax rate must be endogenised to
balance the budget, or vice versa.
It should be noted that Gottardi and Nakajima (2013) study some of the questions addressed in
this Section in an environment without aggregate risk.
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3.4.1 Tax / Transfer Scheme One: Pure Substitution Effect of Capital Tax
This type of scheme involves a linear, proportional tax rate  k on the rate of return to saving
r(zj; k) that is constant and does not vary across types of consumers. The personalised lump sum
transfers T (
i; zj; en) do vary across types of consumers and also with realisations of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks (which affect the amount of labour and capital income). This ensures
that the transfers exactly rebate the amount of tax collected from each consumer, whatever the
realisation of the aggregate and idiosyncratic shock. Introducing this tax / transfer scheme leaves
the expected total income of every consumer unchanged (for any given level of saving), but alters
the rate of return on saving. The effect this has on saving is the pure substitution effect of the tax
and may be used to induce saving behaviour that generates an efficiency improvement compared
with competitive equilibrium.
A rational consumer of type i (with initial wealth 
i) takes the tax rate  k and factor prices
r(zj; k) and w(zj; k) as given and chooses a level of saving a(
i) to maximise expected utility:
max
ai2[0;
i]
u(ci1) + E0[u(c
i
2)] (3.70)
subject to a no borrowing constraint
ai  0 (3.71)
and subject to the period budget constraint in period one
ci1 + a
i  
i (3.72)
plus the period two budget constraints for every possible combination of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shock realisations
ci2(z
j; en)  (1   k)r(zj; k)ai + w(zj; k)en + T (
i; zj; en) (3.73)
where j 2 fG;Bg and n 2 fL;Hg. The period budget constraint will always bind under the
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assumptions discussed in Section Two, while the no borrowing constraint will never bind.
The first order condition is now given by
u0(
i   ai) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)(1   k)r(zj)u0((1   k)r(zj)ai + w(zj)en + T (
i; zj; en))
(3.74)
The firms’ problem is the same as described in Section Two. Full derivations are in Appendix
(C.3).
Definition 11 A Competitive Equilibrium under Tax / Transfer Scheme One is a tax rate  k,
a Decision Rule for consumer saving a(
i) (a function of initial wealth 
i that varies by con-
sumer type) such that (i) the no borrowing constrains (3.71) are satisfied for all consumers; (ii)
all consumer and firm budget constraints (3.72), (3.73) and (3.24) are satisfied with equality for
all possible combinations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and
n 2 (L;H); (iii) the first order condition (3.74) is satisfied for all individual consumers; (iv) the
first order conditions (3.26) for all firms are satisfied for all possible combinations of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); and (v) tax collected
from every consumer is rebated to the consumer using a personalised transfer  kr(zj; k)a(
i) =
T (
i; zj; en), implying that the government budget is always balanced.
Utilitarian social welfare in this competitive equilibrium is again given by a weighted average
across consumer types of expected utility, which takes the form
SW ( k; k) = (
1
I
)
(
u(
i   a(
i)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u(r(k; zj)a(
i) + w(k; zj)en)
)
(3.75)
where T (
i; zj; en) has been substituted out using  kr(zj; k)a(
i) = T (
i; zj; en). After
this substitution is made, it is apparent that this utilitarian social welfare function is identical in
competitive equilibrium to its form (3.31) in laissez faire competitive equilibrium without fiscal
policy.
In order to investigate whether introducing tax / transfer scheme one is efficiency improving,
I compute the marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare (3.75) of introducing the tax / transfer
scheme in competitive equilibrium.
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3.4.1.1 Marginal Effect on Social Welfare of Introducing Tax / Transfer Scheme One
Introducing the tax on the return to saving in tax / transfer scheme one can have a direct
effect on social welfare (say through redistribution) and an indirect effect through the pecuniary
externality on factor prices of a change in saving brought about because of the distortionary tax.
Since utilitarian social welfare in competitive equilibrium under tax / transfer scheme one
(3.75) has the same form as in laissez faire competitive equilibrium (with  k not appearing), it is
clear that introducing the tax / transfer scheme has no direct marginal effect on utilitarian social
welfare. This reflects the fact that the personalised lump sum transfers T (
i; zj; en) rebate all the
tax paid by each consumer, so at the margin they eliminate any income or redistribution effect of
the tax. At the margin, introducing tax / transfer scheme one leaves income unchanged, so welfare
is unchanged, all else equal.
However, the linear, proportional tax  k on the return to saving should change the amount of
average saving or capital accumulation in the economy at the margin. This changes factor prices
and can generate a pecuniary externality that consumers do not take into account when making
savings decisions. In order to evaluate this pecuniary externality, it is necessary to make an
assumption about the impact of the tax on the level of average saving k at the margin.
Conjecture 11 The linear proportional tax  k on the return to saving reduces average saving per
consumer k: @k
@k
< 0
This will be the case in competitive equilibrium under Cobb-Douglas production technology
and CRRA utility, as used in Subsection (3.4.1.7) of Section (3.3) to solve numerically for the
competitive equilibrium.
The marginal effect on social welfare of introducing tax / transfer scheme one in competitive
equilibrium will consist solely of the indirect effect, arising because of the pecuniary externality
@SW ( k; k)
@ k
jz= @SW
@ k| {z }
=0
+
@SW
@k
@k
@ k
=
@SW
@k
@k
@ k
(3.76)
This indirect effect is given by the negative of the marginal effect of additional saving k on
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utilitarian social welfare (3.50) discussed in Section Three. The change of sign occurs because
@k
@k
< 0. Note that the Envelope Theorem implies that changes in individual saving choices a(
i)
because of the tax have no utility effect at the margin, since consumers are already saving at a
utility maximising point in competitive equilibrium.
The marginal effect of the tax / transfer scheme one on social welfare can be written as
@SW ( k; k)
@ k
jComp:Eq:= (77)
+(
1
I
)
X
i
E

u0(
i; zj; en)

k

@r(zj; k)
@k
@k
@ k
  E(@r(z
j; k)
@k
@k
@ k
)

+(
1
I
)
X
i
E

u0(
i; zj; en)

l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k
@k
@ k
  E(l(zj)@w(z
j; k)
@k
@k
@ k
)

+(
1
I
)
X
i

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj))
 jz @w(zj; k)
@k
@k
@ k

+(
1
I
)
X
i

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(
i; zj; en)
 jz (ai   k)@r(zj; k)
@k
@k
@ k

The first two terms are the aggregate risk insurance effects (3.36). Given that the production
function is homogeneous of degree one, these terms continue to be exactly zero, as shown in
Proposition (3) of Section Three. The third and fourth terms represent the idiosyncratic risk effect
(3.54) and the expected income effect (3.51) respectively, as discussed in Subsection (3.3.2) of
Section Three. However, their signs are now reversed. To see this, first consider the effect of the
tax on factor prices.
Proposition 12 It is the case that @w(z
j ;k)
@k
@k
@k
< 0 and @r(z
j ;k)
@k
@k
@k
> 0 for all j 2 fG;Bg.
Proof. It was shown in (3.5) of Section Two that @w(zj ;k)
@k
> 0 and @r(z
j ;k)
@k
< 0. The Conjecture
(11) provides that @k
@k
< 0. Combining these two outcomes gives the result.
The tax on the return to saving reduces average saving (i.e. accumulated capital) k per
consumer at the margin, which lowers the wage. However, it increases the interest rate, because
marginal returns to capital are higher at lower levels of k.
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The sign of the idiosyncratic risk and expected income effects in response to introducing tax /
transfer scheme one can now be established.
Proposition 13 When tax / transfer scheme one is introduced, the expected income effect is
negative and the idiosyncratic risk effect is positive.
Proof. Proposition (6) in Section Three reveals that the expected income effect (3.51) of a
marginal increase in saving k is positive. The expected income effect brought about by the tax is
obtained by multiplying (3.51) by @k
@k
< 0: Proposition (7) in Section Three demonstrates that the
idiosyncratic risk effect (3.54) of a marginal increase in saving k is negative. The idiosyncratic risk
effect brought about by the introduction of tax / transfer scheme one is obtained by multiplying
(3.54) by @k
@k
< 0. This gives the result.
The intuition is that the introduction of the tax reduces saving k, thus lowering the wage and
increasing the interest rate given any realisation of the aggregate shock zj , j 2 fG;Bg. For all
consumers, this reduces the share of expected income obtained from labour and increases the
share obtained from capital. This reduces the share of total income subject to idiosyncratic labour
productivity shocks en, n 2 fH;Lg. Hence, the idiosyncratic risk effect on social welfare of
introducing the tax is positive.
The higher interest rate and lower wage raise the expected total income of the asset rich (i.e.
those with above average saving a(
i) > k) and lower that of the asset poor, conditional on any
realisation of the aggregate shock. The expected total income of the average consumer (with
saving k) is unchanged since
 @r(z
j; k)
@k
k =
@w(zj; k)
@k
E [en] jz
as discussed earlier in Subsection (3.3.2). Overall, there is an increase in inequality of expected
income, conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock (while preserving the mean of the
distribution of expected income). This is penalised by the utilitarian social welfare function used
138
in this chapter. Hence, the expected income effect of introducing the tax is negative.
3.4.1.2 Effect of Initial Wealth Inequality
It should be the case that the negative expected income effect brought about by tax / transfer
scheme one will dominate as the distribution of initial wealth becomes more unequal (i.e. as
var(
i) rises). Intuitively, as var(
i) rises, the widening of inequality of expected income
(conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock) that occurs because of a higher interest
rate and lower wage becomes relatively important (while the mean expected income is preserved).
Because of this, the marginal effect of introducing the tax on utilitarian social welfare (3.77)
should become increasingly negative as var(
i) rises. Note that the effect of the initial wealth
distribution on the expected income effect was discussed in more detail in Section (3.3).
3.4.1.3 Interaction Between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk
The interaction between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk is also important for determining
the impact of introducing tax / transfer scheme one. I consider the same two cases described in
Subsection (3.3.2) of Section (3.3). In the first case, a bad realisation of the aggregate shock makes
a bad idiosyncratic shock more likely (i.e. it affects the skewness of the conditional distribution of
the idiosyncratic shock). In the second case, a bad realisation of the aggregate shock makes the
variance of the conditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock relatively large (vice versa for
a good aggregate shock). In this case, the aggregate shock affects the conditional variance of the
idiosyncratic shock.
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3.4.1.4 Case One - Skewness
Proposition 14 The marginal effect on social welfare (3.77) of introducing tax / transfer scheme
one is unambiguously negative when the probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock (conditional on
a bad realisation of the aggregate shock, as described in (3.55)) approaches one.
Proof. Proposition (9) of Section Three shows that the absolute value of the idiosyncratic risk
effect (3.54) of higher saving k approaches zero as the probability of a bad (good) idiosyncratic
shock (conditional on a bad (good) realisation of the aggregate shock) approaches one. This will
also be true for the absolute value of the idiosyncratic risk effect of the tax, since this effect is the
negative of (3.54), as shown by Proposition (13). As this occurs, the negative expected income
effect of introducing the tax dominates. This gives the result.
Intuitively, the positive welfare effect of reducing the share of expected income subject to
idiosyncratic risk (caused because the tax lowers the wage and raises the interest rate) is less
important when there is correlation between aggregate and idiosyncratic risk of the type described
in (3.55). The extent of purely idiosyncratic risk is lower in these circumstances. Therefore, the
marginal welfare effect (3.77) of introducing tax / transfer scheme one should become negative as
the probability of a bad idiosyncratic shock (conditional on a bad aggregate shock) rises.
3.4.1.5 Case Two - Variance
The positive idiosyncratic risk effect of introducing tax / transfer scheme one should be larger
when the aggregate shock affects the variance of the idiosyncratic shock. The idiosyncratic risk
effect of introducing tax / transfer scheme one is the negative of the idiosyncratic risk effect of
a marginal increase in k. In Subsection (3.3.2) of Section (3.3), I explained that the absolute
value of this effect is larger when the aggregate shock changes the conditional variance of the
idiosyncratic shock.
Intuitively, the utility benefit of scaling down the share of expected income subject to
idiosyncratic risk (because the tax lowers the wage and raises the interest rate) is larger in the
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situation when a bad aggregate shock magnifies the variance of the idiosyncratic shock. This
situation is given greatest weight by the utilitarian social welfare function.
All else equal, the positive idiosyncratic risk effect of introducing tax / transfer scheme one
will be larger relative to the negative expected income effect. This will raise the marginal effect on
social welfare (3.77) of introducing tax / transfer scheme one, making it more likely that a positive
taxation rate on the return to saving is welfare improving. (i.e. reflecting the fact that there is more
likely to be constrained inefficiency due to over saving in this case).
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3.4.1.6 Ramsey Optimal Policy - Tax / Transfer Scheme One
I now proceed to solve for the Ramsey optimal level of taxation, within this type of tax /
transfer scheme. This involves solving a social planner’s problem. The social planner chooses a
tax rate on the return to saving  k and a decision rule for saving (i.e. a level of saving a(
i) for
each consumer type) to maximise utilitarian social welfare
max
k;fa(
i)gIi=1
SW = (
1
I
)
X
i
(
u(
i   a(
i)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u(r(k; zj)a(
i) + w(k; zj)en)
)
(3.78)
subject to satisfying no borrowing constraints for all consumers
a(
i)  0 (3.79)
and subject to satisfying the first order condition of the consumer’s problem for each consumer
type i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig
u0(
i   ai) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)(1   k)r(zj)u0((1   k)r(zj)ai + w(zj)en + T (
i; zj; en))
(3.80)
as well as all period budget constraints for consumers for all realisations of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks
c1(

i) = 
i   a(
i) (3.81)
c2(

i; zj; en) = (1   k)r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en + T (
i; zj; en)
for all j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H), while allowing factor prices to be set in competitive markets
so that
r(zj; k) = zjf
0
k(k; l(z
j)) (3.82)
w(zj; k) = zjf
0
l (k; l(z
j))
and taking into account the effect of individual consumer saving a(
i) on aggregate quantities
k = (
1
I
)
X
i
a(
i) (3.83)
l(zj) = Pr(eL j zj)eL + Pr(eH j zj)eH
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In effect, the Ramsey planner chooses a tax rate  k on the return to saving that maximises
utilitarian social welfare, subject to the requirement that the chosen policy gives rise to a
competitive equilibrium. Full derivation of the first order conditions is in Appendix (C.3).
Definition 12 A Ramsey Equilibrium under tax / transfer scheme one is a tax rate  k and a deci-
sion rule for saving (i.e. a level of saving a(
i) for each consumer type) that maximises utilitarian
social welfare (3.78) such that (i) the no borrowing constrains (3.79) are satisfied for all con-
sumers; (ii) all consumer and firm budget constraints (3.81) and (3.24) are satisfied with equality
for all possible combinations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B)
and n 2 (L;H); (iii) the first order condition (3.80) is satisfied for all individual consumers; (iv)
the first order conditions (3.26) for all firms are satisfied for all possible combinations of aggregate
and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H).
Constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibrium in an economy without fiscal policy
suggests that welfare improvements are possible by changing consumer saving behaviour. Tax
/ transfer scheme one does this by manipulating the return on saving, but without redistributing
any income across consumers. The Ramsey optimal level of tax / transfer scheme one gives
rise to a competitive equilibrium. The level of average capital k generated by Ramsey policy in
competitive equilibrium can be compared with the benchmark, constrained efficient level in the
laissez faire economy without fiscal policy (recalling that constrained efficient k must satisfy
budget constraints but not necessarily Euler equations). This will show whether a tax / transfer
scheme that gives rise to a competitive equilibrium can manipulate saving decisions and generate
an efficiency improvement.
I now use numerical methods to solve the Ramsey problem and I compare the level of average
saving k under Ramsey optimal policy with the benchmark, constrained optimal level in the
laissez-faire economy solved for in Section (3.3). I also compute the marginal effects on utilitarian
social welfare (3.77) of introducing tax / transfer scheme one in competitive equilibrium.
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3.4.1.7 Numerical Solutions - Tax / Transfer Scheme One
The functional forms and parameter values used to obtain numerical solutions are the same as
those used in Section (3.3). Unless otherwise specified, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
shock is approximately sixty per cent of its mean. The standard deviation of the aggregate shock is
around ten per cent of its mean. The tax reduces k at the margin, so raises the interest rate r(zj; k)
and lowers the wage w(zj; k) at the margin, for all zj . For any realisation of aggregate shock zj ,
this lowers the share of expected total income derived from labour and subject to idiosyncratic
risk (i.e. the positive idiosyncratic risk effect on welfare). Also, it raises expected total income
for asset rich consumers (with above average saving a(
i) > k) and lowers it for asset poor
consumers. Conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock, this widens the distribution of
expected income, while preserving the mean expected income: (i.e. the negative expected income
effect on welfare).
Panel One of Figure (3.4.1.7) shows that the marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare of
introducing the tax is positive when the variance of the distribution of initial wealth is relatively
small (as shown on the horizontal axis). However, as the variance rises, the effect becomes
negative. This is because the negative expected income effect of introducing the tax is larger when
initial wealth is more unevenly distributed. The negative expected income effect dominates the
positive idiosyncratic risk effect as var(
i) rises. This is shown explicitly in Panel Two of Figure
(3.4.1.7).
Panel Three of Figure (3.4.1.7) shows the Ramsey optimal level of the tax rate on the rate of
return to saving (accompanied by lump sum transfers rebating exactly the amount of tax paid by
each individual consumer). It is negative when the standard deviation of initial wealth is around
fifty-five per cent of its mean or higher. This is consistent with the marginal welfare effect (3.77)
of introducing the tax shown in Panel One. A negative rate of tax is a subsidy paid to the rate
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of return on saving. It will be financed by lump sum taxes, personalised to each consumer and
exactly equal to the amount of subsidy received by the consumer
Figure (3.4.1.7)
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3.4.1.8 Interaction between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk
3.4.1.9 Case One: Skewness
Panel One of Figure (3.4.1.9) shows that the marginal effect of introducing the tax on social
welfare is negative over a wider range of initial wealth inequality levels, when correlation between
idiosyncratic and aggregate risk Corr(zj; en) is such that the probability of a bad idiosyncratic
shock rises when there is a bad realisation of the aggregate shock, as set out in (3.55). This is
consistent with there being a smaller positive idiosyncratic risk effect (in absolute value) when
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Corr(zj; en) increases, as is shown in Panel Two of Figure (3.4.1.9). Panel Three of Figure
(3.4.1.9) shows the Ramsey optimal rate of taxation in this case. For all levels of initial wealth
inequality shown, there should be a lower tax rate (or larger subsidy) on the rate of return to
capital, compared with the case when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are independent.
Figure (3.4.1.9)
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3.4.1.10 Case Two - Variance
Panel One of Figure (3.4.1.10) shows the case where the realisation of the aggregate shock
affects the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic shock. (i.e. when a bad aggregate shock
makes the variance of the idiosyncratic shock relatively large; vice versa for a good aggregate
shock). It shows that the marginal effect of introducing the tax on social welfare is positive over a
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wider range of initial wealth inequality levels, compared with where aggregate and idiosyncratic
risk are fully independent. At higher levels of wealth inequality, there is a smaller negative effect.
This is consistent with there being a larger positive idiosyncratic risk effect of introducing the tax,
as is shown in Panel Two of Figure (3.4.1.10). Panel Three of Figure (3.4.1.10) shows the Ramsey
optimal rate of taxation in this case. For all levels of initial wealth inequality shown, there should
be a higher tax rate (or lower level of subsidy, in absolute value) on the rate of return to capital,
compared with the case when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are independent.
Figure (3.4.1.10)
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3.4.1.11 Saving - Ramsey Optimal vs Constrained Efficient
Figure (3.4.1.11) reveals that the level of average saving k per consumer in the Ramsey
Equilibrium is relatively close to the constrained efficient level of saving in the economy without
fiscal policy, solved for in Section Three, although somewhat below it. This suggests that
changing the rate of return to saving in competitive equilibrium (using tax / transfer scheme one)
comes reasonably close to the benchmark of constrained efficiency in a laissez-faire economy. It
is perhaps unsurprising that the level of saving in the Ramsey economy does not coincide exactly
with the constrained efficient level. The Ramsey economy must be a competitive equilibrium,
whereas the constrained efficient benchmark need not satisfy consumer Euler equations.
Figure (3.4.1.11)
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3.4.2 Tax / Transfer Scheme Two: Tax with Redistributive Transfers
This type of tax / transfer scheme combines a tax / subsidy that manipulates the rate of return
on saving with redistributive transfers. Transfers that redistribute income from the asset rich to the
asset poor can improve utilitarian social welfare, since they effectively insure consumers against
low endowments of initial wealth. This may alter the rate of taxation / subsidy to the return on
capital that is desirable. Tax / transfer scheme two again involves a distortionary tax on the return
to saving. However, this tax  k(
i) is non-linear in the sense that it is only levied on consumers
with initial wealth exceeding threshold 
. This type of tax / transfer scheme also involves
redistributive fiscal transfers that are subject to an asset based means test. Only consumers with
initial wealth below threshold 
 receive the transfers. In what follows, I make a simplifying
assumption about the number of consumer types.
Definition 13 The number of consumer types is assumed to be two I = 2, with 
R > 
P .
Consumers of type R (with initial wealth 
R) are referred to as asset rich while consumers of type
P (with initial wealth 
P ) are referred to as asset poor.
This implies that asset rich consumers pay the tax  k on the return to saving and asset poor
consumers receive the redistributive transfers.
In the model with both aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, it is possible to consider transfers
T (zj) that vary positively or inversely with the realisation of the aggregate shock zj . Specifically,
transfers can be pro-cyclical, a-cyclical or counter-cyclical. Transfers that are a-cyclical or
counter-cyclical may provide partial insurance against aggregate shocks, so may affect the level
of precautionary saving by consumers. I study this possibility.
In what follows, I proceed by fixing the level of the transfers for all realisations of the aggregate
shock T (zj) and then endogenising the tax rate, to ensure that the government always runs a
balanced budget.
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3.4.2.1 Asset Rich Consumers
An asset rich consumer with initial wealth 
R takes the tax rate (contingent on the realisation
of the aggregate shock zj)  k(zj) as given, along with factor prices r(zj; k), w(zj; k), to maximise
:
max
aR2[0;
R]
u(cR1 ) + E0[u(c
R
2 )] (3.84)
subject to a no borrowing constraint
aR  0 (3.85)
and subject to the period budget constraint in period one
cR1 + a
R  
R (3.86)
plus the period two budget constraints for every possible combination of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shock realisations
cR2 (z
j; en)  (1   k(zj))r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en
where j 2 fG;Bg and n 2 fL;Hg. Rational consumers take the tax rate  k(zj) in each
aggregate state zj as given. The period budget constraint will always bind under the assumptions
discussed in Section (3.2.5), while the no borrowing constraint will never bind.
The first order condition is given by
u0(
R  aR) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)u0((1   k(zj))r(zj; k)aR +w(zj; k)en)
(3.87)
Full derivations are in Appendix (C.4).
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3.4.2.2 Asset Poor Consumers
The optimisation problem solved by an asset poor consumer with initial wealth 
P becomes:
max
aP2[0;
P ]
u(cP1 ) + E0[u(c
P
2 )] (3.88)
subject to a no borrowing constraint
aP  0 (3.89)
and subject to the period budget constraint in period one
cP1 + a
P  
P (3.90)
plus the period two budget constraints for every possible combination of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shock realisations
cP2 (z
j; en)  r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (zj)
where j 2 fG;Bg and n 2 fL;Hg. Rational consumers take the level of transfers T (zj)
in each aggregate state zj as given. The period budget constraint will always bind under the
assumptions discussed in Section Two, while the no borrowing constraint will never bind.
The first order condition is given by
u0(
P   aP ) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (zj)) (3.91)
Full derivations are in Appendix (C.4). The firms’ problem is the same as described in Section
(3.2.8).
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Definition 14 A Competitive Equilibrium under Tax / Transfer Scheme Two is a plan T (zj)
for the payment of fiscal transfers contingent on the realisation of the aggregate shock zj , for
all j 2 (G;B), a Decision Rule for consumer saving a(
i) (a function of initial wealth 
i that
varies by consumer type) such that (i) the no borrowing constraints (3.85) and (3.89) are satisfied
for all consumers; (ii) all consumer and firm budget constraints (3.86), (3.90) and (3.24) are
satisfied with equality for all possible combinations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and
en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); (iii) the first order condition (3.87) is satisfied for all rich
consumers, while first order condition (3.91) is satisfied for all asset poor consumers; (iv) the first
order conditions (3.26) for all firms are satisfied for all possible combinations of aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); and (v) the tax rate  k(zj)
can vary with the realisation of the aggregate shock zj , for all j 2 (G;B), so that the government
budget is always balanced, i.e.  k(zj)r(zj; k)k = T (zj) for all j 2 (G;B).
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3.4.2.3 Marginal Effect of Tax / Transfer Scheme Two on Efficiency
In competitive equilibrium, utilitarian social welfare is given by
SW (T; k) = (
1
2
)

u(
R   aR) + PjPn Pr(zj \ en)u((1   k(zj))r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en)
+u(
P   aP ) + PjPn Pr(zj \ en)u(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (zj))

(3.92)
Substituting out  k(zj) using  k(zj)r(zj; k)a(
R) = T (zj) allows social welfare to be written
as
SW (T; k) = (
1
2
)
(
u(
R   aR) + PjPn Pr(zj \ en)u((1  n T (zj)r(zj ;k)a(
R)o)r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en)
+u(
P   aP ) + PjPn Pr(zj \ en)u(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (zj))
)
(3.93)
Introducing tax / transfer scheme two in competitive equilibrium will have a direct effect (i.e.
from redistribution) on social welfare at the margin. There will also be the indirect (pecuniary
externality) effect, because introducing the tax / transfer scheme affects the level of average capital
k in the economy at the margin. The marginal effect on utilitarian social welfare of introducing
tax / transfer scheme two in a laissez faire competitive equilibrium is
@SW (T; k)
@T
jcomp:eq:
T=0
=
@SW
@T
+
@SW
@k
@k
@T
(3.94)
Specifically, this is given by
@SW (T; k)
@T
jcomp:eq:
T=0
= (
1
2
)
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
 PjPn Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en)
+
P
j
P
n Pr(z
j \ en)u0(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en)
+
P2
i=1 E

u0(
i; zj; en)
h
k
n
@r(zj ;k)
@k
@k
@T
  E(@r(zj ;k)
@k
@k
@T
)
oi
+
P2
i=1 E

u0(
i; zj; en)
h
l(zj)@w(z
j ;k)
@k
@k
@T
  E(l(zj)@w(zj ;k)
@k
@k
@T
)
i
+
P2
i=1 
P
j Pr(z
j)

E [u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj))] jz @w(zj ;k)@k @k@T

+
P2
i=1 
P
j Pr(z
j)

E [u0(
i; zj; en)] jz (ai   k)@r(zj ;k)@k @k@T

9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
(3.95)
The first two terms in the expression represent the direct effect of tax / transfer scheme two
on efficiency. These effects are non-zero because tax / transfer scheme two redistributes income,
unlike the personalised lump sum transfers considered in Subsection (3.4.1) which rebated exactly
the amount of tax paid by the consumer. Redistributing income from asset rich to asset poor
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consumers will itself improve utilitarian social welfare, since it effectively insures consumers
against having low levels of initial wealth.
3.4.2.4 Redistribution Effect
Proposition 15 The Redistribution Effect of tax / transfer scheme two is positive and is given by
 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en) (3.96)
+
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en)
Proof. Recall the assumption that 
R > 
P . It follows that a(
R) > a(
P ), since Proposition
(1) established that saving a(
i) is an increasing function of wealth, for a consumers’ problem
similar to the ones under tax / transfer scheme two. The two groups of terms in (3.96) differ only
by the level of saving a(
i). The second group of terms in (3.96) (which is positive) will be larger
than the first (which is negative) because of the concavity of period utility. This reflects the greater
"weight" given to the utility of asset poor consumers, by the utilitarian social welfare function.
This gives the result.
If this Redistribution term dominates the others in (3.95), then the efficiency impact of
introducing tax / transfer scheme two will be positive. It is important to identify factors that affect
the magnitude of the Redistribution Effect. Intuitively, the greater is initial wealth inequality,
the more redistributive transfers will be efficiency improving, as measured by a utilitarian social
welfare function. Redistributive transfers can be seen as insurance against being allocated a low
level of initial wealth, if this allocation is treated as random.
3.4.2.5 Pecuniary Externality Effects
The remaining terms in (3.95) represent the indirect effect of introducing tax / transfer scheme
two on efficiency. They arise because the tax / transfer scheme involves a tax  k on the rate of
return to saving for rich consumers, which affects the average level of saving k in the economy at
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the margin. Changing k has a pecuniary externality effect on factor prices that consumers do not
take into account when making individual savings decisions.
Again, in order to study the indirect effect, it is necessary to make an assumption about the
effect of the tax / transfer scheme on average saving k at the margin.
Conjecture 16 The marginal impact on average saving k of introducing tax / transfer scheme
two is negative @k
@T
< 0 (noting that a positive transfer T (zj) implies a positive rate of taxation
 k(zj) under the assumption of a balanced government budget).
The terms comprising the indirect effect are identical to those terms (3.77) arising from the
introduction of tax / transfer scheme one. They include (i) the expected income effect (the sixth
term in (3.95)) of a higher interest rate and lower wage, which raises the expected incomes of
the asset rich with above average saving a(
i) > k, while lowering the expected incomes of the
asset poor; and (ii) the idiosyncratic risk effect (the fifth term in (3.95)) of a higher interest rate
and lower wage, lowering the share of expected total income subject to idiosyncratic risk for all
consumers; and (iii) the aggregate risk insurance effects (the third and fourth terms in (3.95)) that
describe changes in exposure to aggregate risk due to changes in the wage and interest rate, terms
which continue to be exactly zero when the production function is homogeneous of degree one, as
explained in Section (3.3.1). These effects were discussed in detail in Section (3.3.2).
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Proposition 17 The expected income effect because of introducing tax / transfer scheme two is
negative while the idiosyncratic risk effect is positive.
Proof. The negative expected income effect is given by
2X
i=1

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(
i; zj; en)
 jz (ai   k)zj @r(zj; k)
@k
@k
@T

(3.97)
while the positive idiosyncratic risk effect is given by
2X
i=1

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(
i; zj; en)(en   l(zj))
 jz zj @w(zj; k)
@k
@k
@T

(3.98)
The proof is exactly the same as that for Proposition (13), given in the discussion of tax / transfer
scheme one.
The intuition about these effects is the same as for tax / transfer scheme one. The expected
income effect is negative because a higher interest rate and lower wage raises the expected total
income of the asset rich, conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock, while lowering the
expected total income of the asset poor. The expected total income of the average consumer (with
saving k) is unchanged since
 @r(z
j; k)
@k
k =
@w(zj; k)
@k
E [en] jz
as discussed earlier in Subsection (3.3.2). With the mean of the income distribution preserved,
there is an increase in inequality of expected income (conditional on any realisation of the
aggregate shock) that lowers utilitarian social welfare. The idiosyncratic risk effect is positive
because the higher interest rate and lower wage reduce the share of expected income subject to
idiosyncratic risk, for all consumers.
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Proposition 18 The marginal effect on social welfare (3.95) of tax / transfer scheme two will be
positive if the positive redistribution effect (3.96) and idiosyncratic risk effect (3.98) outweigh the
negative expected income effect (3.97).
Proof. Propositions (15) and (17) show the redistribution effect and the idiosyncratic risk effect
to be both positive, while the expected income effect is negative. This gives the result.
This suggests that if transfers redistribute income and wealth to a sufficient extent, then this
can offset the distortionary effect of the tax (i.e. the negative expected income effect of a wider
distribution of expected income, because of a higher interest rate and lower wage). This offsetting
is possible because the utilitarian social welfare function rewards income and wealth equality, so
redistribution is welfare enhancing.
3.4.2.6 The Impact of Aggregate Risk
The introduction of aggregate risk (i.e. the probability of bad aggregate shocks zj = zB) can
change the relative magnitude of the redistribution effect (3.96), compared with the situation
when zj = zG always. Intuitively, a bad aggregate shock zB can reduce both the interest rate
and the wage. This can lower the income ratio of the asset poor to the asset rich when zG falls
to zB, provided the percentage fall in the wage is at least as large as the fall in the interest rate.
Since the asset poor receive the bulk of their income from labour, a larger percentage fall in the
wage (compared with the interest rate) is more costly for the asset poor than for the asset rich.
Redistribution through fiscal transfers is particularly beneficial for welfare in these circumstances.
An informal mathematical argument is as follows. First note that for given average per
consumer saving k, the wage and interest rate should fall when there is a bad realisation of the
aggregate shock zB. This is the case when I solve the model numerically, later in this Subsection.
The ratio of conditional expected marginal utilities between asset poor and asset rich consumers
can rise when zG falls to zB (provided the percentage fall in the wage is at least as large as the fall
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in the interest rate)
E

u0(r(zB; k)a(
P ) + w(zB; k)en)
 jz
E [u0(r(zB; k)a(
R) + w(zB; k)en)] jz >
E

u0(r(zG; k)a(
P ) + w(zG; k)en)
 jz
E [u0(r(zG; k)a(
R) + w(zG; k)en)] jz
noting that a(
R) > a(
P ) and holding the level of average capital k constant. Because of this,
the terms of the redistribution effect (3.96) under a bad aggregate shock zB
 
X
n
Pr(en j zB)u0(r(zB; k)aR + w(zB; k)en)
+
X
n
Pr(en j zB)u0(r(zB; k)aP + w(zB; k)en)
are larger in absolute value compared with those corresponding to the case of zG, again holding k
constant. This gives some illustration of how the possibility of bad aggregate shocks can magnify
the redistribution effect on social welfare (3.96) of introducing tax / transfer scheme two.
This has implications for the marginal effect (3.95) of tax / transfer scheme two on social
welfare. If the redistribution effect of tax / transfer scheme two (3.96) dominates the other effects
in (3.95), then the introduction of aggregate risk (i.e. Pr(zj = zB) 6= 0 compared with the
situation when zj = zG always) can magnify the positive marginal effect of tax / transfer scheme
two on utilitarian social welfare, holding all else equal.
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3.4.2.7 Cyclicality of Redistributive Transfers
In the presence of aggregate risk, it is possible to compare the effect on savings behaviour of
transfers that vary pro-cyclically, a-cyclically and counter-cyclically. Transfers that are a-cyclical
or counter-cyclical provide transfer recipients with some insurance against aggregate shocks. This
may reduce the amount of precautionary savings undertaken by asset poor transfer recipients. One
way to examine this issue is to solve for the optimal level of the redistributive transfers within the
class considered in tax / transfer scheme two, by formulating a Ramsey problem. Specifically, I
solve for the optimal level of the transfers T (zj) for all realisations of the aggregate shock, which
will suggest how the transfers should vary with the aggregate shock. I also compute the Ramsey
optimal level of average per consumer saving k and compare it to the constrained efficient level in
the model without fiscal policy, solved for in Section (3.3).
The Ramsey planner chooses transfers T (zj) and saving rules for asset rich and asset poor
consumers (a(
R) and a(
P )) to maximise utilitarian social welfare
max
T (zj);fa(
i)g2i=1
SW = (
1
2
)
8>>><>>>:
u(
R   aR)+
Eu((1 
n
T (zj)
r(zj ;k)a(
R)
o
)r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en)
+u(
P   aP )
+Eu(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (z
j))
9>>>=>>>; (3.99)
subject to satisfying no borrowing constraints for all consumers
a(
i)  0 (3.100)
and subject to satisfying the first order condition of the consumer’s problem for both asset rich
consumers
u0(
R  aR) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)u0((1   k(zj))r(zj; k)aR +w(zj; k)en)
(3.101)
and asset poor consumers
u0(
P   aP ) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (zj)) (3.102)
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as well as all period one budget constraints
c1(

i) = 
i   a(
i) (3.103)
and period two constrains
c2(

R; zj; en) = (1   k(zj))r(zj; k)a(
R) + w(zj; k)en
for rich consumers and
c2(

P ; zj; en) = r(z
j; k)a(
P ) + w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)
for poor consumers, for all j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H), while allowing factor prices to be set in
competitive markets so that
r(zj; k) = zjf
0
k(k; l(z
j)) (3.104)
w(zj; k) = zjf
0
l (k; l(z
j))
and taking into account the effect of individual consumer saving a(
i) on aggregate quantities
k = (
1
I
)
X
i
a(
i) (3.105)
l(zj) = Pr(eL j zj)eL + Pr(eH j zj)eH
with budget balance implying values for the tax rate
 k(zj)r(zj; k)a(
R) = T (zj) (3.106)
Full derivations of the first order conditions are presented in the Appendix (C.4).
Definition 15 A Ramsey Equilibrium under tax / transfer scheme two is a level for transfers T (zj)
for each realisation of the aggregate shock zj , j 2 (G;B) and decision rules for saving for each
consumer type (i.e. a(
R) and a(
P )) such that utilitarian social welfare (3.99) is maximised sub-
ject to (i) the no borrowing constrains (3.100) being satisfied for all consumers; (ii) all consumer
and firm budget constraints (3.103) and (3.24) being satisfied with equality for all possible combi-
nations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); (iii)
the first order conditions (Euler equations) (3.101) and (3.102) being satisfied for all individual
consumers; (iv) the first order conditions (3.26) for all firms being satisfied for all possible combi-
nations of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks zj and en, where j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (L;H); and
(v) the tax rate  k(zj) for all realisations of the aggregate shock zj , j 2 (G;B), being given by
(3.106).
I solve the Ramsey problem using numerical methods. I also solve for a competitive
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equilibrium under tax / transfer scheme two (as defined earlier) and compute the marginal effect
on social welfare of introducing the tax / transfer scheme. Unlike tax / transfer scheme one,
this tax / transfer scheme changes the rate of return on saving and also redistributes income.
Redistributing income may generate a sufficiently large welfare improvement that it justifies a
positive rate of taxation on saving return, even if this drives consumer saving choices further away
from the constrained efficient choices in a laissez faire economy without fiscal policy.
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3.4.2.8 Numerical Methods - Tax / Transfer Scheme Two
I use the same functional forms and parameter values as described in Section (3.3.4), in
order to obtain numerical solutions. Again, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shock is
approximately sixty per cent of its mean, while the standard deviation of the aggregate shock is
approximately ten per cent of its mean.
3.4.2.9 Marginal Welfare Effect of Tax / Transfer Scheme Two
Panel One of Figure (3.4.2.9) demonstrates that the positive redistribution effect of introducing
tax / transfer scheme two (together with the positive idiosyncratic insurance effect of a lower wage
and higher interest rate) dominate the negative expected income effect (arising when a higher
interest rate and lower wage increase the expected income of the asset rich and reduce that of
the asset poor, but preserve the mean (conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock)).
The redistribution effect increases as the variance of the distribution of initial wealth V ar(
i)
increases (shown on the horizontal axis), as does its dominance over the other effects.
Figure (3.4.2.9)
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3.4.2.10 Impact of Aggregate Risk
Consistent with my theoretical analysis, the redistribution effect is larger in the presence of
aggregate risk, all else equal, compared with a model containing only idiosyncratic risk. Panel
Two of Figure (3.4.2.9) above shows this. As expected, the marginal effect on efficiency of
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introducing tax / transfer scheme two is also greater in the presence of aggregate risk, because the
introduction of aggregate risk magnifies the redistribution effect: see Figure (3.4.2.10).
Figure (3.4.2.10)
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Introducing tax / transfer scheme two can be welfare improving, when the variance of the
distribution of initial wealth V ar(
i) is relatively large. The efficiency benefit produced by the
redistributive transfers outweighs the distortion of a positive tax on the return to saving in these
circumstances, thus justifying a positive rate of capital income taxation. The presence of aggregate
risk magnifies this effect.
3.4.2.11 Optimal Cyclicality of Transfers
Ramsey optimal transfers are found to be always positive when the variance of the distribution
of initial wealth V ar(
i) is relatively large. Under the balanced budget assumption, this implies
a positive rate of tax on savings return, consistent with the reasoning just outlined. Numerical
solutions to the Ramsey problem indicate that the transfers should be mildly pro-cyclical: see
Figure (3.4.2.11). Intuitively, a-cyclical or counter-cyclical transfers may reduce the amount of
precautionary saving by asset poor consumers and this may not be beneficial for social welfare.
Making the transfers pro-cyclical means that they will not act as insurance against bad aggregate
shocks (to the wage and interest rate), so they should not reduce precautionary saving to the same
extent.
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Figure (3.4.2.11)
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3.4.2.12 Saving: Ramsey Optimal vs Constrained Efficient
Figure (3.4.2.12) shows that the Ramsey optimal policy of a positive tax rate (and transfers)
can lead to a level of average saving that is below the constrained efficient level in a laissez faire
economy without fiscal policy. This is particularly the case at relatively high levels of initial
wealth inequality. This is an interesting result. The efficiency benefit of redistributive fiscal
transfers seems to outweigh the distortion of a positive tax on the rate of return to saving. This is
Ramsey optimal, despite the fact that it lowers the level of average saving k in the economy to
below the constrained efficient level in an economy without fiscal policy.
Figure (3.4.2.12)
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3.5 Conclusion
3.5.0.13 Constrained Inefficiency
In this chapter, the constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria in the presence of
incomplete markets for aggregate and idiosyncratic risk has been demonstrated. Constrained
inefficiency arises because of the pecuniary externality of savings decisions on factor prices. This
externality is not taken into account in individual decision making and this becomes problematic
in a model with incomplete insurance markets for risk.
At the margin, an increase in aggregate saving raises the wage and lowers the interest rate,
conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock. This has two competing effects. First,
this increases the share of expected total income derived from labour income and subject to
idiosyncratic shocks, which has an efficiency cost: the idiosyncratic risk effect. Second, the rise in
the wage and the fall in the interest rate increases expected income for those with below average
saving a(
i) < k (i.e. the asset poor), while income of the asset rich is reduced. The expected
income of consumers with average saving k is preserved. This reduces inequality of expected
income (conditional on any realisation of the aggregate shock) and is efficiency improving: the
expected income effect.
When initial wealth inequality is high, the positive expected income effect dominates the
negative idiosyncratic risk effect. A marginal increase in average saving raises utilitarian
social welfare evaluated in competitive equilibrium:- hence there is constrained inefficiency
of competitive equilibrium due to under saving. I solve the social planner’s problem for the
constrained efficient level of average saving and find that it exceeds the competitive equilibrium
level when initial wealth inequality is large. The constrained efficient outcome can be used as
a benchmark to judge fiscal policies aimed at improving welfare in the heterogeneous agent
framework.
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3.5.0.14 Interaction Between Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Risk
I considered two different ways in which aggregate shocks can change the conditional
distribution of the idiosyncratic shock (that is, conditional on a realisation of the aggregate shock).
In both cases, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock is approximately the same
as when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are fully independent.
In the first case, a bad aggregate shock makes a bad idiosyncratic shock more likely, as may
happen in recessions (and vice versa for a good aggregate shock). The aggregate shock affects the
skewness of the idiosyncratic shock’s conditional distribution. In this case, there is constrained
inefficiency due to under saving over a wider range of wealth inequality levels, compared with
when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are independent. The correlation of the direction of
aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks means that the extent of truly idiosyncratic risk is lower. This
lowers the utility cost of scaling up the share of expected income subject to idiosyncratic risk
(which occurs when an increase in k raises the wage and lowers the interest rate). The negative
idiosyncratic risk effect of higher k is lower in absolute value.
In the second case, a bad aggregate shock makes the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic
shock relatively large, while a good aggregate shock makes it relatively small. This may be also a
feature of recessions and booms. In this case, the utility cost of scaling up the share of expected
income subject to idiosyncratic risk is large (which occurs when higher k raises the wage and
lowers the interest rate). This is because of the larger conditional variance of the idiosyncratic
shock under a bad aggregate shock. This situation is given the highest weight by the utilitarian
social welfare function. The result is that lower k improves welfare - i.e. there is constrained
inefficiency due to over saving for a wider range of initial wealth inequality levels, compared with
the case where aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are independent.
The key point is that in both cases, the unconditional distribution of the idiosyncratic shock
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is approximately the same as when aggregate and idiosyncratic risk are fully independent. This
demonstrates the importance of studying constrained efficiency in an environment with both
aggregate and idiosyncratic risk, rather than with only idiosyncratic risk.
3.5.0.15 The Substitution Effect of a Tax on the Return to Saving
Efficiency improvements should be possible if consumers can be induced to save differently.
This follows because constrained inefficiency is caused by the pecuniary externality of saving on
factor prices. Tax / transfer scheme one allows the pure substitution effect of a tax on the return
to capital to be considered. This is because the amount of tax collected from each consumer
is exactly rebated using personalised lump sum transfers, eliminating income or redistribution
effects. At the margin, introducing the tax reduces capital accumulation. This harms efficiency
when there is constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibrium due to under saving, as can be
the case when bad aggregate shocks make bad idiosyncratic shocks more likely. The Ramsey
optimal level of tax is negative in this situation (i.e. a subsidy should be paid to the return on
capital). By contrast, a positive tax rate is welfare improving in the case of constrained inefficiency
due to over saving. An example of when over saving occurs can be when the aggregate shock
affects the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic shock. The Ramsey optimal level of taxation
will be positive in this case.
The Ramsey optimal rate of taxation generates a level of average per consumer saving that
is reasonably close to the constrained efficient level, although not equal to it. It is possible to
generate an outcome close to the constrained efficient benchmark because this form of taxation
changes the return on saving to reflect the pecuniary externalities discussed above, without
redistributing income in any way.
3.5.0.16 Redistributive Transfers
The picture changes when a tax on the return to saving is accompanied by transfers that
redistribute income from the asset rich to the asset poor (as in tax / transfer scheme two).
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Redistributive transfers are efficiency improving as judged by a utilitarian social welfare function,
effectively insuring consumers against low realisations of initial wealth. The positive efficiency
effect of redistribution is magnified by the introduction of aggregate risk (i.e. the possibility of
bad aggregate shocks). This is because bad aggregate shocks lower the interest rate and the wage
(all else equal) and can lower the income ratio of the asset poor to the asset rich (provided the
percentage fall in the wage is at least as large as that in the interest rate). The utility benefit of
redistributive transfers is larger in the presence of this risk.
If the amount of redistribution is sufficiently large, the efficiency benefit of the transfers
outweighs the efficiency cost of the tax on saving. In these circumstances, there can be an
efficiency improvement obtained by taxing the return to saving (at least of asset rich consumers)
in order to fund redistributive transfers. The consequence of the tax distortion is that the Ramsey
optimal level of average per consumer saving is below the constrained efficient level in a laissez
faire economy.
3.5.0.17 Pro-Cyclical Transfers
Within this class of tax / transfer schemes, Ramsey optimal policy suggests that the level of the
transfer payments should not vary counter-cyclically (with the realisation of the aggregate shock).
Counter-cyclical transfers and also a-cyclical transfers provide transfer recipients with partial
insurance against bad realisations of the aggregate shock (which reduce income by lowering
interest rates and wages). Partial insurance against bad aggregate shocks may reduce the incentive
to engage in precautionary saving. Numerical solutions for Ramsey optimal policy suggest that
transfers should be mildly pro-cyclical. This suggests that a-cyclical or counter-cyclical transfer
payments would have an efficiency cost in these circumstances, perhaps because of their effects
on precautionary saving.
168
References
Acikgoz, O.: 2014, Transitional dynamics and long-run optimal taxation under incomplete mar-
kets, MPRA Paper No. 53177, Munich, Germany.
Aiyagari, S. R.: 1995, Optimal capital income taxation with incomplete markets, borrowing con-
straints and constant discounting, Journal of Political Economy 103(6), 1158–1175.
Angeletos, G. M.: 2007, Uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk and aggregate saving, Review of
Economic Dynamics 10, 1–30.
Bakis, O., K. B. and Poschke, M.: 2012, On the optimality of progressive income redistribution,
Society of Economic Dynamics Annual Meetings, Society of Economic Dynamics, Pennsylvania
And New York, USA.
Basu, S. and Fernald, J.: 1997, Returns to scale in us production: Estimates and implications,
Journal of Political Economy 105(2), 249–283.
Baxter, M. and King, R.: 1993, Fiscal policy in general equilibrium, American Economic Review
83(3), 315–334.
Benabou, R.: 2002, Tax and education policy in a heterogeneous agent economy: What levels of
redistribution maximise growth and efficiency?, Econometrica 70(2), 481–517.
Bom, P. and Ligthart, J.: 2013, What have we learned from three decades of research on the
productivity of public capital?, Journal of Economic Surveys .
Chamley, C.: 1986, Optimal taxation of capital income in general equilibrium with infinite lives,
Econometrica 54, 607–622.
Chetty, Raj, G. A. M. D. and Weber, A.: 2011, Are micro and macro labour supply elasticities
consistent? a review of evidence on the intensive and extensive margins, American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 101, 471–475.
Conesa, J. C., K. S. and Krueger, D.: 2009, Taxing capital? not a bad idea after all, American
Economic Review 99(1), 25–48.
Conesa, J. C. and Krueger, D.: 2006, On the optimal progressivity of the income tax code, Journal
of Monetary Economics 53(7), 1425–1450.
Costain, J. and Reiter, M.: 2005, Stabilization versus insurance: Welfare effects of procyclical
taxation under incomplete markets, Working Paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Davila, J. Hong, J. K. P. and Rios-Rull, J.: 2012, Constrained-efficient allocations in the growth
model with idiosyncratic shocks, Econometrica 80(6), 2431–2467.
Den Haan, W.: 1997, Solving dynamics models with aggregate shocks and heterogeneous agents,
169
Macroeconomic Dynamics 1, 355–386.
Dixit, A. and Stiglitz, J.: 1977, Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity, Ameri-
can Economic Review 67(3), 297–308.
Domeij, D. and Heathcote, J.: 2004, On the distributional effects of reducing capital taxes, Inter-
national Economic Review 45(2), 523–554.
Erosa, A. and Gervais, M.: 2002, Optimal taxation in life-cycle economies, Journal of Economic
Theory 105(2), 338–369.
Farhi, E.: 2010, Capital taxation and ownership when markets are incomplete, Journal of Political
Economy 118(5), 908–948.
Farhi, E. and Werning, I.: 2012, Capital taxation: Quantitative explorations of the inverse euler
equation, Journal of Political Economy 120(3), 398–445.
Farhi, E. and Werning, I.: 2013, Insurance and taxation over the life cycle, Review of Economic
Studies 80(2), 596–635.
Fehr, H. and Kindermann, F.: 2012, Optimal taxation with current and future cohorts, CESIFO
WORKING PAPER NO. 3973.
Findeisen, S. and Sachs, D.: 2014, Efficient labour and capital income taxation over the life cycle,
Working Paper.
Garriga, C.: 2003, Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models, Kier Discussion Paper
745.
Golosov, M., K. N. and Tsyvinski, A.: 2003, Optimal indirect and capital taxation, Review of
Economic Studies 70, 569–587.
Golosov, M., T. M. and Tsyvinski, A.: 2013, Redistribution and social insurance, NBER Working
Paper No. 17642.
Gottardi, P., K. A. and Nakajima, T.: 2013, Constrained inefficiency and optimal taxation with
uninsurable risks, Working Paper.
Gottardi, P., K. A. and Tomoyuki, N.: 2011, Optimal taxation and constrained inefficiency in an
infinite horizon model with incomplete markets, Kier Discussion Paper 745.
Guo, J.-T. and Lansing, K.: 1997, Tax structure and welfare in a model of optimal fiscal policy,
Economic Review, Quarter One, Volume 33, Issue 1, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Cleve-
land, Ohio, USA.
Heathcote, J.: 2005, Fiscal policy with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets, Review of
Economic Studies 72, 161–188.
170
Heathcote, J., S. K. and Violante, G.: 2014, Optimal tax progressivity: An analytical framework.
Ireland, P.: 2001, Sticky price models of the business cycle: Specification and stability, Journal of
Monetary Economics 47, 3–18.
John-Green, H. A.: 1971, Consumer Theory, Penguin Modern Economics Texts.
Judd, K. L.: 1986, Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight model, Journal of Public
Economics 28, 59–83.
Juillard, M.: 1996, Dynare: A program for the resolution and simulation of dynamic models with
forward variables through the use of a relaxation algorithm, CEPREMAP Working Paper 9602,
Paris, France.
Keen, B. and Wang, Y.: 2007, What is a realistic value for price adjustment costs in new keynesian
models?, American Economic Review 14(11), 789–793.
Krueger, D. and Kindermann, F.: 2014, The redistributive benefits of progressive labor and capital
income taxation, Working Paper.
Krueger, D. and Ludwig, A.: 2013, Optimal progressive taxation and education subsidies in a
model of endogenous human capital formation, Working Paper.
Krusell, P. and Smith, A.: 1998, Income and wealth heterogeneity in the macroeconomy, Journal
of Political Economy 106(5), 867–896.
Kumhof, M. and Yakadina, I.: 2007, Politically optimal fiscal policy, IMF Working Paper
(WP/07/68), International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. USA.
Kydland, F. and Prescott, E.: 1977, Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal
plans, Journal of Political Economy 85(3), 473–492.
Kydland, F. and Prescott, E.: 1980, Dynamic optimal taxation, rational expectations and optimal
control, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2, 79–91.
Lansing, K.: 1998, Optimal fiscal policy in a business cycle model with public capital, Canadian
Journal of Economics 31(2), 337–364.
Leeper, Eric, W.-T. and Yang, S.-C.: 2010, Government investment and fiscal stimulus, Journal of
Monetary Economics 57, 1000–1012.
Marcet, A. and Marimon, R.: 2011, Recursive contracts, Barcelona GSE Working Paper Number
352, Barcelona GSE, Spain.
Panousi, V.: 2010, Capital taxation with entrepreneurial risk, Finance and Economics Discussion
Series 2010-56, Federal Reserve Board, Washington DC.
171
Peterman, W.: 2012, Reconciling micro and macro estimates of the frisch labour supply elasticity,
Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Divisions of Research, Statistics and Monetary Affairs,
Federal Resere Board, Washington DC, USA.
Prescott, E.: 2003, Why do americans work so much more than europeans?, Research Department
Staff Report 321, Federal Resere Bank of Minneaopolis, Minnesota, USA.
Reiter, M.: 2004, The optimal nonlinear taxation of capital in models with uninsurable income
risk, Working Paper, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Reiter, M.: 2005, Solving models of optimal monetary and fiscal policy by projection methods,
Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper, Barcelona, Spain.
Rotemberg, J.: 1982, Sticky prices in the united states, Journal of Political Economy 90(6), 1187–
1211.
Saez, E.: 2013, Optimal progressive capital income taxes in the infinite horizon model, Journal of
Public Economics 97, 61–74.
Sbordone, A.: 2002, Prices and unit labour costs: A new test of price stickiness, Journal Of
Monetary Economics 49, 265–292.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M.: 2004, Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under sticky prices,
Journal of Economic Theory 114, 198–230.
Schmitt-Grohe, S. and Uribe, M.: 2007, Optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal
rules, Journal of Monetary Economics 54, 1702–1725.
Serkan Arslanalp, Fabian Bornhorst, S. G. and Sze, E.: 2010, Public capital and growth, IMF
Working Paper, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. USA.
Werning, I.: 2007, Optimal fiscal policy with redistribution, Quarterly Journal of Economics
122(3), 925–967.
Werning, I.: 2011, Nonlinear capital taxation, MIT Working Paper, Cambridge, MA, USA.
172
Appendix A for Chapter (1)
In this Appendix, I provide full derivations of the consumers problem, firms’ problem and the
conditions describing the Ramsey Economy.
A.1 Consumers’ Problem
The first order conditions of the representative consumer’s dynamic optimisation problem will
be sufficient to characterise a unique interior maximum. There are two reasons for this. First, the
consumer’s objective function (1.5) is strictly quasi-concave. This is because it is time separable
and period utility u(c) + v(1 h) is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave. Second, the opportunity
set of consumers is convex. The opportunity set is defined by consumer budget inequality
constraint (1.7), the labour endowment inequality constraint (1.8) and non-negativity conditions
(1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) every period. For the opportunity set to be convex, note that arbitrary
upper bounds on public and private capital stocks must be assumed. The inequality constraints
always bind for the reasons explained in section (1.2.2), while the nonnegativity constraints never
bind.
The first order conditions of the consumer’s problem are obtained by using the method of
Lagrange multipliers. The consumer chooses a sequence

ct; h
s
t ; K
s
t ; b
d
t
	1
t=0
to maximise the
Lagrangian
L =
1X
t=0
t
8<:
u(ct) + v(1  hst)
 t

ct + p
b
tb
d
t +K
S
t   (1  K)KSt 1
 (1  ht )wthst   (1  Kt 1)rtKSt 1   bdt 1
 9=; (A.1)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the representative consumer’s period budget
constraint at time t. The first order conditions of the consumer’s problem are obtained when the
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first order partial derivatives of the Lagrangian vanish each period:
@L
@ct
= u0(ct)  t = 0 (A.2)
@L
@hst
=  v0(1  hst) + t(1  ht )wt = 0 (A.3)
@L
@Kst
=  t + t+1

(1  Kt )rt+1 + (1  K)

= 0 (A.4)
@L
@bdt
=  tpbt + t+1 = 0 (A.5)
Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier t gives the consumer optimality conditions (1.13), (1.14)
and (1.15).
A.2 Firms’ Problem
The representative, perfectly competitive firm produces a homogenous good using the
economy’s single production technology (1.1). The firm maximises profit. However, the profit
maximising decisions of firms are not dynamic, because the firm rents private capital services and
labour services from consumers each period. The representative firm can be thought of as solving
a static profit maximisation problem each period
max
Yt;Kdt 1;h
d
t
PtYt   wthdt   rtKdt 1
subject to
Yt  F (Gt 1; Kdt 1; hdt )
where Pt is the price of output and Yt is the quantity of the homogenous good the firm produces
and sells each period. The output price is normalised to one Pt  1. The inequality constraint
(1.17) must always bind, else factor inputs would not be fully utilised. Substituting for Yt, the
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static profit maximisation problem reduces to a classic programming problem
max
Kt 1;ht
F (Gt 1; Kdt 1; h
d
t )  wthdt   rtKdt 1
The first order conditions are sufficient for a unique interior maximum. This is because
the representative firm is maximising a strictly quasi-concave function over a convex set. The
production technology (1.1) is strictly quasi-concave by the assumptions made in section (1.2.1).
The firm’s objective function (1.18) is strictly quasi-concave because it is a linear combination
of the period production technology. To see that the opportunity set is convex, recall that labour
supply is bounded between zero and one, as shown by (1.8). The public capital stock is bounded
below by zero and the private capital stock available for rental by the representative firm is also
bounded below by zero. For convexity of the opportunity set, it is necessary to assume that the
public capital stock and private capital stocks are bounded above by some arbitrary constants. The
conditions characterising the profit maximising quantities of labour hdt and private capital Kdt 1
demanded by the firm each period are given by
@
@hdt
jhdt ;Kdt 1= Fh(Gt 1; Kdt 1; hdt )  wt = 0 (A.6)
@
@Kdt 1
jhdt ;Kdt 1= FK(Gt 1; Kdt 1; hdt )  rt = 0 (A.7)
A.3 Ramsey Problem
The conditions determining when the first order partial derivatives of the Lagrangian (1.37) for
the Ramsey problem vanish each period are as follows:
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@L
@ct
= u0(ct)  Et 1u00(ct) (A.8)
 Kt 1u00(ct)

(1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht) + (1  K)

+Kt u
00(ct)
 
E
t
bt

u00(ct)ct + u0(ct) + u00(ct)
 
Kt   (1  K)Kt 1

+
Et u
00(ct)
bt

(1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)Kt 1 +
bt 1
bt

 At = 0
@L
@ht
=  v0(1  ht) (A.9)
 Kt 1u0(ct)(1  Kt 1)FKh(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)
+
Et
bt
  v00(1  ht) + v0(1  ht)
+(1  Kt 1)FKh(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)Kt 1u0(ct)

+At Fh(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)
= 0
@L
@Kt
=  
E
t u
0(ct)
bt
  At (A.10)
 Kt u0(ct+1)(1  Kt )FKK(Gt; Kt; ht+1)
+
Et+1u
0(ct+1)(1  K)
bt+1
+
Et+1u
0(ct+1)KtFKK(Gt; Kt; ht+1)(1  Kt )
bt+1
+At+1

FK(Gt; Kt; ht+1) + (1  K)

= 0
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@L
@Gt
=  At   Kt u0(ct+1)(1  Kt )FKG(Gt; Kt; ht+1) (A.11)
+
Et+1(1  Kt )u0(ct+1)KtFKG(Gt; Kt; ht+1)
bt+1
+At+1

FG(Gt; Kt; ht+1) + (1  G)

= 0
@L
@Kt
= Kt u
0(ct+1)FK(Gt; Kt; ht+1) (A.12)
 
E
t+1Ktu
0(ct+1)KtFK(Gt; Kt; ht+1)
bt+1
= 0
The additional equations which must hold every period in the Ramsey Economy are as follows.
First, the Implementability Condition (1.34) derived from the consumer budget constraint:
ctu
0(ct)
bt
+ u0(ct+1) +
u0(ct)
bt
(Kt   (1  K)Kt 1)
=
v0(1  ht)
bt
ht +
u0(ct)(1  Kt 1)FK(Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)Kt 1
bt
+
u0(ct)bt 1
bt
Second, the Implementability Condition (1.35) derived from the Euler equation for private
capital:
u0(ct) = u0(ct+1)

(1   kt )FK(Gt; Kt; ht+1) + (1  K)

The Aggregate Resource Constraint (1.24) must hold with equality every period in the Ramsey
Economy:
ct +Kt   (1  K)Kt 1 +Gt   (1  G)Gt 1 = F (Gt 1; Kt 1; ht)
The Ramsey Planner will satisfy the Transversality conditions (1.38), (1.28) and (1.29) in the
Ramsey Economy:
lim
j!1
ju0(ct+j)Gt+j = 0
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lim
j!1
ju0(ct+j)

(1   kt+j 1)rt+j + (1  K)

Kt+j = 0
lim
j!1
j
u0(ct+j)
u0(ct)
bt+j = lim
j!1
 
j 1Y
s=0

pbt+s
!
bt+j = 0
Finally, given initial condition b 1, government borrowing in the Ramsey Economy follows the
exogenous path given by (1.30):
bt   b = 
 
bt 1   b

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A.4 Robustness: Model With Only Public Capital
This Appendix presents numerical results for the model with only public capital, under (i)
a more productive public capital stock; and (ii) a lower Frisch elasticity of labour supply with
respect to the real wage.
A.4.1 A More Productive Public Capital Stock
The following figures present the deterministic transition path in the model with only public
capital, as the Ramsey planner reduces government debt at a relatively slow pace (i.e. debt
takes around ten years to fall from 60 per cent of GDP to 45 per cent of GDP). The parameter 
determining the speed of government debt reduction is set to 0.95. All parameters are the same as
in the benchmark case set out in Subsection (1.3.2), except for the elasticity  of output to public
capital, which is set to 0.1, rather than 0.05.
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Figure A.4.1
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Figure A.4.1
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A.4.2 Lower Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply
The following figures present the deterministic transition path in the model with only public
capital, as the Ramsey planner reduces government debt at a relatively slow pace (i.e. debt
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takes around ten years to fall from 45 per cent of GDP to 32 per cent of GDP). The parameter 
determining the speed of government debt reduction is set to 0.95. All parameters are the same
as in the benchmark case set out in Subsection (1.3.2), except for the parameter  in the utility
function which is set to two. This generates a Frisch elasticity of labour supply with respect to the
real wage of two in the ultimate steady state reached by the Ramsey economy.
Figure A.4.2
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Figure A.4.2
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A.5 Robustness: Model With Private And Public Capital
This Appendix presents numerical results for the model with both private and public capital,
under (i) a more productive public capital stock; and (ii) a lower Frisch elasticity of labour supply
with respect to the real wage.
A.5.1 A More Productive Public Capital Stock
The following figures present the deterministic transition path in the model with both private
and public capital, as the Ramsey planner reduces government debt at a relatively slow pace (i.e.
debt takes around ten years to fall from 50 per cent of GDP to 38 per cent of GDP). The parameter
 determining the speed of government debt reduction is set to 0.95. All parameters are the same
as in the benchmark case set out in Subsection (1.3.2), except for the elasticity  of output to
public capital, which is set to 0.1, rather than 0.05.
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Figure A.5.1
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Figure A.5.1
Post Tax Rental Rate Public Capital Stock
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Figure A.5.1
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A.5.2 Lower Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply
The following figures present the deterministic transition path in the model with both private
and public capital, as the Ramsey planner reduces government debt at a relatively slow pace (i.e.
debt takes around ten years to fall from 43 per cent of GDP to 32 per cent of GDP). The parameter
 determining the speed of government debt reduction is set to 0.95. All parameters are the same
as in the benchmark case set out in Subsection (1.3.2), except for the parameter  in the utility
function which is set to two. This generates a Frisch elasticity of labour supply with respect to the
real wage of two in the ultimate steady state reached by the Ramsey economy.
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Figure A.5.2
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Figure A.5.2
Post Tax Rental Rate Public Capital Stock
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Figure A.5.2
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Appendix B for Chapter (2)
B.1 Intratemporal Expenditure Minimisation By Consumers And The Government
Consumers and the government solve a static expenditure minimisation problem to determine
how much of each intermediate good should be used to construct a unit of an aggregate
consumption or public investment good. I solve the problem here using notation for the
consumers’ problem. The problem for the government is identical, although the notation should
differ accordingly. The expenditure minimisation problem is
min
ci
Z 1
0
picidi (B.1)
subject to the constraint Z 1
0
c
 1

i di
 
 1
= 1 (B.2)
Expenditure is minimised subject to the constraint of forming one unit of the aggregate good.
This is a classic programming problem that can be solved by the method of Lagrange multipliers.
The Lagrangian is
L =
Z 1
0
picidi  
"Z 1
0
c
 1

i di
 
 1
  1
#
(B.3)
The first order condition with respect to each variety i of intermediate good is
@L
@ci
= pi    
   1
Z 1
0
c
 1

i di
 1
 1    1

c
  1

i = 0 (B.4)
which simplifies to
pi = 
Z 1
0
c
 1

i di
 1
 1
c
  1

i
I make use of the fact that the amount of consumption aggregate consumed in a given period is
given by
c =
Z 1
0
c
 1

i di
 
 1
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so that the first order condition can be further simplified to
pi = c
1
 c
  1

i
Rearranging for ci - the amount of intermediate good i used - produces
ci =
pi

 
c (B.5)
In order to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier , I raise each side of (B.5) to the power  1

and
then integrate both sides of the equation over the continuum of intermediate goods i 2 (0; 1)Z 1
0
c
 1

i di =
Z 1
0
pi

1 
c
 1
 di
It is possible to isolate the Lagrange multiplier , which equals
 =
Z 1
0
(pi)
1  di
 1
1 
(B.6)
The best way of interpreting the meaning of this Lagrange multiplier  is to use (B.5) and (B.6)
to write an expression for total minimised expenditure on one unit of the aggregate good c in a
given period Z 1
0
picidi =
Z 1
0
pi
pi

 
cdi
and simplify Z 1
0
picidi =
c
 
Z 1
0
p1 i di =
c
 
1 
to reveal that Z 1
0
picidi = c
so that the Lagrange multiplier  must be the price of one unit of the consumption aggregate c
in any period - Pt - which is the price level in the economy
 = Pt =
Z 1
0
(pi)
1  di
 1
1 
(B.7)
It is now possible to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier  from (B.5) to reveal an expression for
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the compensated demand by consumers for the intermediate good i
ci =

pi
Pt
 
c (B.8)
as a function of the intermediate good’s price relative to the price level in the economy.
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B.2 Obtaining A Recursive Formulation For The Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem as defined in section (2.2.6) is not recursive.
Supposing that the Ramsey planner makes decisions sequentially, a recursive problem in a
deterministic setting is one where the decision facing a Ramsey planner is the same each period.
The decision problem is the same each period given whatever the beginning of period value of
state variables happens to be. State variables encapsulate the effects of the initial conditions on
the problem as well as the effects of all decisions made in periods prior to current time t. When
the problem in a deterministic setting is recursive, the sequence of variables chosen sequentially
each period by the Ramsey planner will be the same as the sequence chosen if all decisions (i.e.
the entire infinite sequence) are made in the initial period.
In the Ramsey problem defined in section (2.2.6), the Ramsey planner is constrained at each
time t by conditions which contain forward looking terms (i.e. dated at time t + 1). Specifically,
the Euler equation for government bond holdings (2.40) contains the term u0(ct+1) and t+1, while
the aggregate supply relation (2.42) derived from representative consumer’s first order condition
with respect to price setting contains the terms t+1 and t+1. The presence of these forward
looking terms among the time t constraints on the Ramsey planner implies that decisions made by
the Ramsey planner in future periods limit the choices available to the Ramsey planner at time t.
In other words, decisions taken today constrain the Ramsey planner’s choices in previous periods.
If the Ramsey planner makes decisions sequentially, there is no mechanism in the Ramsey
problem as it is defined in Section (2.2.6) to take account of the effect of time t decisions on the
set of feasible choices available to the Ramsey planner in previous periods. Making decisions
sequentially given the state variables will not be the same as if the Ramsey planner made all
choices in the initial period, taking into account the effect that choices at time t have on the set
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of feasible choices in previous periods. Because of this, decisions made sequentially under the
current formulation of the Ramsey problem may not be optimal. For more information, please see
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Kydland and Prescott (1980).
In order to obtain a recursive formulation of the Ramsey problem, I proceed by defining the
following modified problem at time t. Given values for predetermined variables R 1b 1 and G 1
max
fct+j ;ht+j ;Gt+j ;mct+j ;t+j ;t+j;Rt+jg1j=0
1X
j=0
(t [u(ct) + v(1  ht)])
 1

t
t

+ 2 [tt(t   1)]
subject to the constraints on the Ramsey problem for all periods from t onwards. These include
the Implementability Conditions (2.48)
Gt+j   (1  G)Gt+j 1

+Rt+j 1
bt+j 1
t+j
 mct+jFh(Gt+j 1; ht+j)ht+j + v
0(1  ht+j)ht+j
t+j
= bt+j
plus the competitive equilibrium conditions (2.38), (2.40) and (2.42)
u0(ct+j) = t+j
t+j = 
t+j+1
t+j+1
Rt+j
t+jt+j(t+j   1)
= t+j+1t+j+1(t+j+1   1)
+t+jF (Gt+j 1; ht+j)

mct+j  

   1


and the aggregate resource constraint (2.34)
ct+j +Gt+j   (1  G)Gt+j 1 + 
2
(t+j   1)2 = F (Gt+j 1; ht+j)
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plus the exogenous downward process for government borrowing (2.46)
bt+j   b = (bt+j 1   b)
The difference between this problem and the one defined in section (2.2.6) is that I have added
the forward looking components of the competitive equilibrium conditions (2.40) and (2.42)
from time t   1 to the objective function of the Ramsey planner, weighted by 1 and 2. This
formulation of the problem can be solved every period t: In order to obtain a recursive formulation,
it is necessary that the planner commits to update the weights 1 and 2 when solving the modified
problem in period t with the values of the Lagrange multipliers attached to the time t   1
constraints (2.40) and (2.42), obtained when solving the problem at time t  /1. By committing to
update the weights 1 and 2 in this way each period, the planner commits to take into account the
effect of decisions at time t on the feasible choices available to the Ramsey planner in previous
periods. This sequence of modified optimisation problems defines a recursive formulation for
the Ramsey problem. The state variables each period t are the predetermined values R 1b 1;
G 1 and the value of the Lagrange multipliers attached to the time t  1 competitive equilibrium
conditions (2.40) and (2.42) in the modified problem solved at time t   1. Given the values of
these state variables, the modified problem is the same each period. The key feature allowing for
this recursive formulation is the augmenting of the number of state variables with the Lagrange
multipliers described, as pointed out by Kydland and Prescott (1980), Marcet and Marimon (2011)
and Kumhof and Yakadina (2007). The solution to this sequence of modified problems can be
obtained by solving a single problem using the method of Lagrange multipliers. The Lagrangian
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for this problem was given above by (2.50) and is:
max
fct;ht;Gt;t;t;mct;Rtg1t=0
L =
1X
t=0
t8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
u(ct) + v(1  ht)  Et 1 tt+
Pt 1tt(t   1) + Et tRt
+Ct [u
0(ct)  t]
+Pt
"
tF (Gt 1; ht)
h
mct  

 1

i
 tt(t   1)
#
+Gt

bt  

Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

 Rt 1 bt 1t +mctFh(Gt 1; ht)ht  
v0(1 ht)ht
t

+At

F (Gt 1; ht)  ct
 Gt + (1  G)Gt 1   2(t   1)2

9>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
where Et and Pt are the Lagrange multipliers at time t attached to the competitive equilibrium
conditions (2.40) and (2.42) with forward looking terms. The Lagrange multiplier Gt is attached
to the Implementability Condition (2.48) derived from the government’s real period budget
constraint while At is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the aggregate resource constraint
(2.34) at time t. An additional Lagrange multiplier Ct is attached to the competitive equilibrium
condition (2.38).
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B.3 Solving The Ramsey Problem
In this Appendix, I present the Ramsey problem when the Ramsey planner is required to set
nominal interest rates in order to satisfy the interest rate feedback rule in (2.49). The Lagrangian
for this problem is
max
fct;ht;Gt;t;t;mct;Rt;atg1t=0
L =
1X
t=0
t (B.9)8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
u(ct) + v(1  ht)  Et 1 tt+
Pt 1tt(t   1) + Et tRt
+Ct [u
0(ct)  t]
+Pt
"
tF (Gt 1; ht)
h
mct  

 1

i
 tt(t   1)
#
+Gt

bt  

Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

 Rt 1 bt 1t +mctFh(Gt 1; ht)ht  
v0(1 ht)ht
t

+At

F (Gt 1; ht)  at
  
2
(t   1)2

+Rt
h
ln( Rt
Rt 1
)   ln

t
t 1

  AD ln

at
at 1
i
+ADt

at   ct  Gt + (1  G)Gt 1

9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
where Rt is an additional Lagrange multiplier at time t attached to the interest rate feedback
rule (2.49) and ADt is a Lagrange multiplier at time t attached to the definition of aggregate
demand (2.30).
The conditions determining when the first order partial derivatives of the Lagrangian vanish
each period are as follows:
@L
@ct
= u0(ct) + Ct u
00(ct)  ADt = 0 (B.10)
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@L
@ht
=  v0(1  ht) + Pt tFh(Gt 1; ht)

mct  

   1


(B.11)
+Gt mctFhh(Gt 1; ht)ht
+Gt mctFh(Gt 1; ht)
 
G
t
t
[v0(1  ht)  v00(1  ht)ht]
+At Fh(Gt 1; ht)
= 0
@L
@Gt
=  Gt   ADt (B.12)
+Pt+1t+1FG(Gt; ht+1)

mct+1  

   1


+Gt+1(1  G)
+Gt+1mct+1FhG(Gt; ht+1)ht+1
+At+1FG(Gt; ht+1) + 
AD
t+1(1  G)
= 0
@L
@t
=  
E
t 1
t
+ Pt 1t (t   1) (B.13)
+
Et
Rt
+ Pt

F (Gt 1; ht)

mct  

   1


 Pt t (t   1)
 Ct + Gt
v0(1  ht)ht
2t
= 0
@L
@mct
= Pt tF (Gt 1; ht) + 
G
t Fh (Gt 1; ht)ht = 0 (B.14)
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@L
@t
=
Et 1t
2t
+ Pt 1t (2t   1) (B.15)
 Pt t (2t   1) +
Gt Rt 1bt 1
2t
 At  (t   1)  Rt 

t 1
t

1
t 1

+
R
t+1

t
t+1

t+1
2t

= 0
@L
@Rt
=  Et
t
R2t
+ Rt

Rt 1
Rt

1
Rt 1

  Gt+1
bt
t+1
  Rt+1

Rt
Rt+1

Rt+1
R2t
= 0 (B.16)
@L
@at
=  At + ADt   Rt AD
at 1
at

1
at 1

+ Rt+1AD

at
at+1

at+1
a2t

(B.17)
The additional equations which must hold every period in the Ramsey Economy are as
follows. First, the competitive equilibrium conditions (2.38), (2.40) and (2.42). Second the
Implementability Condition (2.48) derived from the government budget constraint:
Gt   (1  G)Gt 1

+Rt 1
bt 1
t
 mctFh(Gt 1; ht)ht + v
0(1  ht)ht
t
= bt
Next, the aggregate resource constraint (2.34) must hold. Further, real government borrowing
must follow the exogenous downward path in (2.46)
bt   b = 
 
bt 1   b

The interest rate feedback rule (2.49) must be satisfied by the Ramsey planner
ln(
Rt
Rt 1
) =  ln

t
t 1

+ AD ln

at
at 1

where at  ct + Gt   (1   G)Gt 1. Other conditions in the Ramsey economy are the
transversality conditions (2.45) and (2.51), with the initial conditions R 1b 1, G 1 and E 1, P 1
for the Lagrange multipliers attaching to constraints with forward looking terms.
The conditions describing the Ramsey Economy when monetary policy is set optimally
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(unconstrained by the interest rate rule (2.49)) are essentially the same as those presented in this
Appendix, but with Lagrange multipliers Rt and ADt set to zero in every period. Further, the
interest rate rule itself (2.49) and the definition of aggregate demand (2.30) are omitted from the
conditions characterising the Ramsey Economy, when monetary policy is set optimally by the
Ramsey planner.
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B.4 The Numerical Solution Method Used To Find The Deterministic Transition Path
I present the deterministic transition path of the Ramsey Economy from a state with a relatively
high level of government debt to a steady state with relatively low level of government debt.
Government debt as a percentage of GDP will be ultimately lower in the new steady state. I do
this both in the Ramsey Economy where monetary policy is set optimally and again in the Ramsey
Economy where the Ramsey planner is constrained to choose nominal interest rates in accordance
with the feedback rule (2.49). Each time, I carry out the following steps to do this:
(1) I derive again the equations characterising the Ramsey Economy described in section (2.2.7),
this time using the specific functional forms chosen in section (2.3.1).
(2) The values of the model’s parameters are set to those described in section (2.3.2).
(3) I set initial conditions for the public capital stock G0 and for the initial level of real
government debt bhigh such that the level of government debt to GDP is at the desired value
in the early periods of the transition. The initial conditions for the lagrange multipliers E0
and P0 on the constraints (2.40) and (2.42) with forward looking components are set to zero.
According to Marcet and Marimon (2011), Kumhof and Yakadina (2007) and Reiter (2005),
the choices of the Ramsey planner in the first period of the transition cannot constrain the
planner’s choices in previous periods, implying that these constraints are not binding and thus
the multipliers should be set to zero.
(4) The level of government borrowing must fall in the first period of the transition path according
to the equation (2.46) describing the exogenous downward path for government borrowing.
Thereafter, real government borrowing bt asymptotes towards its new target level blow over the
transition path.
(5) There are thirteen equations characterising the Ramsey Economy for each of the T periods
of the transition path when monetary policy is set optimally, forming a large system of
simultaneous non-linear equations. In the Ramsey Economy with the interest rate feedback
rule, there are sixteen equations each period. In the final period T , I set the values of the
endogenous variables to their values in a steady state where the level of government borrowing
is blow 
c; h; ; G; ; ;mc;R; E; P ; G; A; C
	
In this steady state, the level of government borrowing (as a percentage of GDP) is at a lower
value than it was initially. The terminal condition for the level of real government borrowing
is blow. The chosen length of the transition period T must be sufficiently long such that the
economy will be close to this new steady state by the time period T is reached.
(6) I set the duration of the transition to T = 200 and then solve this large system of equations for
the sequence 
ct; ht; Gt; t;mct; t; Rt; 
E
t ; 
P
t ; 
G
t ; 
A
t ; 
C
t
	T 1
t=1
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in the case of optimal monetary policy. The solution can be obtained by using a solver of
systems of simultaneous non-linear equations, such as that described in Reiter (2005) or
Juillard (1996)9.
(7) Different lengths T for the transition path can be experimented with, to ensure that the choice
of T does not overly influence the results. In other words, the level of real government
borrowing should have time to fall from bhigh to blow according to the exogenous path given
by equation (2.46) by the time T is reached, so that endogenous variables have had time to
adjust. By the time T is reached, endogenous variables should be close to their values in the
new steady state.
9 The non-linear equation solver used to obtain the results presented in this chapter is that called by the "SIMUL"
command in DYNARE Version 4.3. I have also solved the model using an alternative non-linear equation solver
designed for systems with a very large number of equations. This alternative solver was developed by Michael Reiter
and I am most grateful to him for providing me with the necessary computer code.
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B.5 Robustness: More Productive Public Capital
The following figures present the deterministic transition path, as the Ramsey planner reduces
government debt subject to an interest rate feedback rule. All parameters are the same as in the
benchmark case set out in Subsection (2.3.2), except for the elasticity  of output to public capital,
which is set to 0.1, rather than 0.05.
Figure B.5
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Figure B.5
Gross Inflation Rate Consumption
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B.6 Robustness: Lower Frisch Elasticity of Labour Supply
The following figures present the deterministic transition path, as the Ramsey planner reduces
government debt subject to an interest rate feedback rule. All parameters are the same as in the
benchmark case set out in Subsection (2.3.2), except for the parameter  in the utility function and
the price adjustment cost parameter . Figure (B.6) (Parts One and Two) present the case when
the Frisch elasticity of labour supply is three in the steady state of a competitive equilibrium,
generated by setting  to 2.5 and  to 21.875.
Figure B.6 - Part One
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Figure B.6 - Part Two
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Figure (B.6) (Parts Three and Four) present the case when the Frisch elasticity of labour supply
is two in the steady state of a competitive equilibrium, generated by setting  to 2 and  to 26.25.
Figure B.6 - Part Three
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Figure B.6 - Part Four
Govt Borrowing (% GDP) Gross Real Interest Rate
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Appendix C for Chapter (3)
C.1 Decomposition
The marginal effect of higher average saving k on indirect expected utility of a consumer with
initial wealth 
i can be decomposed as (3.35):
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

k

@r(zj; k)
@k
  E(@r(z
j; k)
@k
)

+
E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k
  E(l(zj)@w(z
j; k)
@k
)

+

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)(en   l(zj))
 jz @w(zj; k)
@k

+

X
j
Pr(zj)

E

u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
 jz (ai   k)@r(zj; k)
@k

PROOF
First, some Algebra.
Proposition 19 It is the case that
0 =
@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj) (C.1)
for all j2 (G;B).
Proof. The production function y = zjf(k; l(zj)) is assumed homogenous of degree one (h.d.1)
in private inputs, as discussed in Section (3.2). By Euler’s Theorem, it must be the case that
y(zj; k) =
@zjf(k; l(zj))
@k
k +
@zjf(k; l(zj))
@l
l(zj) (C.2)
It follows that in competitive equilibrium
y(zj; k) = r(zj; k)k + w(zj; k)l(zj) (C.3)
for all j 2 (G;B), where y(zj) denotes the output of an individual firm and the interest rate and
the wage are defined as in equations (3.27). Taking the derivative of individual firm output with
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respect to average per consumer saving k
@y(zj; k)
@k
=
@r(zj; k)
@k
k + r(zj; k) +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj) (C.4)
it follows that
0 =
@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj) (C.5)
for all j 2 (G;B), because (3.27) shows that
@y(zj; k)
@k
= r(zj; k)
This gives the result.
An important consequence is the following proposition.
Proposition 20 It is the case that
E

zj
@r(zj; k)
@k
k + zj
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj)

= 0 (C.6)
Proof. The unconditional expectationX
j
Pr(zj \ en)

@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj)

(C.7)
must equal zero because (C.5) shows that
0 =
@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj)
for all j 2 (G;B).
Corollary 21 The term @r(z
j ;k)
@k
k + @w(z
j ;k)
@k
l(zj) multiplied by
 Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en) is zero for all j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (H;L). The
term E
h
zj @r(z
j ;k)
@k
k + zj @w(z
j ;k)
@k
l(zj)
i
multiplied by  Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
is zero for all j 2 (G;B) and n 2 (H;L).
Take the marginal effect on social welfare (3.34) of higher k in competitive equilibrium
@U(
i)
@k
jComp:Eq:= 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj\en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i)+w(zj; k)en)

@r(zj; k)
@k
a(
i) +
@w(zj; k)
@k
en

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add and subtract

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj)

and subtract

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

E

@r(zj; k)
@k
k +
@w(zj; k)
@k
l(zj)

so that the marginal effect of higher average capital per consumer k on utilitarian social welfare
becomes

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

k

@r(zj; k)
@k
  E(@r(z
j; k)
@k
)


X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

l(zj)
@w(zj; k)
@k
  E(l(zj)@w(z
j; k)
@k
)


X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

(en   l(zj))@w(z
j; k)
@k


X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

(ai   k)@r(z
j; k)
@k

which gives the result.
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C.2 Constrained Efficiency
The social planner chooses individual saving rules fa(
i)gIi=1(and a corresponding level of
average saving k) to maximise a weighted average of expected utility over I consumer types:
max
fa(
i)gIi=1;k
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)
(
u(
i   a(
i)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
)
(C.8)
subject to
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)

a(
i)

= k (C.9)
The first order conditions of the planner’s problem can be obtained using Lagrange multipliers.
The Lagrangian is:
L =
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)

u(
i   a(
i))
+
P
j
P
n Pr(z
j \ en)u(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

(C.10)
 
(
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)

a(
i)
  k)
where  is the lagrange multiplier attaching to (C.9). The first order condition with respect to the
savings a(
i) of consumer with initial wealth 
i is
@L
@a(
i)
= (
1
I
)
  u0(
i   a(
i))
+
P
j
P
n Pr(z
j \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)

  
I
= 0
(C.11)
while that with respect to k is
@L
@k
= +
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)
(

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)
 
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
i)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
!
u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en
)
= 0
(C.12)
Using (C.12) to substitute out the Lagrange multiplier  from (C.11) gives the following
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condition necessary to characterise the constrained efficient k
u0(
i   a(
i)) (C.13)
= 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)a(
i) + w(zj; k)en)
+
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)
(

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)
 
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
i)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
!
u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en
)
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C.3 Tax / Transfer Scheme One
C.3.1 Consumer’s Problem
The consumers of type i choose a level of saving a(
i) to maximise expected utility:
max
a(
i)
(
u(
i   a(
i)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u

(1   k)r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en + T (

i; zj; en)
)
(C.14)
where c1(
i) and c2(
i; zj; en) have been substituted out using period budget constraints
(3.72) and (3.73). This is an unconstrained optimisation problem in single variable a(
i), with
consumers taking the tax rate  k and factor prices r(zj; k), w(zj; k) as given. The first order
condition is:
@
@a(
i)
=
8<:
 u0(
i   a(
i))
+
P
j
P
n Pr(z
j \ en)(1   k)r(zj; k)u0

(1   k)r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en + T (

i; zj; en)
 9=; = 0
(C.15)
which implies the Euler equation (3.74):
u0(
i   ai) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)(1   k)r(zj; k)u0

(1   k)r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en + T (

i; zj; en)

C.3.2 Ramsey Problem
The first order conditions of the Ramsey problem are obtained using Lagrange multipliers. The
Lagrangian is:
L = (
1
I
)
X
i
8>>>><>>>>:
u(
i   a(
i)) + Eu

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en

 i
24 u0(
i   ai) E(1   k)r(zj; k)u0 r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en)
 35
9>>>>=>>>>; (C.16)
  
(
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)

a(
i)
  k)
where i is the Lagrange multiplier attaching to the Euler equation (3.74) of consumers of type
i 2 f1; 2; :::; Ig and  is the Lagrange multiplier attaching to (3.83) The government budget
balance condition T (
i; zj; en) =  kr(zj; k)a(
i) has been used to substitute for T (
i; zj; en).
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The first order condition with respect to saving a(
i) of consumers of type i is given by:
@L
@a(
i)
= (
1
I
)
X
i
8>>>><>>>>:
 u0(
i   a(
i))
+Er(k; zj)u0(r(k; zj)a(
i) + w(k; zj)en)
+i
24 u00(
i   ai)
+E(1   k)r(zj; k)2u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en
 35
9>>>>=>>>>; (C.17)
  
I
= 0
while the condition with respect to average per consumer saving k is:
@L
@k
= (18)
(
1
I
)
X
i
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(
E
 
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
i)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
!
u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en
)
+i
26664
E(1   k)r(zj; k)
 
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
i)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
!
u
00

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en)

+E(1   k)@r(zj ;k)
@k
u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en)

37775
9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
+ = 0
Finally, the first order condition with respect to the tax rat  k is:
@L
@ k
=  (1
I
)
X
i
(
i
"

X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0

r(zj; k)a(
i)
+w(zj; k)en)
#)
= 0 (C.19)
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C.4 Tax / Transfer Scheme Two
C.4.1 Asset Rich Consumer’s Problem
An asset rich consumer chooses a level of saving a(
R) to maximise expected utility:
max
a(
R)
(
u(
R   a(
R)) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u

(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en)
)
(C.20)
where c1(
R) and c2(
R; zj; en) have been substituted out using period budget constraints
(3.86). This is an unconstrained optimisation problem in single variable a(
R), with consumers
taking the tax rate  k(zj) (for every realisation of the aggregate shock zj) and factor prices
r(zj; k), w(zj; k) as given. The first order condition is:
@
@a(
R)
=
8<:
 u0(
R   a(
R))
+
P
j
P
n Pr(z
j \ en)(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)u0

(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en
 9=; = 0
(C.21)
which implies the Euler equation (3.87):
u0(
R   aR) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)u0

(1   k(zj))r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en

C.4.2 Asset Poor Consumer’s Problem
An asset poor consumer chooses a level of saving a(
P ) to maximise expected utility:
max
a(
P )
(
u(
P   a(
P )) + 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)u

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j))
)
(C.22)
where c1(
P ) and c2(
P ; zj; en) have been substituted out using period budget constraints
(3.90). This is an unconstrained optimisation problem in single variable a(
P ), with consumers
taking the level of transfers T (zj) (for every realisation of the aggregate shock zj) and factor
prices r(zj; k), w(zj; k) as given. The first order condition is:
@
@a(
P )
=
8<:
 u0(
P   a(
P ))
+
P
j
P
n Pr(z
j \ en)r(zj; k)u0

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)
 9=; = 0 (C.23)
which implies the Euler equation (3.91):
u0(
P   aP ) = 
X
j
X
n
Pr(zj \ en)r(zj; k)u0

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)

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C.4.3 Ramsey Problem
The first order conditions of the Ramsey problem are obtained using Lagrange multipliers. The
Lagrangian is:
L = (
1
2
)
8><>:
u(
R   aR)
+Eu((1 
n
T (zj)
r(zj ;k)a(
R)
o
)r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en)
+u(
P   aP ) + Eu(r(zj; k)aP + w(zj; k)en + T (zj))
9>=>; (C.24)
 R
8><>:
u0(
R   aR) 
E
  
1 n
T (zj)
r(zj ;k)a(
R)
o !
r(zj; k)u0

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)
! 9>=>;
 P

u0(
P   aP )  Er(zj; k)u0

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)

  
(
IX
i=1
(
1
I
)

a(
i)
  k)
where R and P are the Lagrange multipliers attaching to the Euler equations (3.87)
and (3.91) of asset rich and asset poor consumers respectively. The symbol  is the
Lagrange multiplier attaching to (3.105). The government budget balance condition
T (
i; zj; en) = 
k(zj)r(zj; k)a(
R) has been used to substitute for  k(zj).
The first order condition with respect to the saving of asset rich consumers a(
R) is given by:
@L
@a(
R)
= (
1
2
)
  u0(
R   aR)
+Er(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en   T (zj))

(C.25)
+R
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
u
00
(
R   aR) + Er(zj; k)2u00

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

+E

T (zj)
a(
R)2

u
0

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

 E

T (zj)
a(
R)

r(zj; k)u
00

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
  
2
= 0
while that for asset poor consumers is:
(
1
2
)
 u0(
P   aP ) + Er(zj; k)u0(r(zj; k)aR + w(zj; k)en + T (zj))	 (C.26)
+P

u
00
(
P   aP ) + Er(zj; k)2u00

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)

  
2
= 0
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The first order condition with respect to average saving k per consumer is given by:
@L
@k
= (
1
2
)
8>>>><>>>>:
E
"
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
R)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
#
u0

r(zj; k)aR
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

+E
"
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
P )
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
#
u
0

r(zj; k)aP
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)

9>>>>=>>>>; (C.27)
+R
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
E @r(z
j ;k)
@k
u
0

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

E
"
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
R)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
#
r(zj; k)u
00

r(zj; k)aR
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

 E
"
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
R)
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
#
T (zj)
a(
R)

u
00

r(zj; k)aR
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

9>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>;
+P
8>>><>>>:
E @r(z
j ;k)
@k
u
0

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)

E
"
@r(zj ;k)
@k
a(
P )
+@w(z
j ;k)
@k
en
#
r(zj; k)u
00

r(zj; k)aP
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j)

9>>>=>>>;
+	 = 0
The final first order conditions of the Ramsey problem are with respect to the level of transfers
T (zj) (that can vary with the realisation of the aggregate shock) and are given by:
@L
@T (zj)
= (
1
2
)
8>><>>:
  Pr(zj)u0

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj))

+ Pr(zj)u0

r(zj; k)a(
P )
+w(zj; k)en + T (z
j))

9>>=>>; (C.28)
+R
8>><>>:
  Pr(zj)( 1
a(
R)
)u
0

r(zj; k)a(
R)
+w(zj; k)en   T (zj)

+
 Pr(zj)( T (z
j)
a(
R)
)u
00
(r(zj; k)a(
R) + w(zj; k)en   T (zj))
  Pr(zj)r(zj; k)u00(r(zj; k)a(
R) + w(zj; k)en   T (zj))
9>>=>>;
+P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